Making decentralization work
for women in Uganda

Making decentralization work
for women in Uganda

Alfred Lakwo

To my late sons: Opio and Odongo Lakwo.
You made me realize the courage I have to face life
and to love humanity the more.
And to Nina, Carabine, and Néiel,
your sacrifices are my inspiration.

Contents

List of tables

List of figures

List of boxes

List of abbreviations

AFARD	Agency for Accelerated Regional Development
CSCBP	Civil Society Capacity Building Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EDF	European Development Fund
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
HURINET	Human Rights Network - Uganda
LC	Local Council(s)
LGDP	Local Government Development Programme
LLG	Lower Local Governments
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UGX	Ugandan shillings
WCE	Women Council Executives

Exchange rate of the Ugandan shilling in 2008: €1 = UGX 2,350

Acknowledgement

Positioning the study

1

The title of this book – Making Decentralization work for Women – presents two sides of the same coin. Foremost, it reveals that decentralization was not working for women and second, it indicates that decentralization can work for women. How the gendered decentralized governance can be engendered is the central argument presented in this book.

This chapter therefore explains the key problems of the study. This is followed by recasting the study scope which is largely based on a case study of AFARD's work on women's political capabilities building. The chapter then ends with explaining the study questions and methodology.

The central issue

This study pivots on the euphoria with which decentralized governance is presented as a neutral arena in which women and men benefit equally. The belief that the localization of politics will bring governance closer to women and men and that government will be responsive and accountable to local needs is always not questioned. Instead, it is claimed that having more women in local governance is an avenue within which the traditional hegemonic power relations and undue gender inequalities are challenged to the benefit of women.

This political approach to promoting gender equality has been the central debate in feminist political theory that has for long continued to prioritize issues of spaces for power (Phillips 1999; Young 2000) as Goetz & Hassim (2003) argue for women's relationship with the state and Kabeer (2005) for gendered

citizenship. What seems to matter most is women's representation in politics, what Goetz (2007: 88) terms as 'simple access to politics' despite its focus on 'women's efficiency' in politics (World Bank 2001; Evertzen 2001; and see Goetz 2007 for criticism).

Often, it is assumed that the greater the closeness of local government to the people the more citizens, women and men alike, are informed about and demand services from government (Tendler 1997; Cox 1997; Manor 1999; Harriss *et al.* 2005). Added to increased women in politics, it is also intractably linked that such representation will enhance claiming of women's rights against socio-political exclusions (Jackson 1999).

While such an argument for women's representation may bring forth local presence and opportunity to advocate for women's preferential needs (Goetz 2007: 91 citing Anne Phillips 1991: 62-63), it is prudent to note that proximity of government to local actors is not synonymous with effective participation of women on the one hand and local government responsiveness and accountability as is assumed on the other hand. Thus, the equation between women's citizenship and responsible government does not automatically balance.

Little has been done to understand the challenges of localization with respect to the perpetuation of cultural hegemony against women constituency. Besides, the 'ambiguity of local governments' (Rai 1996; Randall 1998) and how local governments are 'antithetical to gendered local democracy and women's political and socio-economic rights' (Beall 2005) is always downplayed. This is why critical observers as Molyneux & Razavi (2002) see women's engagement in local politics as simply a 'sweetener for the bitter pill of neo-liberal adjustment and rising inequality', Harriss (2002) opposes such a depoliticization approach and Heller (2000) notes that there are no *a priori* reasons why more localized forms of governance are more democratic and accountable.

This study, therefore, uses decentralized local governance in Uganda as its case study. It focuses on exploring how women's political participation operates within an already gendered political arena and whether it can become rewarding to grassroots women and good governance. The focus on women is because women's political participation unlike that for men is conditionally expected to champion exclusively women's interests. Meanwhile the need for good governance cannot be overemphasized given its vitality in foreign aid.

Contextualizing the issue

The situation in Uganda reflects the dilemma above regarding the benefits of women's political participation both to women and good governance. As a policy, decentralization in Uganda has been made legally gender sensitive. Political quotas are provided for women and a parallel Women Council structure with

Women Council Executives (WCE) running from villages to the national level are in place. While this strategy of 'inserting' women in politics has phenomenally increased the numeric presence of women in political positions, the extent to which such inclusion benefits grassroots women through effective women's participation in public policy processes as well as winning local government responsiveness to services delivery and accountability is debatable.

Kapwepwe (2007: 1, 7-8) already observes that there is growing discontent among the poor masses (mainly women) to the increasing inaccessibility, non-availability, inadequacy, and poor quality of government services. FOWODE's (2007) study of NAADS the main government strategy for transforming subsistence agriculture confirms that agriculture which employs 85% of the people (mainly women) instead receive less than 5% of the national budget allocation. And the 2007 Beneficiary Participation and Accountability assessment report (see summary in Box 1.1) produced by Uganda Bureau of Statistics provides more compelling evidence. It reveals that the multi-donor funded Local Government Development Programme (LGDP II), aimed at improving basic services delivery and engendering economic growth and poverty reduction simply by-passed the citizens (UBOS 2007).

Box 1.1 Community participation in local governance and access to services

In a national study involving 1500 households, 42 key informants from private firms, and 62 communities, it was found that:

- Only 22% of respondents heard of LGDP II of which majority were men (24.4%) as compared to women (19.5%).
- Overall 75% of respondents noted that they were not consulted on what LGDP II should do in their areas.
- Decisions were primarily made by political leaders (92.2%) and not the other community members (7.8%) and mainly starting at parish levels (66.7%) and not at the village levels.
- Access to and utilization of basic services were considered curtailed by lack of drugs (57.1%) in health facilities, inadequate facilities (72.4%) in schools, and limited outreach (73.5%) of agricultural extension services.
- As a result, political conflicts between politicians and technocrats were reported to be high at both district (67%) and lower local government (64%) levels.
- Further, many people were dissatisfied with the services offered by government (water projects, 34%; health projects, 52%; education, 27%; roads, 66%; and agricultural projects, 62%).

Source: UBOS (2007)

The above evidences show that the political inclusion of women has raised mixed debates. On the one hand, such an approach is shown as a promotion of 'symbolic presence' as opposed to 'transformative presence' for women (Gaventa 2002, 2004b; Goetz 1995; DENIVA 2002). The main criticisms herein is that in spite of the more number of women in the political arena women have largely lacked access to basic services they need most from government. Instead, government (both central and local) resource allocations are tainted with increasing levels of 3Cs – Corruption, Capture and Clientelism – as government institutional players, largely men, find themselves acting on their own will (see Box 1.2 and Table 1.1).

Proponents of this view express their disillusionment that this approach is simply a policy show-piece given the inability of grassroots women and women leaders to exploit the "invited and open political space" as an avenue within which women's needs could get onto political agenda setting to receive services delivery (Gaventa 2006; Goetz 2003). Rightly, Goetz (1997: 251) has this to say:

> Women's representatives, even if their numbers expand significantly, cannot be expected automatically to be representatives of women. A feminine presence in politics is not the same as a feminist one. Getting more women into politics is a worthy project from the point of view of democratic justice, but the real challenge is in institutionalizing gender equity in government policy … Unfortunately, the first and the easiest project – increasing the numbers of women in politics – is often mistaken for the second. This is confusion between numerical and strategic representation of women.

Contrary to the arguments above is the practitioner-led camp which notes that even mere 'symbolic presence' is already a step towards the one thousand miles destination to gender equality for women. Captivatingly Kharono (2003: 9-10) echoes that the entry of women into the various political spaces has 'increased their political representation in parliament and local governments with enhanced women's visibility, self-confidence and legitimized position in public arena'. The advocates in this camp argue that it is the 'lack of empowerment' of the women political actors that continues to impede their effective representation and participation of women from which government responsiveness and accountability for engendered poverty reduction could be attained (de Wit 1997; Kurian 1999). Hassim (2004) in this view rightly calls for the need to consolidate the political legitimacy women have won from the national legislative framework. Tripp (2000) notes that women's political engagement requires 'building bridge' for effective entry and stay in local democracy. And Molyneux & Razavi (2002: 4) reiterate that 'the only effective means to challenge inequality and to advance programmes that would promote greater

Box 1.2 Corruption in Uganda central government systems

Julius Kapwepwe in the Daily Monitor of October 6, 2008 listed a host of corruption related scandals that cost Uganda UGX 510 billion annually. In National Social Security Fund (NSSF) alone he pointed out that corruption had costed the fund UGX 11 billion in Temangalo land; UGX 8 billion in Nsimbe housing estate, UGX 3.8 billion in the dysfunctional Integrated Financial Management System; and UGX 120 billion in overpricing of Pensions House. Yet more to come to the fund were the proposed UGX 17 billion in Alcon/Workers House contract court dub and UGX 24 billion in the proposed deal with Uganda Revenue Authority. Further, he spelt out that Uganda lost about UGX 36 billion in the Nytil deal; UGX 6.5 billion in Lira Spinning Mill; UGX 94 billion in hosting CHOGM; UGX 40.5 billion in funds Bank of Uganda unauthorized overdrafts in 2005/06 let alone GAVI funds, Global Fund, and Kanathan/ AGOA saga.[1]

While these financial corruption represents part of the picture of lack of transparency and accountability at central government level, the Office of Auditor General's report for 2007 even present the scope of losses at local government levels as is shown below in Table 1.1.

With such scopes of free rider actions, what kind of services should people expect? No doubt, the Auditor General report of 2006 for Ministry of Health noted that districts deny lower health units from participating in budget planning let alone managing most of the funds centrally besides failing to use ministry set formulae to allocate funds to health centers. As such, drugs are in short supplies, staffs are ill-managed, facilities are put to waste due to non-use, procurements are poorly managed and the general quality of health services remain wanting (Office of the Auditor General 2006).

Table 1.1 Scope of financial mismanagement in local governments, 2007

Areas of budget abuse	Amount (UGX)	%
Arrears of revenue	2,689,409,371	4%
Excess expenditure	8,430,127,922	11%
Un-accounted for administrative expenses	9,919,655,269	13%
Unvouched payments	2,408,627,971	3%
Procurement irregularities	2,070,903,970	3%
Non-remittance of taxes to URA	381,314,680	1%
Purported remittance of taxes to URA	622,481,188	1%
Unspent balance	454,384,874	1%
Diversion of funds	562,110,526	1%
Board of Survey	6,124,034,518	8%
Non-depreciation of assets	39,969,988,853	54%
Total	73,633,039,142	100%

Source: Office of Auditor General, 2007 (Appendix I-XI)

---

[1] Julius Kapwepwe '*Invisible hands visibly grabbing Uganda's riches*' Daily Monitor of October 6, 2008.

social justice and more equitable development' is to link democracy with human rights. Not surprising, Fraser (1989) calls for a critical shift from the preoccupation with conflict over competing interests into a more radical focus on the politics of redistribution and recognition.

Practitioners, therefore, see as Heller, Harilal & Chanhuri (2007) that 'effective deepening of political democracy requires capacity building' of political capabilities among the hitherto excluded groups. As a result, some practitioners have embarked on women/gender advocacy work. In Uganda, this lot includes Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE), Action for Development (ACFODE), Gender Resource Centre (GRC), Uganda Women Network (UWONET), and the Agency for Accelerated Regional Development (AFARD), among others who are pre-occupied with gender budgeting, poverty resource monitoring, and leadership building.

The problematic

The contrary views expressed above where one side doubts the effectiveness of women's political participation and the other expresses optimism that proactive interventions can give meaning to women in governance raises three cardinal challenges that this study takes up to explore. These challenges present a supposition:

- First, that decentralized governance makes it automatic for grassroots women to effectively participate in the legitimate political spaces provided to them by decentralization;
- Second, that having more women in political positions automatically makes women leaders' effective women constituency representatives given that they are provided with mandatory spaces to advocate for women's interests; and
- Third, that undertaking to build the political capabilities of women leaders translates into bridging the gap of representative political failures among women. It is construed that doing so leads to women's empowerment and responsive and accountable local governments.

This study, therefore, unravels these three empirical gaps through an action-oriented projects run for the last 3.8 years by AFARD (the 2007 Best Grantee Award Winner). The projects were funded by HURINET for a period of 1.5 years and the 9th EDF for 2.3 years. AFARD's case is preferred for the following reasons. First, the project focused on promoting a grassroots approach to participatory gender planning and budgeting as a way for furthering social accountability. Second, the project used a constituency and not a community driven approach to poverty resource monitoring thereby dodging the vagueness

of the term community that often is not all inclusive. Third, the project worked with the Women Council structure legally established by the 1993 Act of Parliament specifically to champion women's needs without the encumbrance of any local council; a case already noted by Holzner & de Wit (2003) as critical in diverting women councilors attention away from women's interests. Finally, the choice of AFARD's project was also because it uniquely put the women leaders at the frontline and strengthened their capacity in search for their political voice unlike what many advocacy organizations do when they talk *for* their beneficiaries implying representation within an already encumbered representation; something Lavalle, Houtzager & Castella (2005) term as '*de facto* representation'.

Objectives and questions

The core objective of this study derived from the three challenges above is to pragmatically engender decentralized governance wherein the politics of development management is encumbered with policy slang and neutrality. Table 1.2 below specifies the specific objectives that all revolve around women leaders' effectiveness on the one hand and grassroots women's participation and local government responsiveness and accountability on the other.

To do so the study explores how women as a constituency are included in decentralized governance arena and how local government actors adapts to such political inclusion. It analyses in-depth: (i) the level of participation of women in local policy processes given that a favourable legislative framework allows for that; (ii) the level of political capabilities among women leaders for democratic civic engagement; and (iii) how capability enhancement does impact on the way the various actors – women, women leaders, and local government officials – interact within the shared political spaces.

To meet these objectives, the study posed as its central question:

To what extent and in what ways is women's political capability building in Uganda an effective approach to empower women to claim citizenship and engender decentralized local government responsiveness and accountability?

This question hinges on the fact that the legal framework in Uganda guarantees women's political participation in decentralized local governance. As to whether or not their participation is effective remains a question to be answered. Thus, in answering this question in is also prudent that how local governments respond to gender equality issues underpinned by responsiveness to and accountability for services delivery is explored. In so doing, this central question is further broken down by specific objectives into lead and sub-questions. Table 1.2 below summarizes the study focus.

Data management

This study adopted a case study approach (Berg 1995: 68-85). To elicit information, triangulation of data sources, investigators, and methods were used (Denzin 1978) between 2005 and 2008 in data collection and analysis. Details of each data collection processes are covered under the various chapters (especially 4, 5 & 7). However, worth pointing out is that some methods like routine performance reviews were used more than once within the project span. Meanwhile other methods evolved out of the recursive analysis of the project implementation. Nonetheless, the following methods were used:

a) Individual surveys: Four surveys were conducted to estimate the baseline and change status in the participation of women in local development planning and budgeting processes as well as the civic engagement competencies among women leaders. In these surveys, individual women were asked using both closed and open ended questions about their participation in local development planning processes (survey 1 & 3) and their civic engagement competencies (survey 2 & 4).

b) Key Informant Interviews: This method was used concurrently with the surveys but especially with key district and LLG officials as well as representative of civil society organizations to gather information that would otherwise be difficult to attain from the normal surveys and "normal" channels.

c) Focus Group Discussions: These were mainly held with the women leaders especially in the form of information sharing meetings when critical advocacy issues were identified. During such discussions eminent advocacy processes were also strategized.

d) Documentary reviews: to keep pace with the project needs as well as the academic orientation of the subject under study, a number of literatures were studied in relation to the project and the subject.

e) Review and feedback workshops: These were held 4 times starting with the discussions on the way forward to improve women's participation followed by how to build women leaders' core civic competencies. Likewise, midterm and end-of project reviews were also held in which project performances were assessed by the women leaders and local government officials.[2]

---

[2] To note here is that as an evolving project, a number of feedback meetings were held to share information and strategize future actions. Details on these meetings are provided in chapters 4 & 6.

Data analysis

Given the diversity of the above data collection methods, different data analysis methods were used in order to give meaning to the project/study. While context analysis helped juxtapose the study within its theoretical and geographical situation, quantitative and content analysis were used to measure and show processes of change respectively.

Organization of the book

This book is organized in nine chapters starting with this part that presents the study problem, focus, and conduct noting that while women's political participation is seen to occur within a decentralized arena that is neutral, controversies abound its effectiveness. Chapter 2 dwells on the general theoretical arguments on decentralization. It identifies three pillars: participation, citizenship, and accountability as the basic tenets why decentralization matters. Anchoring these pillars on social accountability as the ideal organizing principles within which decentralization policy can be effective, the chapter further elaborates on how decentralization policy has been implemented in Uganda showing how gender issues gained currency in the policy.

Chapter 3 gives attention to the implementation of decentralization policy. Using a case study of Nebbi district, it shows how despite the increasing central government funding, much of the resources are sunk in administrative costs.

In an attempt to answer questions related to why decentralized government are encumbered with budget mismanagement to the detriment of services delivery amidst the presence of grassroots women and women leaders, Chapters 4 and 5 present case studies of assessment of grassroots women's participation in decentralized development processes and the political capabilities women leaders have for civic engagement. Both chapters demonstrate that generally grassroots women are shelved off decentralized policy arena while women leaders are not aware of their roles and they lack the requisite skills with which to execute their roles.

To toe the line of the advocates who believe in the efficacy of political capabilities, Chapter 6 also presents a case study of a capacity building project run by AFARD. It ties it with the various observations already made with regard to enhancing civic engagement in local politics. Thus, Chapters 7 and 8 presents an assessment of how political capability building works both for grassroots women and women leaders on the one hand and LLG responsiveness and accountability practices on the other hand. It shows that enhancing the capacity of women leaders does not only improve their knowledge and skills about their roles but also improves their functionality in mobilizing more grassroots

Table 1.2   Summary of the study focus

Specific objectives	Lead questions	Sub-questions	Data needed	Methods	Respondents
Explore how women are utilizing the legitimate open and invited political space in decentralized development processes	To what extent and with what effects are grassroots women participating in the decentralized development planning and budgeting in Nebbi district lower local governments?	• How is decentralized development planning and budgeting process structured? • To what extent are grassroots women participating in these processes? • What challenges impede their participation? • What are the implications of such participation to women's development?	Descriptive data on the planning and budget cycle Quantitative data on women's participation Descriptive data on challenges to & effects of participation	Literature review Key Informant Interview Individual survey Focus group discussions	LG staffs/ Women leaders/ Grassroots women
Assess the effectiveness of women leaders' in representing women in decentralized governance	To what extent are women leaders effectively executing their representative roles?	• Are women leaders aware of and performing their roles? • Do women leaders have the requisite skills to and practicing those skills in performing their roles? • What are the roadblocks to women leaders' effective performance?	Quantitative and qualitative data on: • Awareness of roles • Knowledge for roles execution • Implementation of roles • Challenges to roles implementation	Individual survey Focus group discussions	Women leaders
Identify a relevant capability improvement project	In what ways were women leaders' political capabilities for transformative' leadership built?	• What did the project aim to address? • What strategies did it adopt? • What activities were implemented?	Descriptive data on the project: • Justification • Strategies • Activities	Literature review	Project Officers

Ctd>>

Table 1.2   Summary of the study focus (continued)

Specific objectives	Lead questions	Sub-questions	Data needed	Methods	Respondents
Assess the extent to which political capabilities' building empowered women and improved local governance	To what extent did the project empower women and made LLG responsive and accountable?	• To what extent and in what ways did the project change women leaders' knowledge and skills for effective civic engagement? • To what extent and in what ways did the project change women's participation in the budget cycle? • To what extent and in what ways did the project change LLG budget responsiveness? • What tangible benefits have resulted for women from effective participation and LLG responsiveness and accountability? • To what extent and in what ways did the project change LLG transparency and accountability practices? • To what extent are LLGs gender responsive?	• Levels & perceptions of women leaders knowledge and practices • Levels & perceptions of women's participation • LLG budgets management • Perception of LLG transparency and accountability practices • Tangible projects identified • Gender Responsiveness Index	Individual survey Key Informant Interviews Review workshop Documentary review	Women leaders LLG officials Grassroots women
Build a way forward for social accountability in local governance	How can decentralized governance be sustainably engendered?	• What lessons to learned from AFARD projects? • What challenges continue to hinder engendering decentralized co-governance? • What more needs to be done to sustain the current gains achieved?	Stakeholders opinion on: • Performance enabling factors • Impediments to success • Information on what worked well and not	Review workshop	Project staffs Women leaders & LLG officials

women's participation. As a result, LLG has but one choice to become responsive in their plan targeting and budget allocations and disbursement for services delivery contrary to the hitherto favour for administrative sectors. Notable cases of tangible projects as well as an innovative approach to assessing the gender responsiveness of LLG are also presented.

Finally, in chapter 9 lessons learnt and the ways forward are presented. Inherent is that for women's effective participation in local governance to result into their empowerment as well as LLG responsiveness and accountability, political capability building that equips people with civic competencies in order that they begin to think and act as citizens is inevitable. This arena, it is argued, requires a third part in the citizen-state equation – civil society organizations.

2

Decentralized governance

This chapter focuses on presenting the rational for adopting decentralization in developing countries generally and Uganda in particular. It starts with the theory behind decentralization. This is followed by the processes of decentralization adopted in Uganda. The chapter ends by highlighting gender equality uptake in the legal and policy framework in Uganda.

The theoretical perspective of decentralization

Decentralization has been defined variedly as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government ministries and agencies to field units of central government ministries or agencies (deconcentration); subordinate units or levels of government (devolution); semi-autonomous public authorities (delegation); or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations (privatization) (Rondenelli & Nellis 1986: 8). These constitute the basis upon which Litvack and Seddon identify three main types of decentralization: (i) political decentralization that basically aims at a pluralistic politics and representative government whereby citizens or their elected representatives have more power in public decision-making i.e., the formulation and implementation of policies; (ii) administrative and fiscal decentralization that seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government by the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and

management of certain public functions; and (iii) economic or market decentralization where there is shift in responsibility for functions from the public to the private sector (for details also see Rondinelli 1981; Rondinelli *et al.* 1989; World Bank 1997; and Litvack *et al.* 2001).

The 1990s witnessed what Oluwo (2001: 11) terms as a 'forth path of democratic decentralization' that was seen as a new way of promoting local development. This motivation Oluwo (2001: 12-15) insists relate to the realization of failures of both the structural adjustment policy and centralized public sector management. As such, many donor agencies (World Bank and International Monetary Fund primarily) ignited the need for political and policy reforms with the demand for good governance and greater involvement of citizens in policy processes. To the World Bank (2000), decentralization was seen as building state capabilities for effective (responsive and accountable) services delivery; what Hickey & Mohan (2005: 243) refer to as 'smartening the state'.

Therefore, as a policy goal and a policy instrument, decentralization aims at the shifting of responsibilities for development to local authorities i.e. bringing decision-making process closer to the people so that they become agents of their own change. This reform is envisaged to contribute to democratization and improved public administration so that there is effective development. Particularly the socially weak and excluded (as women and other marginalized groups) are expected to participate and gain from this policy reform as the elected leaders and their electorates in a '*local-local dialogue*' co-partake in 'participatory co-governance' (de Wit 1997: 3-5; Kurian 1999: 6-7; Siato 2002: 1).

Seen in this way, it can be argued that the drive for decentralization was based on its four-tier merits, namely:

(i)   For the government, it improves public sector management through improved responsiveness to deliver 'locally preferred' services away from political and elite capture;

(ii)   For the people, decentralization promotes democracy as popular participation requisite in citizenship building is promoted;

(iii)   For both the government and people, it espouses the need for transparency and accountability between central and local governments and between local governments and their constituencies; and

(iv)   For the market, it promotes private-public partnership as the roles of services production and provisioning is delineated.

The realization of these assumptions however requires not only 'building a strong and competent local-central government institution' (Dunleavy 1980: 116) but also 'a systematic return of power to the people who need government services most' (Crosby & Orsini 1996). Leaders and the led should in practice

work as a team in determining and working towards the achievement of a common destiny – poverty reduction (Guijt & Shah 1998).

What stands out from the above discussion is that for decentralization to facilitate local development three things must inevitably be in place – the pillars of effective democratic decentralized governance, namely; first, participation of people in agenda setting within the decentralized jurisdiction; second, citizenship as a shift away from having people who are mere beneficiaries and/or users of government services to people who are citizens with rights and claims over government services; and finally, accountability as a response of local government to the needs of the citizens it serves. Below I present a brief on each of these three vital aspects.

Participation
A lot has been written about participation to the point that others like Gaventa (2004a: 9) note that it has been called on to 'perform a wide range of functions for differing purposes, ideologies and political project' and Cooke and Kothari (2001) term it as a 'new tyrant' in development.[1] I will therefore focus here only on its value-addition to public policy processes deriving from the works of Gaventa (2004) and Hickey & Mohan (2004) with regard to transformative participation as an ingredient to citizen's political participation.

Central to the transformative political participation is the vitality of collaborative agenda pursuance wherein state actors and those they are meant to serve cooperate and collaborate for a shared goal after dialogue on varied interests. A number of reasons have been cited to merit such popular participation in policy-making process, namely, levelling off policy information asymmetry (Mehrotra 2006); increased legitimacy of accountability seekers as rights-holder over government as duty bearer (Goetz & Jenkins 2005); improved plan and budget responsiveness to local priorities (Aber 1998); improved quality of services delivered (Picciotto 1995; Sharpe 1998); increased policy implementation support and share of manager's dilemmas (Cernea 1991); cost-sharing through beneficiaries' contribution and compulsion of leaders for more efficient use of resources (Alesina 1994); inclusiveness of the marginalized and transparency by policy managers (Hydén 1992; Seragaldin 1996); empowerment of beneficiaries (Bratton 1990; Frischtak 1994); and check and balance on the traditional dominance and power wielding by technocratic elites (Brinkerhoff, 1996).

---

[1] While Chambers (1988: 9-12) identifies the basic principles of participation that Gaventa (1998: 13) operationalize as 'handing over the stick', institutional change, and collaboration, Pretty (1994) models a seven component typology of participation that Lane (1995: 183) and Mikkelsen (2005: 61) summarizes in 4-forms of participation.

16

However it is important to note that these gains from popular participation in policy processes entails a shift away from informative and consultative participation to shared and collaborative approach where the leaders work hand in hand with their led (Blackburn & Holland 1998). This is because what gives real meaning to popular participation is the collective effort of the people concerned to pool their efforts and whatever other resources they decide to pool together, in order to attain objectives they set for themselves (Higgins 1996: 447; Rondenelli 1983: 113).

Therefore, while Keely & Scoones (2000) point to the leading role that politics play in shaping policies, Rebecca Sutton (1999) argues that policy process should be owned by the people and it should involve organizations outside the government as well. Lakwo (2003) echoes this view when he notes that policy makers then need to shift away from 'closed door' to 'open door' policy making processes so that they can ably supply the direly needed services according to the demands of their constituencies.

In all, participation is seen as opening space for a common agenda through public dialogue so that all voices are heard. Yet, this means that those responsible for opening space are willing to do so and those to take up such space and echo their voices are able to do likewise. Chapters 3 and 4 will dwell on showing how these are uphill tasks encumbered with both the strategic exclusion of grassroots women by government officials and lack of political capabilities among the elected women leaders. Such gaps as I will explain inhibit women from meaningfully taking up the available political spaces to their own end. Unless addressed as chapter 5 will show, having women council structures and political quota alone for women is inadequate to make decentralized governance responsive and accountable.

Citizenship
For a long time Cornwall (2000) notes, would-be citizens were seen as the poor, beneficiaries, and users of government services ascribed as good for them forgetting that they have rights and identity that link their people-people and people-state relationship. This error in part Booth (2005) attributes to the failure of the aid paradigm that favoured making states effective through state building eschewed to increasing state's capacity to provide and regulate services rather than state-citizen building.

Citizenship building is a process of building agency, identity, dignity, and self-respect as the organizing principles for making people gain awareness of their rights in order to mobilize around local and sub-national issues of importance to them (de Renzio *et al.* 2006). Thus, the sense of citizenship does not start with the state but people's own gains in their entitlements, rights and responsibilities. Hence, citizenship building is about enhanced horizontal (citizen-

community) and vertical (citizen-state) interactions for the benefit of the local people through forums created by the state, NGOs, self-organized movements or even through parallel governance structures (DRC 2006). In this way, Gaventa (2005: xii- xiv) notes, 'the hitherto poor, beneficiaries, and users of donor/ government services become rightful and legitimate claimants of such services'.

Gaventa (2006 citing Luckham *et al.* 2000: 22-23) therefore reiterates that citizenship building in this light of deepening democracy aims at developing and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the democratic process beyond representative democracy (as is in decentralized governance). It transcends the oligarchic and elite capture of democracy because: (i) hollow citizenship violates the enjoyment of equal rights and entitlements; (ii) lack of vertical accountability enables government and political elites to use state power for personal gains; and (iii) weak horizontal accountability breads tyranny among the executives in ways of manipulating checks and balances through patronage, corruption, and stifling dissents.

The importance of citizenship in democratic decentralization relates to the centrality of political space as an arena within which hitherto voiceless political actors express their agency power. While Hickey & Mohan (2004) see such dynamics as the transformation of governance system, Gaventa (2004a) eloquently explains that citizen participation within public spaces changes the essence of participation from a nuance and dictated one into a balance in the citizen-state relations. Fung & Wright (2001: 24-25) links these changes to the emergence of 'equality of power relations between citizens and the state' and Cornwall & Gaventa (2001: 2-4) sums the change as what makes people 'markers and shapers of the processes of governance'. Rightly Phillips (1991) posits that citizenship presents the active condition of struggling to make rights real. Mukhopadhyay (1998) elongates this observation by noting that given the 'othering' and exclusion within decentralized governance, 'democracy needs to be seen as a critical resource rather than a structural guarantee' to gender equality.

To note is that political space can according to Guijt (2005) classification be 'formal by right' or 'formal by invitation' as where legislative provisions provide for inclusion and where leaders chose who should be included respectively. It can also by Gaventa (2004a) and Cornwall (2002b) be 'closed space' as where no non-state actor inclusion occur; 'invited space' as Guijt's formal by invitation; or 'claimed/created space' as where hitherto excluded groups on their own take up part of political arena from power-holders for their own benefits or where power-holders exclusively provide such spaces for such categories.[2]

---

[2] For details on location and durability of political spaces, see Cornwall (2002a, 2002b).

To sum up this debate, citizenship extends democracy away from the focus on *voters* to that of *employers*. It brings to fore the need for recognition, rights and responsibilities, inclusion and entitlements of the ordinary masses in governance. These issues renders representative democracy inadequate because citizen engagement means increased people's participation in, and control over, collective decision-making. Besides, it manifests *democratic governance* where the society, state, and the market interact without the hegemony of rule of minority representatives. In the view of Avritzer (2002), the '*participatory public*' narrows the gap between political space and political representation in the state-society relation. This is what Ackerman (2004) terms as '*co-governance*' given that citizens participate in public choices *with* the state.[3]

Accountability

The bulk of recent literature on accountability at best tie it to the responsiveness of the state to citizens' voice in order to avoid 'voice without influence' that can disillusion especially the marginalized and excluded citizens from influencing policies and institutions (McGee *et al.* 2004). They also transcend accountability debates beyond the often abused supply side of financial probity (mechanisms to spend money well) of government by putting forth the demand side of opening up budget processes both for local views on needs to be included in resource allocations and citizen oversight roles on budget execution. This supply and demand balance Bosworth (2005) notes make accountability dualistic in its objective and a power game between unequal actors. The World Bank succinctly concludes on this argument when it noted that it is important to:

> [...] fully institutionalize participative mechanisms, to involve societal actors from the beginning of the design stage of the process, to open up participation to a wide diversity of social and political actors, and to complement decentralization with centralized supervision (2004: 2).

Failures to do so, the World Bank (2004: 4) argues from its lesson in the Latin America and Caribbean region drawing on the works of Ackerman (1999), Fox (1994), and Stigler (1971) respectively, leads to *3-Cs,* namely: *corruption* (that enriches individual bureaucrats and hampers services delivery thus distorting the market), *clientelism* (where public resources are channelled to a specific group thus limiting political competition and effective resource allocation) and *capture* (where economic rent is provided to specific economic

---

3 Note that this society-state partnership can be opened up by either initiatives from above (supply side) or that from below (demand side). *Participatory planning, budgeting, implementation and M&E* are renowned ways of balancing this supply and demand sides as they allow for a direct citizens engagement with the state both in resource allocations as well as resource utilization and public accountability.

actors thereby jeopardizing the position of consumers, workers and the environment).

Thus, accountability especially of state officials involves *answerability* (obligations to inform about and explain what they are doing), *enforcement* (the capacity to impose sanctions on those who violate their public duties), and *receptiveness/responsiveness* (capacity of officials to take into account citizens' knowledge and opinion). These dimensions of accountability (in the view of Behn 2001 cited p. 8) yield: (i) *financial accountability* concerned with financial accounting; (ii) *accountability for fairness* that focuses on adherence to ethical standards; and (iii) *performance accountability* that looks at the accomplishment of agreed upon public needs (pp. 7-8). While the first two dimensions are concerned with *how the government does what it does* they can be effectively gauged using *legal accountability* measure, the third, however, requires an assessment of public policy (plans and budget) using relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact tests.

Seen in this way, then, government accountability cannot be pursued by purely voting (*vertical accountability*) alone, given that the voters and elected leaders must tango before the next election when every politician/party regime is evaluated. *Horizontal* (state and non-state inter-agency) *accountability* adds to the leader-led accountability as every actor (from state and society – people and their support agencies) has special interest to be pursued.

However, Fung & Wright (2003) note that the effectiveness of such state-society relation is determined by first, the democratic space made available by committed bureaucrats (is the arena available?); second, the inclusiveness of such spaces (who can participate?); and third, the openness with which such space and actors therein can engage and dialogue (how is bargaining, interest aggregation and power shared?). These will be the focus of chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

Social accountability: The organizing principle

I have argued above that decentralization pillars on the effective transformative participation of local actors in policy processes not as mere beneficiaries but as citizens with rights and claims over government officials who instead are expected to reciprocate by being responsive to and accountable for those needs. Social accountability as an umbrella concept best describes this situation where citizens and state actors in the words of Helmsing (2005) 'dance on the same arena and to the same tune'.

According to Laney (2003), social accountability is all about the civic engagement of citizens and civil society organizations with state institutions. The primary aim for doing so is to ensure state accountability to its constituency.

And the central focus is on citizen participation in the processes of public resource management.[4] Within the decentralization context, therefore, social accountability can be seen as a process of ensuring that civic actors fully participate in the allocation, disbursement, and monitoring and evaluation of decentralized resources in view of agreed upon goals.[5]

Malena *et al.* (2004: 1) elongate this debate by arguing that besides the supply-side of accountability expected to be provided by duty-bearers to rights-holders, social accountability also aims at enhancing the demand-side by enabling citizens to engage with government officials (public servants and politicians) in a more informed, direct, and constructive manner. This is because overtime 'governance crisis' (Paul 2002) or 'legitimacy crisis' (Gaventa 2002) has characterized citizen-government relations as citizens are denied presence, voice, and benefits by their very elected leaders.

The principle of social accountability according to Ackerman (2004) is that accountability should ideally be applied before, during, and after the exercise of public authority (see Table 2.1 on the how of public resource management). In this vein, social accountability is executable at two distinct but interlinked stages within the government policy processes:

- Citizen participation during the planning and budget formulation and analysis processes. This guarantee responsiveness to local needs and dialogue on preferred needs from the various interest groups; and
- Citizen participation during government plan and budget implementation. Herein, both actors will ensure adherence to the agreed upon projects without manipulations thereby promoting a process of routine and honest monitoring of and reporting on the performance of approved plan and budget to beneficiaries as well as to the funders.
- Such synergetic relation is why Malena *et al.* (2004: 4-5) echo that social accountability 'improves governance' – through enabling voice of the electorates to matter in the policy board room; increases 'development effectiveness' – by breaking information asymmetry between state agencies and the populace; and leads to 'empowerment' – by reactivating political space for

---

[4] My focus on resource other than expenditure management is because the latter is only concerned one side of the equation (expenses) neglecting that how and why what is spent is generated is vital in poverty reduction. Such an insight of balancing income and expenditure equation now informs participatory poverty resource monitoring albeit is community approach dilemma.

[5] Laney (2003) enumerates a number of tools that are used in social accountability, namely: citizen participation in public policy making, participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring of public services, citizen advisory boards, and lobbying and advocacy campaign.

Table 2.1 Participatory public expenditure management scheme

	Budget formulation	Budget analysis	Budget expenditure	Performance monitoring
Key process	Budget conference	Sectoral committee analysis	Budget disbursement for services delivery	Budget accounting and progress reporting
Actors	State actors, CSOs and the general public	Members of sectoral committees	Technical sector staff and outsource agencies	Elected leaders and technical staffs
Pre-occupation & justification	Needs identification from public voice	Resource allocation in adherence to national policy frameworks & equity concerns	Services delivery in line with agreed upon plans	Assessing value-for money, operational effectiveness

the excluded in governance arena. Therefore, social accountability brings to light a rights-based approach to development where participation of the poor, government responsiveness to the needs identified, as well as upholding transparency of actions undertaken become mandatory (Malena 2004: 7).

A growing fashionable way of promoting social accountability nowadays is through making government spending more pro-poor. Deborah Bräutigam (2004: 653) lists an array of approaches such as 'people's budget, alternative budget, women's budget, and participatory budgeting'. Of these, Participatory Budgeting/Gender Budgeting are the most popular.[6]

---

[6] Matovu & Mumvuma of Municipal Development Programme for Eastern and Southern Africa (2007) defines participatory budgeting as a continuous, open and inclusive process divided into distinct stages, by which citizens and sub-national governments widen mechanisms for promoting direct and indirect citizen participation in identifying local needs, deciding preferences as well as the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the budget taking into account expenditure requirements and the available income resources. In short the process therefore involves debating, analyzing, prioritizing, mobilizing resources, monitoring and evaluating the expenditure of public funds and investments.

The May 2003 'Opinion on Gender Budgeting' by EU Advisory Committee of Equal Opportunities for Women and Men notes that Gender budgeting is an application of gender mainstreaming in the budgetary process. It means a gender-based assessment of budgets, incorporating a gender perspective at all levels of the budgetary process and restructuring revenues and expenditures in order to promote gender equality. The aim herein is to ensure that (i) expenditures are specifically targeted at women; (ii) women and men gain equal opportunity initiatives in the

The focus of these approaches on the budget is because in spite of the budget being a vital socio-political and economic policy instrument of government, traditionally its decision-making was the preserve of government officials (see Table 2.1 and Box 2.1 below). Citizens who contributes (in)directly to public resources were positioned as mere beneficiaries of budget decision. Often, this culminated into weak budget transparency and accountability with increased leakage of public resources (through corruption and ineffective services delivery).

Thus, by ensuring that the budget process is participatory, Matovu & Mumvuma (2008: 8-13) presents an elaborate list of benefits of participatory budgeting to governments, citizens, and the private sector core of which are the credibility, legitimacy, responsiveness, and transparency of services delivery. de Renzio *et al.* (n.d.: 6) reiterates that social accountability increases the quality and quantity of budget information to the public, improves budget literacy to those who initially lacked knowledge of economic issues, and strengthens budget policy processes in terms of public participation. Further, Mehrotra (2006) points out that it challenges clientelism approach dominant in traditional local governance practices. And Robinson (2006: 18-26) notes that it increases budget allocation for social welfare expenditure overtime while concurrently reducing budget misallocations; something that enhances resource availability for development investments at the local levels. It is also noted to enhance answerability of political leaders thereby reducing corruption (Crook & Manor (1998).

From the above alluded to gains it can be argued that social accountability is a vital approach for ensuring that the budget processes involve the poor and marginalized (participatory budgeting), budget allocations are for needed services (allocation efficiency and effectiveness), budget utilization are in line with agreed upon priorities (utilization discipline), and eventually end-users are in-

---

public sector; and (iii) public actors show gender impacts of public budget expenditure.

AFARD fashions participatory and gender budgeting into Participatory Gender Planning and Budgeting. This is done because on the one hand participatory budgeting downplays the centrality of planning that is assumed to occur automatically; presupposes that development targeting caters for gender equality concerns; assumes that participation of the marginalized groups is an integral part of the participating public; and takes it that gender concerns are inherently covered in budgets. On the other hand gender budgeting focuses on budget outcomes without concerns for budget formulation mechanics; approaches plans and budget in an ex ante and ex post manner downplaying the manipulations in budget execution; hinges on elite power and has tools that can not be used by illiterate populace; and suffers from government inability to target their outreach by gender.

formed of what their budget actually did (budget transparency). Herein, the traditional notion that budgets and budget processes are technical and a preserve of policy-makers and their technocrats because the ordinary people do not comprehend budget issues is weaned off as many people access information about the budget. In the process, government legitimacy is improved as more citizens start to engage in public budget management thereby regaining their space and confidence in government. By so doing, government resource allocation manipulations and inequalities are exposed and resolved amicably. Associated with this is the aspect of increased responsiveness and transparency as more people would know what were agreed upon and question any deviation. This is what Goetz & Jenkins (2005: 15) term as the 'new accountability agenda'.

Box 2.1   Importance of the budget in development policy

Elson (1997) writing on gender budgeting points out that (engendering) the budget leads to:

1. *Adherence to laws and regulations* especially that of Convention for Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) thereby furthers women's and human rights.
2. *Policy relevance, transparency, and accountability* because the consumers of government services deserves what they need (policy relevance), and in a more participatory manner (transparency and accountability).
3. *Equitable share of public resources between women and men and impact-oriented programming* given that resources are aligned to result-based specific gender needs rather than resource-driven planning and budgeting.
4. *Empowerment of women* as more women join in to participate in and question public decisions wherein their political entitlements are widened.
5. *Space to advocate and lobby political support to gender equality* as more results of unequal resource allocations and results provide avenue for dialogue on the better ways forward.

Source: Elson (1997)

Recasting this debate back to the focus of this study, it is important to point out that within decentralized governance grassroots women are expected to benefit in mainly in the form of services delivery that can improve their quality of life. Such gains should come through government responsiveness and accountability to their needs. Women leaders are specifically positioned within and parallel to local government structures primarily for this interest. The centripetal avenue resides in public resource management where women's preferential needs should also find a place on poverty resource allocation agenda, be

funded and reported on. As such, decentralized development should not be given as a handout or privilege to women by the powers that be. Rather, women should enter decentralized policy arena, echo out their needs and ensure that the needs are addressed as a matter of justified women's rights and claims.

Decentralization process in Uganda

What is clear from the vast documentations about decentralization in Uganda is that although Uganda had through the 1919 and 1955 Local Government Ordinances and District Administration Ordinances and 1962 Constitution adopted some partial decentralization, the 1966 coup and its 1967 Local Administration Act and Urban Authority Act centralized all functions hitherto devolved to local authorities (Burke 1964; Munyonyo 1999).

This situation continued until 1986 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over power. The NRM was inspired to decentralize governance to local authorities. Mutabwire (2007: 24) closely link this desire to decentralize to three crises the NRM regime experienced, namely:

> An *institutional* crisis that had paralyzed the functioning of central government; a *legitimacy* crisis that had created a large chasm between the populace and governance; and the *inconsistence* between the people-centred administrative system the NRM had set up in liberated areas during the 1981-85 civil war and the highly centralized structures it inherited on taking power.

No doubt, the 1987 Commission of Inquiry chaired by Prof. Mahmood Mamdani, among others, recommended decentralized local governance. The 1987 Resistance Councils Statute was then enacted upon this recommendation and it reversed the centralized governance although it did not offer authority or autonomy in the management of human and financial resources. Following the Presidential Policy Statement of 1992, 13 pilot districts were decentralized in 1993 under the Decentralization Statute enacted that same year with the objectives as summarized in Box 1.1. This statute was crystallized in the 1995 Constitution (section II (iii)) and harmonized in the Local Governments Act (LGA) 1997 (now amended 6 times). These objectives can be summarized as the creation of functioning local bureaucracies under the direction of accountable and democratically elected leaders (Councils) who take responsibility for the development and good governance of the people in the geographical jurisdictions.

The Act provided for a vertical layering of local government structures starting with local council 1(village/LC 1) and 2 (parish/ward/LC 2) as administrative units up to local government units 3 (sub county/town council/LC 3), 4 (county/LC 4), and 5 (City, Municipal, and district/ LC 5). These units are filled

Box 2.2 Objectives of decentralization in Uganda

According to Apollo Nsibambi (1998) the objectives of decentralization in Uganda in line with Statutes No. 15 of 1993 were to:

- transfer real power to the local governments and thus reduce the work load on remote and under-resourced central officials;
- bring under control (political, managerial, and administrative) the delivery of services to local people to improve effectiveness and accountability and to promote a sense of people's ownership of local government programmes and projects;
- free managers in local government from constraints of central authorities to allow them to develop organizational structures that are tailored to local conditions;
- improve financial accountability and responsible use of resources by establishing a clear link between the payment of taxes and the provision of the services they finance; and
- improve the capacity of local governments to plan, finance, and manage the delivery of services to their constituents.

with elective positions and in some cases (unit 2, 3, 4 & 5) with technical staffs.[7]

These legal and administrative frameworks devolved power to higher (LC 5) and lower (LC 3) local governments. Besides, the Act made local governments' body corporate and not central government subordinates (Kuenberg & Porter 1998). Local governments were therefore empowered to be able to sue or be sued; initiate and approve own plans, budgets, and bye-laws except those bye-laws contrary to the Constitution and other laws; hire and fire staff, and to revoke the services of its councilors. These were roles hitherto performed by the Minister of Local Government.

Equally arising from the incremental approach to administrative decentralization to local governments the following were undertaken: first, personnel decentralization was effected. Local governments under their District Service Commissions took over 70% of the national Public Service staffs and had the discretion to hire and retain staffs (although now tendencies of recentralization are evident).

Second, fiscal decentralization was initiated with 38% of the national budget then spent on local governments. Sequentially, central government decentralized recurrent budget starting with the vote system in 1993/94. In the next years, block grants and Poverty Action Funds were (and are being) transferred

---

7   According to the Auditor General's report 2007 there are 80 districts, 13 Municipal councils, 91 Town councils and 897 sub counties and division of urban councils. Mutabwire (2007: 8) shows that there are 900 counties, 5,500 parishes/wards and 45,000 villages.

through the systems of unconditional grants, conditional recurrent grants, conditional development grants, and equalization grants.[8] This was done to ensure: (i) increased responsiveness of political leaders to locally chosen development needs; (ii) which would stimulate community participation and trust in their local governance; and (iii) role segregation with central government setting the national statutory and regulatory frameworks as well as undertaking mentoring, monitoring and regulating roles.

Lastly, financial accountability mechanisms were established. A number of legislations were put in place. For instance, the Inspector General of Government Act 2002, Leadership Code Act 2002, Public Finance and Accountability Act 2003, Public Procurement and Disposal of Asset Act 2003. Accompanying these acts were the setting up of independent offices such as the Inspector General of Government, Public Procurement and Disposal of Asset Authority, District Tender Boards, (Parliamentary/Local Government) Public Accounts Committee, District Auditors, and Annual Performance Assessment.

Uptake of gender concerns

To ensure that decentralization was cognizant of gender equality, the NRM furthered an all-inclusive politics that recognized women's participation. Commentators like Tidemand (1994: 78-79) argues that women's inclusion into NRM popular politics was because first, women's competence during the bush war brought it to power and second, women being less threatening politically provided an avenue for secure electoral victory. With such a view, Tamale (1999: 19) notes that 'the taking of women aboard the NRM political concord was an ex-post reward for past support to the movement and ex-ante enticement for future political base.

Nonetheless, women's inclusion met with a number of legislative and policy measures. First, by Act of Parliament, the 1993 Women Council Statute established a parallel Women Council structure that run from the village to the national levels as the champions of women's affairs.

Second, the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution also known as a 'women's constitution' according to Waliggo (2002: 138) engendered Ugandan society. This Constitution recognizes the full rights of women as subjects and not as objects. It promotes women's involvement in decision-making such as by establishing 1/3 quota position for women in local governance and a district woman representative in parliament. It also provided for equal opportunity in leadership and in the job markets with equal pay and equal access to health and

---

8   Now 80-85% of local governments are central government fund dependent.

education services. It opposed cultural rigidities but provided for affirmative action.

The Constitution was further enriched by the 1997 national Gender Policy and the 1997 LGA promotion of popular participation for both men and women in the country's development processes and outcomes.

Summing up

This chapter revealed that decentralization policy brings governance closer to women and men allowing them to become active agents for their improved quality of life either directly or through their representative. It also revealed that Uganda adopted mixed decentralization policies – democratic, personnel, fiscal, and market decentralization, and is committed to gender equality. However, what matters for gender equality is beyond the legal and policy statements concerned with opening political spaces and providing political representation for women. It requires engendering development so that gender gaps and discriminations that bias against women are dealt with. The next chapters explore if this is happening.

28

Figure 3.1   Map of Uganda showing Nebbi district

3

Decentralization and services delivery in Nebbi district

This chapter underscores the implementation of decentralization policy. Nebbi district, one of the 80 districts in the country, is used as a case study to show how decentralization policy is enmeshed with inability to promote local development. An analysis of the budget management at both the district and lower local government levels are presented to show how women, the majority population, are missing out on the increasing decentralized budgets largely central government funded.

About Nebbi district

Nebbi district, located 400 kms from Kampala (the capital city) in north-western Uganda, is one of the 80 districts in Uganda. The district was one of the 14 districts that were decentralized in the second phase of the decentralization process in the country in 1994/95.

Administratively, Nebbi district has 16 sub-counties, 3 town councils, 89 parishes and 1,329 villages. According to the result of the 2002 Population and Housing Census, the population of the district totals to 435,360 (living in 90,040 households with an average of 6 people per household). Of these: (i) 52% are females and 48% males; (ii) 56% are children below 18 years; (iii) 92% live in rural areas and (iv) 85% and only 9% depends on subsistence farming and waged employment respectively. The active population aged 14-64 years who are unemployed constitute up to 38% of the active population.

In the district, 6 in every 10 people live on less than US $ 1 a day. Literacy status stands at 62% and gross enrolment rate in primary schools is only 78%. Access to safe water and latrines is 65% and 44% respectively. Only a negligible proportion of the population (0.5%) has access to (thermal) electricity and those who own a permanent housing unit are only 3%. There are about 44,000 people per medical doctor and maternal mortality rates (506/100,000) and infant mortality rates (147/1,000) are exceptionally high. HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is 4.4% with some cases especially among the fishing communities showing extra high VCT sero-positivity rate (20-30%). It is, therefore, not surprising that the life expectancy in the district is only 46 years.

The functions of local governments

The Constitution, 1995 (articles 97, 98, 176(2), 190 and the 6th schedule) as enshrined in the Local Governments Act, 1997 (section 7, 31, 36, 37, 38, 75, and the 2nd and 4th schedules) stipulates the functions of local councils in regards to planning (see Box 3.1 for a summary).

Box 3.1 Functions of local governments in Uganda

- Provide vertical and horizontal information and insights to all stakeholders;
- Coordinate the mapping and mobilization of local capacities and resources especially the informal private sector with the expectation that this will promote local economic growth, employment and production of surplus that the local government can in turn tax;
- Provide a domestic framework to promote the participatory formulation, conceptualization and operationalization of local development plans;
- Ensure the fair and equitable targeting of poverty reduction programmes at the local level;
- Facilitate the development of socio-economic and physical infrastructure; and
- Generate greater trust and accountability between state and its citizens by involving local leaders, entrepreneurs and civic organizations in democratic dialogue and in the workings of government.

Source: LGA 1997 (Schedule 2)

These functions are intricately linked to the various services local governments are expected to deliver to their constituencies (for details see LLG 1997, 4th Schedule). Thus, to deliver these services as body corporate, local governments are required to:

- Establish a functional District Planning Unit that is charged with planning facilitation, coordination and negotiation roles at the district level;
- Have functional Technical Planning Committee composed of technical personnel within the local government (from both government and NGOs); and
- Develop a comprehensive and integrated 3-Year Development Plan incorporating the plans of the lower level councils but in recognition of national priorities.

Evidently these functions indicate that generally local governments are expected to catalyze the processes of development, acting as facilitators rather than as controllers of the processes. As such, government officials and the electorates are to co-govern through a process of participatory public policy management.

Such an orientation to co-governance should take care of the traditionally "messy policy processes" (Dresang & Gosling 1989: 146-172; Juma & Clarke 1995) by accommodating the diverse values, needs, and politics that are involved in the process (Nakamura & Smallwood 1980: 46-66; Levine, Peters & Thompson 1990: 81-99).

To do so, under decentralization, districts and lower local governments are mandated to plan for their areas of jurisdiction so that annually they deliver services in conformity with the local development needs. The planning function is to accelerate the pace and spread the benefit of growth with efficient allocative geographic dimension (where to place investments); social dimension (who should benefit from the investments); and institutional dimension (what agency or who should be in charge of it) (Prud'homme 1995) basing on the available resource envelops (Sai 1993: 11-12).

Programmes implemented by Nebbi district

In order to execute the above functions, right from its decentralization in the financial year 1994/95, the various report from the District Planning Unit (DPU) revealed that Nebbi district undertook to implement a number of national priority area programmes together with what are prioritized locally, namely:

The plan for modernization of agriculture (PMA)
PMA is a multi-sector conditional grant meant to modernize agriculture and enhance agricultural productivity. In Nebbi district PMA is implemented under three funding arrangements – PMA in all the 19 LLGs, the private sector-led advisory services (NAADS) and the Northwest Smallholders Development Project for the West Nile sub-region (NSADP). Attention herein is given to the agricultural modernization where from farm households can increase their productivity, income and livelihood security.

Universal primary education (UPE) and school facility grant
As part of the universal education policy, the district receives capitation grant for government aided schools based on their enrolment. It also receives funds for infrastructural development in the neediest schools. This covers the construction of permanent classroom block and VIP latrines, and supply of school desks. Of these funds, the district retains 5% for monitoring functions.

Rural roads and rural water conditional grant
The 530 rural roads in the district started in 1995 with road opening works but have now reached the stage of maintenance and rehabilitation. This is mainly labour based. The district also receives funds for the provision of safe water through establishing new points and rehabilitating old ones. It has already benefited from SNV gravity water scheme (in Paidha town) and from the Directorate of Water development's small town water supply (in Nebbi and Pakwach town councils). An alternative water supply for Alwi dryland corridor is being explored by the Directorate of Water Development.

Peace reconstruction and development plan (PRDP)
PRDP is a major planning framework developed by the GoU under the Office of the Prime Minister for districts in Northern Uganda including Nebbi. The implementation of this framework started with the resettlement of displaced people in Acholi and Lango Sub-region.

Northern Uganda social action fund (NUSAF)
By mid-2008, NUSAF had supported 309 sub projects worth UGX 3.9 billions. The district has a total of uncommitted balance of UGX 4.6 billions. More subprojects have been appraised and submitted to NUMU for funding. The district has restructured NUSAF management and consolidated involvement of LLGs to speed up process of mobilization, desk and field appraisal, accountability, technical supervision and monitoring, training of CPMCs and CFs.The district is committed to absorb the balance of fund in NUMU.

Development assistance to refugee hosting areas (DAR)
DAR is a tripartite programme between the Office of the Prime Minister, the German Development Services (DED) and the District. It focuses on health, education and water project particularly in the communities where refuges from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan are settled.

TPO – West Nile project

This is primarily a peace-building program that is supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants who benefited from Amnesty in the period 2002-2005 as well as the local community who suffered atrocities during the period of conflict.

Rural electrification programme

Through the Ministry of Local Government, community capacity is being built for the increasing rural electrification program. A private company – West Nile Rural Electrification Co. – supports this programme through the provision of thermal electricity in part of Arua and Nebbi district. It is also engaged in small hydro-electric power dam construction besides extension into Parombo via Angal and Nyaravur and to Pakwach Town Council.

Bonna Bagaggawale (BB)

As part of the 2006 Presidential manifesto of Prosperity for all program (BB), the district has joined the nation in promoting village Banks. So far, 17 of the 19 LLGs have established functional village banks (known as Savings and Credit Cooperative Society – SACCO). These banks will act as conduits for the chan-nelling of government microfinance for the active poor.

Budget management

The district implementation of all the above programmes is dependent on funding that it raises locally as well as it receives from donors and central government. Central government provides districts directly with Poverty Action Fund (PAF), Local Government Development Fund (LGDF), and Equalization Grants.

These funds are required to be allocated in an efficient way so that effective and equitable development is attained. That is in part why decentralization in Uganda is tagged to 3Es – Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity. This therefore makes local government plans and budgets critical policy instrument that guide local government management.

Evident from Figure 3.2 below is that generally Nebbi district's budget has been steadily increasing over the years. This increase is also associated with a rising per capita from UGX 9,451 in the financial year 1995/96 to UGX 33,991 in 2007/08. It is also evident from the figure that the rise in real terms in the total budget is associated with drastic decline in local revenue generation es-pecially from the financial year 1999/2000 on wards (for details see Annexes 2 & 3 on Nebbi district and LLGs budget performance). This decline then means that Nebbi district is largely dependent on central government and donor fund-ing.

Figure 3.2   Nebbi district: actual budget performance, 1995-2007

Mutabwire (2007: 8-12) already cautioned that decentralization in Uganda is stifled by inadequate (and often dictated) financing that does not permit local governments to effectively respond to and even sustain their development needs. This is what Helmsing (2005: 15) terms 'unfunded mandates' that drives a high tendency for upward accountability than downward and performance accountability.

Such a rosy picture does not tell us how much people are benefiting from the budget. Thus, a closer analysis of budget allocation and disbursement at the lower local government levels as is presented in Figure 3.3 clearly depicts the inability of local government leaders (elected and appointed) to be responsive to, and accountable for local development needs.[1]

By examining the proportion of all lower local government budgets allocated to the administrative sectors and services sector[2] it became clear that LLGs (and

---

[1] It was difficult to analyse the district budget due to the fact that the annual accounts for the various years do not tally income and expenditures.

[2] While the administrative sector includes Boards, Commissions and Council, Management Support Services, and Finance and Planning, services sector includes education and sports, health and environment, production and marketing, natural resource management, technical service and works, and community based services.

expectedly their overseer the district local governments) are dishonest to their populace. They do not honour their budget commitment to services delivery during cash budget management. For instance, while 56% of the budget was allocated to deliver services it turned out that only 40% was disbursed to the services sector in the financial year 2003/04. As funds are disbursed to them, they shift away from spending on their commitments to the people to meeting administrative cost where they benefit most as one of Sub county Chief confessed:

> When we are making the budget, politicians are happy to show to the people that much money is allocated to meeting the various services needed by the community. However, when funds are posted to our accounts, they prefer their allowances to be paid first. Often, many unplanned for meetings and trips also crop up. All these costs take precedence at the expense of the services that we had promised to deliver to the people in the course of the financial year.

Such practices mean that the majority of the population (who unfortunately are women) do not benefit from the bulk of funds that central government remits to the districts for local development. It can be argued that LLG officials in this case prefer to reward themselves with funds that they should have used to provide services to the people they are employed to serve. It is therefore not

Figure 3.3   LLG budget management practice in 2004/05

surprising that in Nebbi district, a wide gender gap exists between men and women as can be exemplified below:

- The literacy level between men and women stands at 78% and 56% respectively. This is a cumulative effect of the lack of equity approach in promoting education given that even with the advent of universal primary education the general enrolment rate continues to vary between boys (136%) and girls (97%) while more boys (37%) than girls (7%) complete their primary education cycle with even more boys (78%) than girls (22%) attaining division 1-2 in primary leaving examinations.
- More women (506/1,000 births) continue to die during unsupervised delivery especially from traditional birth attendants as access to medical care is limited by inadequacy of drugs and disillusioned staffs whose professional attitudes are contrary to medical ethics. Likewise many children die before seeing their first birth day (147/100,000 birth).
- Many women are confined to subsistence farming (and continue to bear the brunt of food insecurity) without access to improved agricultural extension services as male contact farmers are preferred by political targeting of PMA/ NAADS programmes.

The puzzle

From the above analysis it is evident that, first, women who lack educational knowledge with which to join civil service and therefore can only benefit more from services sector budget are denied this opportunity as much of the funds remitted to the district is spent on administration. Without recognition and voice of the women constituency it can be construed that women are denied public services from LLGs not entirely from the 'sin of omission' that LLGs do not have the funds with which to deliver services. Rather it is largely due to 'sins of commission' (Mehta 2005) because state power-holders prefer to fund what benefit them.

It can therefore be concluded that generally decentralization has not made women's quality of life and the inherent gender equality therein any better. Rather, it is perpetuating gender inequalities as the predominantly male politicians and technical staffs prefer to reward themselves at the expense of the masses they ought to serve. This is what Lakwo (2003) referred to as decentralization has turned into "democratic centralism" and Schuurman (1997: 152) that 'decentralization in itself in no way guarantee that things will improve for the poor'. Local governments are simply non-responsive and non-accountable to their constituencies (Nerfin 1987).

In a dialogue meeting held in 2005 to explore why LLG budgets are insensitive to Services sectors from which majority of people, especially women,

would benefit local government officials pointed out at two critical issues, namely: first, women generally do not participate in policy-making processes where the cake (budget) is shared; and second, that women leaders do not effectively represent and push for the needs of women. While the absence of women in the policy arena should not be a license for them to be denied access to mandatory government services, such a response shows how 'decentralized despotism' (Mamdani 1996) operates within local political arena. It also shows how the elected leaders and technocrats have captured local governance (Van de Welle & Need 1995; Mehrotra 2006) to the detriment of women. Finally, it shows that the presence of women leaders within the local government systems is no automatic guarantee that women will benefit from the assumed proximity of decentralized governance. Unchallenged, no significant change can be expected in the quality of life of women.

While this observation tends to present a justified case for the optimism expressed about the need for building women's political capabilities, it remains unclear from local government assertion to what extent grassroots women are not participating in local policy-making processes as well as how ineffective women leaders are in representing women' interests on the resource allocation agenda. Understanding these gaps provides a basis for identifying what strategy should be adopted in promoting women's political engagement.

Answers to these uncertainties are explored in-depth in the next two chapters that deal with individual survey of the extent to which grassroots women participate in annual planning/budgeting processes and how effective women leaders are in representing women's interest.

Women's participation in policy processes

This chapter deals with the earlier noted dilemma that unequal resource allocation in part emanates from women's non-participation in local decision-making processes. It explores to what extent and how women are participating in the local government policy process using findings from an individual survey. Finally, the chapter presents the implications of the findings to democratic governance and women's development.

Assessing the participation of women

It was echoed by many local government officials that women are losing out on budget support because of non-participation in the local policy processes. How true such an assertion is, more so from men who can be construed to defend their dividends from a lack of women's participation, therefore called for a field-based empirical study. AFARD teamed up with Action Aid International in Uganda (Nebbi Development Initiative) to conduct this study with both parties providing technical and financial support respectively.

Study objective and scope
This study aimed at understanding women's ineffective participation in the local government policy-making processes primarily for a pragmatic policy action. Doing so was seen would enable AFARD to (i) explain why women have ineffective participation in local government planning processes so that (ii) ap-

propriate actions can be taken to explore within the policy arena how women's citizenship entitlements can be enhanced. The opening of such a space is relevant to ensure that as citizens, women demand for services (by participating in decision-making processes) and guarantee that such services are provided timely and in the right quality and quantity (by holding local government leadership accountable).

The study question

To achieve the above objective, this study asked a central question: to what extent and with what effects are grassroots women participating in the decentralized development planning and budgeting in Nebbi district lower local governments?

Herein decentralized development planning is seen as the entire process of local government planning and budgeting cycle which involves planning, budgeting, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.

The central question was broken down into sub-questions as below:
1. How is decentralized development planning and budgeting process structured?
2. To what extent are grassroots women participating in these processes?
3. What challenges impede their participation?
4. What are the implications of such participation to women's development?

Data collection methods

Answers to the above questions were got from an individual survey among randomly sampled grassroots women drawn from one LLG per county. Three LLGs of Panyimur in Jonam county, Akworo in Padyere county, and Paidha Town Council in Okoro county (with eleven parishes/wards - Nyakagei, Ganda, and Boro in Panyimur; Kasatu, Murusi, and Kituna in Akworo; and Central, Omua, Cana and Oturgang in Paidha TC) were covered.

A study team composed of 6 research assistants drawn from civil society organizations, local government, and the District Women Council (DWC) under the team leadership of AFARD participated in the study.

Methodological triangulation was used in data collection. A quantitative individual survey was conducted only among grassroots women. The interviewers randomly sampled these women radiating outwards from the LLG headquarters. The survey used a short, closed, and open-ended questionnaire that captured data in regards to the women's knowledge of and participation in local government planning processes.

Besides, qualitative methods were also used. Focus group discussions (FGDs) involving 30 participants per local government were held. Participants

in these meetings were women from women council I-III, women councillors, female youth council, female person with disabilities and representative of women groups. The FGDs primarily focused on the institutional analysis as to why the women leaders think the grassroots women don't participate in the planning processes. To complement the FGD, video recording and photography were also done.

Key informant interviews were conducted with LLG technical and political leadership especially the Sub-county chiefs/Town clerks, Sub-accountants/Town Treasurers, Assistant Community Development Officers, Secretaries for Finance and Planning and Chairpersons LC III. In total, 12 people were interviewed. These are people who spearhead the planning processes in their local councils. They are not only aware of the practices undertaken but also know why they adopt certain practices even if it does not conform to the prescribed guidelines of Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.

Documentary review complemented these other methods. It involved a literature study on decentralization, participation, women, gender and development. LLG budgets and plans were also reviewed using the approved LLG guidelines to ascertain whether the prescribed processes are always followed.

Finally, a feedback and strategy workshop was held. The workshop aimed at widening the understanding of the insights of how decentralized planning is conducted in practice in Nebbi district, why and how women are involved, and what ought to be done for an effective participation of women in the local government planning processes. Political and technical leaders from both the study LLGs and the district local government participated in this workshop together with representatives of women councils and civil society organizations. During the workshop, the study findings were presented and the way forward was discussed and agreed upon. Thus, the leaders concerned with local development processes were made aware of the effects of their policy practices on women's participation in development policy processes.

The approved planning framework

In order to understand how the planning/budgeting cycle is managed, it was imperative to explore what steps must be followed and involving which actors (see Table 4.1). This we found in the Local Governments Act 1997 (section 36-3) that provides for the district as well as the LLGs to develop comprehensive and integrated development plans that incorporates the plans of lower council administrative units (parishes and villages). This mandate is exercised through the planning and budgeting cycles guidelines provided by Decentralization Secretariat (2006a, 2006b) which, emphasize that first; villages should develop

their plans (often by listing their priorities) for onward submission to the parish/ward and eventually to the LLG. Figure 4.1 presents a summary of the planning cycle flow.

Figure 4.1   Prescribed decentralized planning process

A two way process that should work in conformity characterizes this planning cycle: bottom-up (getting opinions from villages to the higher levels) and top-down (respecting guidelines and options from the centre downwards). Before the plan approval and implementation, a number of interconnected activities have to be implemented. Table 4.2 presents the summary of the various steps that must be adhered to. It is required that the people who should participate in the process are not only knowledgeable of when these activities take place but also the importance attached to these planning interventions.

In essence, therefore, under decentralization, district planning process should begin at the village levels, ascending to the parish levels and to the sub-county levels with a preliminary plan and budget conference. At the LLG, a similar process should be done and an annual plan submitted to the district level for the formulation of a comprehensive district development plan.

Table 4.1   Prescribed local government planning and budgeting schedule

Activities	When to be done	Who are involved	Expected outputs
1. Dissemination of policy and planning guidelines	30th September	District and ministries	• Circulars are sent to LLGs
2. Consultative meeting on: Implications of policy guidelines; plan-ning and budgeting processes; Participation of development part-ners in the process and areas of complementarities between govern-ment and partners; and Indicative planning figures by all actors	1st week of October	LLG executive committee, LG TPC, Development partners (CSO, NGOs)	• Plan and budget process are synchronized • IPFs are declared by all partners including CSOs • Consensus with other actors is built
3. Dissemination of consultative meeting-planning and budgeting programme	2nd week of October	SCC/TC	• Circulars on P&B are sent to LLC • Harmonized approach, process and timeframe
4. Community (village and parish) level consultations	2nd week of October	Village and parish councils	• Community priorities are identified
5. Consolidation and submission of community proposals and plans to LLG	2nd week of November	Parish Chief, parish councils, PDCs	• Community are proposals consolidated and submitted
6. Planning and budgeting conference to review performance and agree on priorities	15th November	Council, TPC, Development partners	• Priorities are agreed upon by a wide spectrum of the stakeholders
7. Consolidation and costing of LG priorities	3rd week of November	TPC secretariat	• Priorities are costed and consolidated
8. Discussion of LG draft plans and estimates	15th March	Sectoral committees	• Draft plan and budget are synchronized
9. Consolidation and incorporation of sectoral committee recommendations	March-April	Executive committee	• Recommendations are incorporated into draft plan and budget
10. Consolidation and preparation of LG three year draft plan and annual estimate	30th May	TPC secretariat	• Final three year draft plan and annual estimate in place
11. Presentation of LG three year plan and budget estimates to council for approval	15th June	Finance secretary/ Speaker	• Annual plan and budget are approved
12. Dissemination of information in plan and budget to HLG and LLCs	30th June	SCC/TC	• Formal submission of approvals and recommendations to HLG and LLC
13. Plan and budget implementation	Continuous/ monthly	PMCs, LCIII, LCII, LCI	• Plan and budget are implemented
14. Plan implementation reviews	Quarterly	Councils, CSO, TPC	• Reviews are done

Source: MoLG (2004)

Table 4.2 One-sample t-test for grassroots women participation

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Participated in village mobilization	271	0.06	0.229	3.98	270	0.000*
Participated in village meeting	271	0.08	0.274	4.88	270	0.000*
Participated in parish meeting	271	0.03	0.159	2.68	270	0.008*
Participated in LLG budget conference	256	0.03	0.174	2.87	255	0.004*
Participated in LLG budget approval	271	0.01	0.121	2.01	270	0.045*
Received village feedback	271	0.04	0.189	3.22	270	0.001*
Received parish feedback	271	0.01	0.121	2.01	270	0.045*
Heard of parish development plan	271	0.12	0.323	6.01	270	0.000*
Heard of LLG plan	271	0.15	0.359	6.94	270	0.000*
Aware of any services being delivered	271	0.35	0.477	11.97	270	0.000*
Participated in village implementation	271	0.15	0.355	6.84	270	0.000*
Participated in parish implementation	271	0.03	0.180	3.05	270	0.003*
Participated in LLG implementation	271	0.03	0.159	2.68	270	0.008*
Participated in village project M&E	271	0.08	0.268	4.76	270	0.000*
Participated in parish project M&E	271	0.02	0.147	2.47	270	0.014*
Participated in LLG project M&E	271	0.03	0.180	3.05	270	0.003*
Participated in LLG budget M&E	271	0.00	0.000	-	-	-
Participated in LLG PIC M&E	271	0.00	0.000	-	-	-

* denotes statistically significant at 5% and 1%
Source: Individual survey

This process involves de-briefing the community on Budget Framework Paper, Annual and Medium Term Budget and Annual and Medium Term Plan. It also involves the review of past performance – budget, projects, and linkages established; soliciting for proposals for implementation in the coming year; and prioritizing the activities identified. This also includes problem identification, data collection and analysis, generation of alternatives and choices and plan conference.

These processes are ideally replicated in the feedback process whereby the district, after the plan approval on June 30th of every financial year, should brief the LLGs of their projects that have been adopted in the district plan/budget. Similarly, the LLG should give a feedback to the parishes which in turn should

44

provide a feedback to the villages on what priority areas have been identified and listed for implementation in the financial year.

When properly followed, these processes should be able to open up local government system for the transparent participation of all actors. It should also make local government interventions local priorities responsive and people empowering as the state-market-civil society organization relations is improved (Griffin 1989).

The extent to which women are participating

Figure 4.2 shows the extent to which grassroots women are participating in the various planning and budgeting processes. While 89% of the 271 women interviewed considered it their human rights to participate in such processes, a majority are shelved off from the policy making arena. What is apparently clear from this figure is that: (i) fewer women are participating in the policy processes; and (ii) with increasing local government levels, political space gets narrower for women and, women's participation continues to be limited.

Figure 4.2 Women who participated in the 2005/06 planning/budgeting processes (%)

This observation is supported by the statistical analysis shown in Table 4.2 and in Figure 4.2. These reveal the significance of the limited extent to which women are effectively present in all stages of the policy-making processes. They are excluded from echoing out their voices. Neither are women provided feedback of what projects have been approved for them in order to ably expect services delivery from their LLGs. As a result, women are generally unable to engage in the implementation of LLG development or even ask the leaders to account for (in-)actions.

Impediments to women's participation

The main obstacles to women's effective participation identified by the FGDs and key informants were related to:

- *Ineffectiveness of women leaders to champion women's needs.* It was noted that the elected women leaders were neither mobilizing grassroots women to participate in the planning processes nor were they performing their roles of representing women well. Women Councillors and Women Council Executives were noted to exhibit conflict of interest as the former considers itself superior to the latter. As such, they are not unified to echo a common voice.

- *Limited awareness of the planning and budgeting process:* While 93% of the interviewed women indicated that it is important to have the annual planning process conducted in their villages, and 83% were willing to participate in them, only 32.2% were aware of any such planning meetings.

- *Exclusionary mobilization strategy.* While in every LLG Parish Development Committees (PDC) are in place with two people (a man and a woman) acting as the link with the LLG, it was found out that the level of women's involvement in mobilization was minimum. Only 5.5% were involved in mobilization because they were mainly not informed to mobilize (60.1%). This shows foremost the intentional exclusion of the women constituency. Besides, the household-to-household approach used in mobilization, done by men, rarely finds women at home because they are busy meeting their survival needs. Worse of all, the male mobilizers employ selective mobilization: first giving priorities to the men; secondly, to those who they perceive as knowledgeable and can offer *developmental* ideas; and lastly, to those with whom they share same political ideology.

- *Neglect for village level planning.* Many LLGs and their administrative units ignore community participation in village planning. Rather, they prefer, as short cut due to time and resource constraints they argue, the LC1 execu-

tives, Parish Chief and Parish Development Committee representatives to convene the village meetings and come up with their priorities. In Akworo LLG, the acting Sub-county Chief confirmed that no village planning meeting was held except for some parish meetings which were held in Kituna and Rero. In Panyimur, a woman in Paryem-east Village noted that,

> In our village no meetings are held. I have never heard or seen it taking place. May be others who are more important than me are invited for such meetings. The only meeting I know of is that where LCs sit to settle disputes and get money from court fees.

- *Lack of facilitation during planning meetings.* Often LLGs discriminately provide financial support for the participation of their officials. This denial affects the participation of a majority of women as a woman noted in Panyimur,

> If meals and even drinks can be provided during burials, funeral rites, marriage ceremonies… why can't the same be done for our planning meetings if at all these meetings are very important for our development? Yet selectively LLG pay only their officials some funds as facilitation allowance.

- *Livelihood insecurity.* Women are the main bread earners in many homes. However, most of the LLG planning timing does conflict with women's work. In Paidha town, the women traders commonly known as *"Abicamukani"* (or petty traders involved in immediate buying and reselling of goods in the market) noted that they are always busy and when invited for meetings the timing is not appropriate. The Speaker Paidha town in this regard concluded that:

> On many occasions women are kept out of the political domain due to their heavy workload. As a result they (women) remain inadequately informed and unaware of not only government programmes but also their right to participate in affairs that govern them.

- *Inaccessibility to LLG plans and budgets.* It was also noted that many LLGs produce only 5 copies of the approved plans and budgets. These copies are distributed to the District Planning Unit, the LLG Chairperson and Secretary for Finance & Planning, and Sub county Chief/Town Clerk and the Accountant. The rest of the councillors are also not given copies of the document. Likewise, many considered the plan and budget documents too bulky to read and internalize. As a result, many people men and women alike are ignorant of what transpires in their LLGs.

- Monitoring is always considered as either a technical issue or the responsibility of politicians. During the FGDs and key informant's interviews, it was noted that even the technocrats and politicians who conduct such monitoring

always produce no management reports for action points. The Town Treasurer of Pakwach town mentioned that:

> There is no monitoring mechanism to check on what the Councillors do and they do not bring any report of project monitoring and yet they are given monthly facilitation allowance.

Implications of women's ineffective participation

The feedback workshop held to discuss the study findings pointed that such a very low extent of women's participation has a number of implications (some of which also corroborated some of the study findings). Notably were:

1. Limited awareness of the approved plans and budgets and services delivery

Although the decentralization policy mandates local governments to develop and disseminate (in relevant forms and contents), their plan intentions and budgets to the people they serve, the results of individual women asked if they have ever heard of their parish and LLG development plans and budgets show the contrary to the policy demand. Only 11.8% and 15.1% were aware of parish and LLG development plans/budgets respectively. In the FGDs it was noted women had very scanty knowledge of these documents. For instance, in Akworo none of the participants knew of the LLG plan/budget. In Paidha town, only four out of thirty people had seen the plan and budget document without reading it. Even the Councillors who approved the documents were found neither to have copies of the plan nor read it.

And given that plans are translated into services delivery in which direct financial resources are spent, women's awareness of service delivery in the LLG was also significantly low (31%).

2. Limited participation in planning processes

Even if the ideal local government participatory bottom-up planning and budgeting processes should start at the village, parish, and LLG levels, at all the three levels it was found that women's non-participation recorded an exceptionally high 91.9%, 97.4% and 98.5% respectively. Equally, 85.5%, 96.7%, and 97.4% did not participate in village, parish, and LLG project implementation. Also 92.3%, 97.8% and 96.7% did not participate in the monitoring of the village, parish and LLG projects respectively.

3. Women's disempowerment

That the entire planning and budgeting processes are self-managed by only local government officials (technocrat and politicians), it was noted that women who should demand for and benefit from government services are disempowered.

They are fenced-off from voicing their demand for services from government. A woman in Akworo, Sirimba village, Murusi parish reaffirms this when she noted that, *"how do you expect us to demand for services from government when we are not part of the planning team that is dominated by government officials?*

4. Non-gender responsive plans and budgets
It was also noted that the prevailing trend of budget allocation skewed towards administrative cost was not accidental. It was 'a practice of men rewarding themselves for their employment in the system' echoed a Woman Councillor. In such ways, negligible funds are allocated for services delivery from which the poor, most of whom are women, can benefit.

5. Lack of accountability
Related to the above is that lack of voice to demand for services go hand in hand with inability to demand for accountability for whatever services are offered (be it correctly or not). Indeed, plan/budget feedback meetings as a mechanism for providing accountability (both political and financial) to the population was only recognized to be provided by 3.7% and 1.5% at village and parish levels respectively. An elderly woman in Panyimur pointed that, *'how would we question what those people (referring to sub county official) are doing when we even do not know what they have in the budget document?'*

6. Corruption and poor quality services delivery
Where people's voice does not matter, 'the jungle rule flourishes' noted the District Community Based Services Officer. He argued that although LLGs in accordance with the Financial and Accounting Regulations Act, 1998 and the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act, 2003 works with tenderers to provide services, the choice of their services were questionable. Besides, often those services are overpriced and of poor qualities. Tenderers often linked such price hikes and low work qualities to contract buy-ins (bribery). Finally, community representation entrusted in Project Implementation/Management Committees (PIC/PMC) was also reported as ineffective. For instance, a woman in Bed-ku-wedu village, Oturgang ward, Paidha town voiced that:

> There is a big problem when the town council use tenderers to implement activities for us. In one case, our spring was to be constructed using the box design which we protested because we wanted the traditional system that works without the box. When we informed the tenderer, he told us that he was sent from above. Sensing that we have no rights over him we stopped our request. Now the spring is well protected but there is no water in it and when it rains, storm water gets into the box. The

community has thus, abandoned the protected spring. And … this means a waste of resources meant for us.

7. Loss of ownership and sustainability of projects

That projects are simply handed over to the communities even when they are not demanded for, community response has been to delimit their support towards the sustenance of such projects. Water sources are left to dry up or boreholes are abandoned unrepaired and classrooms are vandalized without community intervention. The Community Development Officer Panyimur hinted that,

> Often the community say that 'your' [referring to LLG] water source is broken down. Come and repair it for us. This is contrary to the community based finance and maintenance system, which requires that benefiting communities from any infrastructural project should undertake to operate and maintain such projects.

8. Loss of trust in government

Participants also noted that where the state-society linkage is broken, there is no trust especially in local government officials. A member of the District Women Council Executive reiterated that many women actually refer to LLG officials (politicians and technocrats alike) as 'those employed to enrich themselves but not to work for the people they lead'.

Wrapping-up

The case of LLG budget misallocation presented in Chapter 3 was justified by local government official to emanate from the ineffective participation of women in the policy making processes. While the scope of such non-participation was not clear, this study found out that it is true that majority of women are not participating in LLG public policy-making processes. While women's self-exclusion was a quick conclusion to explain their non-participation, to the contrary this study unearthed the fact that women's non-participation was a result of LLG strategic institutional exclusion.

James C. Scott (1990: chapter 3) while elaborating on public transcript as a respectable performance reiterated that, first, concealment is practiced in order not to threaten official story unless such contradictions are publicly declared. This is because, 'in certain cases, certain facts, though widely known, may never be mentioned in public context'. What comes out is, 'virtually a dual culture: the official culture filled with bright euphemism, silence, and platitude and the unofficial culture widely known are not introduced into public discourse. Second, euphemism and stigma are often used to obscure that which is negatively valued but entirely to mask the facts of domination by giving them a

harmless or sanitized aspect. Notwithstanding, the political price is that it becomes a political cost for those who are subordinated.

The view of Scott above reveals how LLG officials despite knowing what they are expected to play in decentralized development continue to ignore the absence of women in the policy arena; a fact that can affect the 'dividends they unquestionably enjoy' (Schneider & Goldfrank 2002). They are also less bothered of the myriads of implications of limited women's participation. Yet it is vividly clear that excluding women from the policy arena from a human rights perspective, makes decentralized governance an arena where women's rights are highly violated with impunity. From a gender advocacy focus such exclusion means that women's needs and interest are excluded from the resource allocation agenda. The daunting consequence is that decentralized governance is non participatory and non transparent/accountable to women. Instead, as is practiced, it perpetuates gender inequalities. Nelson & Wright (1995) summarize this fact when they write that:

> Participation has ... positioned people very differently in relation to the development apparatus … – as a presence, as objects of a theoretical process of economic and political transformation; as expected 'beneficiaries' of programmes with pre-set parameters; as contributors of casual labour to help a project achieve its ends; as politically co-opted legitimizers of a policy; or as people trying to determine their own choice and direction independent of the state.

That the found women's exclusion takes place in essence of various women leaders' presence both within and parallel to the various layers of decentralized governance system raises yet another fundamental question, 'to what extent are the women leaders' who are insiders of the LLG structures effective representatives of women's interest?' The next chapter will attempt to answer this question.

Women representation:
The cross-road

This chapter focuses on assessing the effectiveness of women leaders as champions of women's needs in local government policy arena. It explores the extent to which women leaders know their roles, are performing those roles, and whether they have the requisite skills and are using them to engender decentralized development. Finally, it ends with an analysis of the setbacks that women leaders face in executing their roles and responsibilities.

Assessing the effectiveness of women leaders

In Chapter 1, I pointed out that the Constitution of Uganda provides women one third of local council composition. Added to this, I also stated that the 1993 National Women Council Statute established a parallel Women Council structure that runs from the village (involving all women who are 18 years and above) to the national levels into a body that specifically champions women's needs. This means that at every level of governance there are elected women leaders (Women Council Executives and Women Councillors). Such a setup should ideally provide women with numerical advantage over men within existing LLG structure. However, I also argued that political numeracy as is construed under the majority win the show ideal of democracy should not be taken for granted that it will automatically give women as a constituency any advantage in decentralized development. My point of contention was that decentralized governance is not a neutral arena; it is gendered given that the

male politicians armed with majority male technocrats are likely to take forth their traditional hegemony into local government and using informal systems steal the show.

In Chapter 3 such doubts started to unveil in the taken and normal practice of skewing decentralized poverty resources in favour of administrative costs. Local government officials even had the guts to point out that the absence of women during dividing the 'cake' should be blamed for the mess. Chapter 4 confirmed the limited participation of women in the entire planning and budgeting processes.

However, both Chapters 3 and 4 pointed a finger at the ineffectiveness of women leaders as democratic representatives of women. They were noted not to be doing their role of championing women's interests when plans and budgets are being formulated; a gap that has also made women's needs to be ignored in LLG resource allocation. This is what Cornwall (2004: 85) refers to as citizen participation in any political space can only have meaning when citizens (such as women leaders) are able to exercise their voice therein. Failure to do so, Gaventa (2004a) cautions can lead to capture by prevailing power-holders.

Below, I explore to what extent such ineffectiveness as is manifested by the mandated roles of women leaders.

Objective, questions and scope of the assessment
For women to receive attention in LLG development process one option is for them to have effective leaders who can represent their needs in the political spaces provided to them. However, women leaders can only succeed if it falls within their mandated roles and responsibilities, and if they have the ability to do so. This study also delved into assessing the effectiveness of Women leaders' in representing women in decentralized governance. Strengthening women leadership as is proposed by gender advocates requires understanding women leaders' areas of core ineffectiveness. To do so, this study asked the following central question:

> *To what extent are women leaders effectively executing their representative roles?*

The central question was further broken down into three sub-questions:

- Are women leaders aware of and performing their roles?
- Do women leaders have the requisite skills to and practicing those skills in performing their roles?
- What are the roadblocks to women leaders' effective performance?

To answer these questions, data was collected using an individual survey of women leaders using semi structured questionnaire and Focus Group Discus-

sion (FGD). Overall, 154 women leaders drawn from 12 randomly sampled LLGs of Pakwach Town, Pakwach, Panyimur, Panyango, Wadelai, Erussi, Nyaravur, Kucwiny, Parombo, Akworo, Nebbi Town, and Paidha participated.

Both data collection instruments were administered in sequence. Women leaders as respondents were invited to the LLG headquarters, on dates set and communicated to them beforehand, where they met with a team of data collectors drawn from district local government and District Women Council office.

The data collectors first conducted the individual interviews with all the invited women leaders in the study area independently. Thereafter, both the data collectors and the women leaders joined in a room where they had the focus group discussions.

Below are the findings from this assessment.

Knowledge of mandated roles

Ideally, Women leaders are expected to collaborate and network in the following areas:

- Identifying women's concern and assisting the local council in implementing them.
- Sensitizing women and the community on national and local government policies/programmes and development issues. This also goes hand in hand with mobilizing women for development by encouraging the involvement of women in community activities.
- Linking women in the community and the decision makers and mobilizing resources for women concerns e.g. influencing the budget.
- Advocating for promotion and protection of women's rights in their communities.
- Monitoring service delivery to ensure that women effectively participate and benefit.

In view of the above stated roles, the functionality of the women leaders was gauged by asking whether the leaders knew those roles and were performing them. Figure 5.1 indicates that women leaders were generally aware of their roles of identifying women's concerns for development (60.4%) and sensitizing women on government programmes (50.6%). However, almost all were not aware of their roles of advocacy for women's rights (87.0%) and monitoring of service delivery (94.2%).

Likewise, many women leaders were mainly performing those roles that they know by 62% in linkages to decision makers, 61% sensitization/mobilization

54

Figure 5.1   Knowledge and performance of mandated roles

and 58% on gender advocacy. Yet, most of these women leaders confessed that they were only performing these roles without knowing them as their mandated roles.

Skills to perform mandated roles

In order to translate those roles into winning budget allocation for services sectors where women benefit most, the women leaders were also asked whether they had the skills to conduct and were engaged in gender-responsive planning and budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, and advocacy. These skills where considered important because they provide the basis for analyzing and directing resource allocations. For instance, to voice the need for budget allocation for women's interest, a woman leader is expected to ally with other LLG leaders to support her concern (advocacy). Yet, such concerns must have valid basis (information drawn from monitoring existing situation) to show the defects of any decision that does not support it (gender analysis).

As Figure 5.2 reveals, many women leaders lack the requisite skills with which to effectively perform their mandated roles although as seen above, they confessed that they simply find themselves engaged in the use of those skills somehow. Thus, their inability to effectively champion women's needs is curtailed by the lack of civic engagement skills.

Figure 5.2   Having and using skills to engender plans and budgets

Analysis with them during the focus group discussions showed that while many of them are familiar with gender analysis in needs assessment, the analytical skills required for drawing a work plan, gender mainstreaming, project monitoring and strategic pushing of women's needs among politicians as well as technocrats are lacking.

Drawbacks to women leaders' effectiveness

In the various focus group discussions, women leaders attributed their ineffectiveness to the following constraints:

- *Limited knowledge about and skills for their roles.*
Women leaders pointed out that foremost majority of them are inadequately informed of their roles. Second, they have been ignored by government in terms of capacity building as one WCE member in Parombo pointed out that,

> I have been in this leadership position for two terms now. Yet no single day was I invited for any induction or training with regards to my roles as a leader of women. Elections are held when the time comes and that is it. When it comes to what those elected leaders should do it is not divulged to us. I can confess that what I have done and how I did them in the last two years were solely a personal matter. That is why many Women leaders even do not want to be called so. We have no unified direction

of where to go beyond the title a Women Council Executive. We are wagging like headless chicken!

- *Lack of facilitation*

Especially the women council leaders noted that unlike women councillors who are catered for by LLG budgets, they are not provided for in any LLG plan and budget. The only allocation they hear about is that for Women's Day celebration. Because they are considered a creation of the central government, it is also assumed that they should be facilitated separately by that system. In this regard the Sub county Chief Erussi hinted that, 'Women Council structures are not provided for in our budgeting guidelines. It will be illegal to fund them!'

- *Failure on the side of the LLGs to implement planned activities*

The Women Council Executives also pointed out that their weakness in part stem from the demoralization they get from LLGs. Often, planned for activities are not implemented. Funds allocated for such activities, however small, are diverted into areas where LLG officials feel they can benefit from. As a result, they find it unworthy to continue working without results. A WCE member in Pakwach LLG remarked,

> How else would you expect us to continue working when our electorates and us inclusive see no results? All the LLG can offer us are disappointments. They say there is no money but the LLG offices are not closed. Salaries are paid, for what I cannot tell. This is frustrating!'

Closing remarks

This study assessed the effectiveness of women leaders in championing women's needs in LLG policy arena. As was hinted in chapters 1, 3 & 4, it found that first most of the women leaders were not even aware of the very roles they are expected to play. They were simply elected and left to do what they were not even inducted into. This confirms Goetz (2007) assertion that women's political participation is only vital to the extent that it provides for simple access into political positions. Whether or not the elected leaders are performing their roles does not simply matter.

Second, almost all the women leaders also lack the requisite skills with which to engender decentralized governance. They are relying on personal intuition to try and ensure that they represent women constituency in the LLG policy arena. What stands out, as the women leaders attributed, is that women leaders ineffectiveness are masterminded by local government marginalization through ignoring their skills enhancement and failure to facilitate them to perform their roles.

These findings confirm the earlier assertion that decentralized governance despite being closer to the populace is in fact distant to many for whom the arena is prohibitive. But the findings also provide a basis for civil society organization to support political activism. This is a justification upon which AFARD, a local NGO, took up to build the political capabilities of women leaders so that they can become productive political actors to their constituency. The next chapter, therefore, delves into explaining what AFARD did in order to build the political capabilities of the women leaders in an attempt to engender decentralization.

6

Building political capabilities

This chapter focuses on describing the processes of building the political capabilities of women leaders. It presents an overview of the AFARD projects implemented with funding from HURINET and 9th EDF-CSCBP from February 2005 to July 2008.

Civic engagement: The missing link

The two contradictory arguments pointed in Chapter one as the central issue of this study have all proved true. The doubt that the provision of mere political positions for women is inadequate to ensure that women's interest receive government support turned to be true. Local government officials simply allocate decentralize development funds to suit their interests. Besides, the findings that women leaders lack the skills with which to effectively represent women within the available political arena justifies the call by practitioners for political capability building.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 reveal that decentralized governance is gendered. The available political spaces within which women could demand for services from their local governments have become 'closed space'. Budget allocations are neither engendered nor pro-poor responsive. Public funds are spent, without due accountability, on administrative costs that benefits power-holders in formal government structures. To women who constitute the bulk of the population and have for long suffered from hegemonic relations such practices manifest in their denied human development.

The main stumbling blocks revealed to perpetuate such ineffective participation of both women and women leaders reside in the fact that women are institutionally shelved-off the policy arena. They are denied information, capacity building, facilitation, and so on to ensure strategically that they do not tamper with the status quo which is benefiting a few selected local government official. In this way, politicians and their bureaucrats negates the essence of co-governance. They chose to do as they wish – deciding on projects for the people and implementing such projects without accountability.

These situations justify what Véron *et al.* (2006: 1926) refers to as 'decentralization of corruption' and Heller *et al.* (2007: 628) as 'democratic authoritarianism' given that the democratic rights of individuals are replaced by the *de facto* wills of local government officials (Hickey & Mohan 2005: 253).

That the human rights of women seems not to be adhered to means the claim that localized politics enhances the opportunity for the excluded social category to claim their rights is questionable. Women's human rights in this area are abused by LLG officials. As Moser & Norton (2001), Mikkelsen (2005) and O'Neill (2003) observe such an abuse means that women as a constituency cannot demand from their duty-bearers in local government to supply and account for whatever they need.

The cardinal missing link to this citizens-state co-governance equation is civic engagement. In order to change such exclusionary, autocratic and technocratic approach to decentralized development requires enhancing a 'participatory public' (Heller *et al.* 2007: 643) where women can make claims as citizens and not clients thereby challenging their hitherto patronage relations to local government officials (Aber 1998). Doing so, Hickey & Mohan notes requires 'participation for empowerment' or 'participatory citizenship' which seeks to challenge existing power relations rather than negotiating around them. This requires, they reiterate:

> … not only bringing people into political processes, but also to transform and democratize the political processes in ways that progressively alter the 'immanent' processes of inclusion and exclusion that operate within particular political communities, and which govern the opportunities for individuals and groups to claim their rights to participation and resources (Hickey & Mohan 2005: 250-251).

This collaborative governance is the focus of citizen engagement. Civic engagement is commonly defined as a process of organizing citizens or their entrusted representatives to influence and share in public affairs. It is about demystifying political and bureaucratic monopoly in public affairs and opening space for knowledge about, acceptance of, respect for each actor's conditions and interests. However, civic engagement as the 'confluence between democracy and development' (Cornwall & Coelho 2006: 4) requires space and timely and reliable information for effective participation to occur. While space pro-

vides the arena for negotiation, contestation, and collaboration as different actors bring divergent interests for open discussions and decision-making (ibid.: 1-2), information give meanings to the contents of participation and decisions that are made.

Promoting civic engagement in public policy processes therefore requires, first, *citizenship building* so that people effectively participate in exercising their rights. People need to know their rights before they can mobilize to claim their political entitlements from any public institution. Second, it entails *institutional orientation* (in rules and procedures) that should encourage legitimate multi-actor participation. Finally, there is need for building a *political culture* of collective responsibilities so that leaders-know-it-all mentality common with elite and politician capture is replaced by the we-know-it-all attitude. These aspects solidify citizen participation and makes public policy openly debated rather than imposed. It also allows each interest group to speak *as* and *for* itself and to willingly allow for collective decisions made to override its interest (if not supported) (Cornwall & Coelho 2006: 6-17). In this way, Gaventa (2005: xii-xiv) echoes that the traditional rights and responsibilities hijacked by the state is challenged by having citizens who can claim their rights through voicing their concerns to which the state has to yield.

What these discussions point at is the need for 'collaborative policy making'. However, the questions is, if the political space has been provided yet the political capabilities in terms of the awareness of roles and responsibilities, skills to engage within the space, and the culture and motivation for engagement are lacking, which ways forward? Cuthill & Fien (2005: 65) proposes capacity building. To them, capacity building is countering power for collective reasoning and deliberation inherent in knowledge, ability and energy for collective action.

In regard to this study, it is implied that women leaders need their political capabilities to be built so that they can become citizens and effective leaders. But what is political capability? Below I present this concept and its cardinal aspects.

Political capabilities explained

While the initial concept of political capabilities according to Whitehead & Gray-Molina (2003) focused on the sustained constructive political interaction by the poor with state agencies, Williams (2004) added value to it by critically raising the issues of those who were hitherto excluded for public arena, like women and women leaders in this case, having a set of skills with which they can manoeuvre and re-shape in the political arena available to them. This view even extends the quest for political space beyond having mere space or a seat

into citizenship building. Such an integration attempts to balance the citizen-state governance equation so that co-governance is no longer an issue that can be treated in an either or fashion but as one body of governance management system. That is why others like Haberman (1992) term it as a process of 'political socialization' and Foucault (2004) as 'subjectification'.

Therefore, political capabilities focus at smoothening the citizen-state balance sheet especially for the poor who had hitherto been denied political experience. As Whitehead & Gray-Molina (2003: 36) note it is about 'political learning' from which people are 'encouraged to learn to behave like citizens' (Rose 1999) and thereby become able to gain and exercise their individual agency and collective control (Appadurai 2002). This learning however pivots on three critical aspects, namely:

1. Awareness

Awareness as a capability is concerned with creating responsible citizens who know their rights, the opportunities for claiming those rights, the procedures involved in making such claims and the actors to co-act with. Doing so helps in changing the mindset of those who had been denied rights to become conscious of their environments and stand up as citizen and not as beneficiaries to claim such rights (Gaventa 2004a; Cornwall 2002).

2. Civic engagement skills

The intractable rules that govern the management of local governments mean that co-governance entails a multi-actor engagement. The involvement of different stakeholders – elected politicians, (schools) technocrats, and other civic communities makes co-governance to be marred by actors who all speak different languages. Yet to tango on the deliberation floor requires that all actors speak with understanding (regardless of the degree) the same language. For the poor who are largely unschooled and had been outside this arena it requires having the opportunity to be able to understand the various 'governance language' (Gaventa 2004b).

The acquisition of various skills that Fung & Wright (2001) consider as 'negotiation skills' and Gaventa (2004b) terms 'political organizational skills' is pertinent. Women leaders need skills with which to mobilize their constituency, put agenda on resource allocation table, generate factual and relevant information, and communicate effectively with other actors. They also need managerial skills particularly those related to planning, budgeting and monitoring so that they are able to see whether or not a given policy will benefit women. Short of these skills it is likely they can remain docile in the policy arena (DENIVA 2002).

3. Alliance building

Finally, being aware and having the skills alone are not sufficient to get a social category interest supported. This is because the deliberative democracy exhibited by co-governance involves multi-actors with diverse and competing interests; that they all want supported. Thus, in collaborative policy-making process there is need to built a network with which an actor can link in order to win or provide support. This network has to exist both vertically and horizontally let alone ensuring a strong internal team spirit.

The calls to action

In line with the June 2008 NGO Policy and CSO Minimum Agenda[1] of promoting a transparent decision-making process based on facts and consensus arrived at under a situation of open dialogue and effective participation of citizens, AFARD took to build the political capabilities of women leaders. The focus on women leaders was for two reasons. First, these are change agents who are already legally put in place. Some of the women had been working in office for the two 5-year terms. Working with them would therefore sustainably hasten their ability to bridge the performance gaps they had been experiencing. Second was the fact that given the projects' short duration (and funding size), it would be impractical to reach out effectively to the entire women constituency in the district.

To do so, AFARD, headquartered in Nebbi, responded to the call for proposal from HURINET in 2004 and the European Union (EU) – Government of Uganda (GoU) under the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme (CSCBP) in 2005. These proposals won the competitive funding bids for projects that were implemented in 2005/06 and 2006/2008. The projects were named *"Strengthening Women Councils in Nebbi district to participate in planning and budgeting at sub county and district levels"* and *"Engendering Services Delivery and Accountability in Decentralized Local Governments in Nebbi District"* respectively. These projects focused on invigorating the engagement of women with decentralized power centres to ensure 'equitable services delivery and accountability by local government officials. The project covered all the 19 (3 Town Councils and 16 Sub-counties) Lower Local Governments (LLGs) in Nebbi district.

---

[1] See DENIVA, CDRN, UJCC and Uganda National NGO Forum (2004). *Together for Peace and Development. A Civil Society Minimum Agenda for 2006 and Beyond.* Kampala. The inherent values are: integrity and accountability; transparent decision-making; active citizen participation; peaceful co-existence, tolerance, reconciliation; effective sharing of resources; openness to change and willingness to negotiate; and equitable distribution of resources.

The projects focused on changing the: (i) continued exclusion of women's voices and needs from the entire planning and budgeting cycle; (ii) weak demand capacity of the women leaders for services that benefit their constituency; and (iii) perpetual wrong spending of public funds on non-poor services. That is the projects wanted to ensure that first, women become citizens in order to secondly compel local governments to become responsive and accountable to women.

Thus, the broad objective of the projects was that, *'local governments in Nebbi district provide gender sensitive and equitable services to the community'*. This objective was focused at two fronts: first, changing the mindset of the people, men and women – politicians, technical staffs, and civil society actors towards gender needs as a human right in all services delivery; and second, enabling women to engage service delivery policy makers to ensure that gender issues are integrated in the processes of service delivery.

The project's specific objectives were:

1. Women leaders have increased knowledge and skills in gender planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and advocacy/lobbying.

Women leaders needed specialized skills, with a gender lens, in order to be able to meaningfully engage in the entire local government development processes. *Being trodden over by opportunistic politicians and technocrats under the pretext that women are not knowledgeable enough had outlived its justification!*

2. Effective participation of women in local government planning and budgeting increased.

The mobilization of women as a constituency to participate, at all levels of local governments, in planning and budgeting processes in order to echo (and force if need be!) their needs on budget agenda setting was vital. *Women's numerical strength needed to be used as a leverage apparatus in decentralized democracy!*

3. Local governments are transparent and accountable to their constituents in general and to women in particular

Local government policy makers needed to be advocated and lobbied in order to change their mind-set in favour of upholding women's development, not as a privilege but as a human right. In this way, they would willingly promote decentralized development from a human rights perspective. *Fake promises during election times normally termed as 'air supplies' would no longer be entertained!*

Inherent in these objectives was the need to secure *women's empowerment* that would instead compel LLGs to become *responsive* and *accountable* thereby entrenching a deeper 'trust and solidarity' in women to continue partaking in co-governance (Andrews & Kouzmin 1999).

In this view: first, empowerment as Colle & Gonella (2002) note comes with voice in public affairs and awareness of the development processes and outcomes that can lead to demanding for accountability. Second, government responsiveness was envisaged to come from the realistic allocation of resources to meet gender sensitive plans as well as honouring those plans during budget execution. Finally, accountability was seen beyond the current 'vertical approach' (Andrews & Kouzmin 1999) practiced in local government but also to include vertical and horizontal as well as performance and financial accountability.

This wider focus on accountability was because first, it was noted that the 'ministerial responsibility' approach of accountability derived from the vote power (Levine 1975: 361) has been enmeshed with 'bureaucratic capture' (Shannon 1987: 195); a process that makes 'accountability counterfeited' in the words of Brook (1990) by 'technocratic manipulation' that ensures leaders responsiveness to the needs of their constituency is autocratic (Wlezein 1995). Second, Dehn, Reinikka & Svenssen (2001) and Reinikka & Svensson (2002) noted that budget allocation alone is not sufficient to guarantee service delivery.[2] As Figure 3.2 revealed, budget disbursement analysis presents a better picture of budget management in local governments. Finally, as Walker (2002) notes, the less visible LLG performances are to the people it serves the weaker are the people involved in demanding for accountability; a process that Moran (2004) encapsulates on as a free-space within which government officials perpetuates centralized, ritualistic and autocratic practices to their capture advantage. That is why Colle & Gonella (2002) and Claibourn & Martin (2007) emphasize that demanding for accountability also requires citizens to be aware; a process that comes from engaging in the generation or receiving of reliable information, timely.

Project strategies

Cuthill & Fien (2005) advices that civic engagement demands a civic culture that allows people to participate in public life. Where such a culture is missing, Kirlin & Kirlin (2002) have argued that capacity building is inevitable. This capacity building should however enhance possibilities for 'dialogue that is

---

[2] They argue that government may spend on unagreed upon issues or spend only minimally. Thus, how the budget allocation is done (participation and effectiveness of leaders), where the allocated sum is spent (disbursement), and keeping the people in the know about it (answerability) needs to be ascertained.

essential in multi-stakeholder engagement' (Colle & Gonella 2002). It should also promote a sense of rights as well as roles and obligations for joint action (Shotter 1985) so that people agree collectively on what to do and account with undue pressure. This is what Walker (2002) argues that social accountability should promote collective practices such as consensus, cooperation, and commitment to participation.

Although the project primarily targeted women leaders, its implementation also involved LLG officials (technocrats and politicians alike). The involvement of LLG officials were at two levels both as training facilitators especially by Community Development Officers and as participants side by women leaders in order to have shared knowledge and skills. This last aspect was adopted because at the on-set of the project implementation, it was noted that most of the core skills for engendering decentralized plans and budgets as well as accountability were lacking among local government officials.

AFARD hinged these projects on a right-based approach (see Table 6.1 above). Rights-based approaches (RBAs) according to Moser and Norton (2001) and Mikkelsen (2005) integrates the norms, standards and principles of the international human rights system into the policies and processes of development. Such rights, already ratified by many nations, are legally guaranteed by human rights law and are enshrined in treaties, declarations, guidelines and principles (United Nations 2003). Mikkelsen (2005) and O'Neill (2003) however cautions that RBA has a skewed approach that falls into a demand-driven trap as rights-holders are only enticed to demand for their needs without

Table 6.1 The centrality of rights based approach to the project

Elements	Features
Empowerment	• Right-holders need political capabilities for claiming their rights as citizen and not beneficiaries of local government services.
	• Effective participation of right-holders gives responsibility to different actors and meaning to development.
Responsiveness	• Duty-bearers as gate-keepers should ensure that development is framed as legally enforceable entitlements of rights-holders.
Accountability	• Development is an obligation and not a privilege.
	• Such obligations are shared between right-holders and duty-bearers.
	• Obligations also include abstinence from violation of rights in favour of protecting, promoting and providing for those rights.
	• All actors (state, market, society) are held accountable and subject to rights-based standards.
	• A rigorous framework for monitoring implementation and sanction is inevitable.

Source: Adapted from Beall, Lewis & Sutherland (2003).

due consideration by rights-holders to supply in whatever form that which can enable duty-bearers to deliver to their claims. Therefore, to implement the projects, AFARD:

- Adopted a women constituency-driven approach by working primarily with women leaders. This was done to ensure specific targeting of both outreach and outcome beyond the vague community approach wherein anybody and nobody fits;
- Used relevant and timely information management in order to arm women with facts and figures that cannot be disputed. This was the basis for evidence-based advocacy;
- Ensured that women do not wait for government officials to invite them to the already open policy arena. Rather women, as policy beneficiaries, were encouraged to take it upon themselves to engage with government officials over what is due to them;
- Ensured that women participated in all planning and budgeting processes so that agreed upon plans are the ones for which budgets are allocated and such priorities are adhered to in the plan/budget execution as well as accountability;
- Entrenched the culture of transparency and accountability as well as effecttive monitoring and evaluation of government programmes from an engendered perspective thereby making government not only to account for services provided but also on those who benefited;
- Broke the 'symbolic presence conflict' between Women Councillors and Women Council Executives. Alliance was built between these two actors for furthering their common front that is women's interests; and
- Ensured effective communication at every stage of the project among and between local government leaders on the one hand and women leaders and grassroots women on the other.

Project activities

Publicizing the project
To ensure that the project was known and supported as widely as possible, publicity was done. A brochure detailing the project goal, objectives, activities, and implementation strategies was distributed to district and LLG leadership. Equally, a radio talk show (in English and Alur language) was hosted on Radio Paidha. This was hosted together with the Chairperson District Women Council and it explained to the public all about the project.

Desk reviews

To inform the project with the existing practices of grassroots women, women leaders and LLG officials, a desk review was conducted on local government planning and budgeting processes. The information generated helped to synchronize the district planning calendar as well as lobbying the District and Sub county Technical Planning Committee to gazette planning dates. This review also explored the existing reporting frameworks. The realization that these instruments were technocratic and hence a mechanism of shelving off (semi-)illiterate leaders and the population from understanding the contents of their plans/budget led to the formulation of a gender responsiveness audit tool (Annex 4) and its utilization to assess the participation of grassroots women, effectiveness of women leaders, responsiveness of LLG plans and budgets to women's needs, and LLG accountability for their actions.

Capability assessment and capability building trainings

In order to build the capacity of women leaders for good governance the capacity assessment described in chapter 5 was conducted among women leaders representing 30% of the total LLG women leadership positions. The findings from the assessment guided the formulation of training goals, objectives, content, and methodologies. Three training manuals were developed covering the Women Council, human and women's rights, gender budgeting, budget cycle, advocacy and participatory gender monitoring and evaluations. Table 6.2 summarizes the key training content.

Using the manual, 15 trainers derived from AFARD, District Women Council Executives and local government staffs were inducted on the manual. This induction was done so as to harmonize the approach, methodology, actual training delivery and reporting.

Trainings were then conducted for 502 women leaders on their roles and human and women's rights;[3] 1,358 women leaders and LLG officials in gender

---

[3] The criticisms forwarded by local government leaders at the closure of this training provided a valuable input for adopting a new integrative approach during the subsequent trainings. The Chairperson Local Council III (Hon. Okumu Robert) in Panyimur noted:

> While it is important to make women know their roles and rights, often it is the men who violate those rights starting from our homes into the public spheres. Besides, such knowledge is a tool that can be used within local government even better because policy makers are not aware of what women council roles are and what they aspire for. It would then be vital not to marginalize men during such knowledge building events but rather to integrate them so that they can respond posivitively both on their own accord or when women demand for such rights.

Table 6.2   Summary of the various trainings covered

At the end of the training sessions participants are:

- Able to enumerate all the roles of the women council.
- Able to enumerate at least 3 women's rights as stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda.
- Able to explain development from a human rights perspective and position women's rights as pivotal in local government development process.
- Able to use a gender responsive budget analytical tool to analyze annual local government budgets.
- Explain the local government planning and budgeting cycle.
- Enumerate their roles in each of the stages of the cycle.
- Identify some strategies of strengthening their involvement in the planning and budgeting cycle.
- Able to monitor the lower local government's plans and budgets
- Able to use the advocacy/lobbying checklist to influence budgetary allocations for women's constituency.

Focus	Sub topics
The Women Council	• Why the Women Council? • The structure of the women council • Roles and functions of the women council • Relationship with lower local governments
Human & Women's Rights	• Human Rights in context • Development as a Human right • Women's rights in perspective • Human rights and good governance – decentralization
Gender Budgeting	• Women, gender and development • Key concepts in gender • What is gender responsive planning and budgeting • LG planning cycle • Why do gender responsive planning and budgeting • Why a budget approach • When to do a gender responsive planning and budgeting • How to do a gender responsive planning and budgeting • Challenges of doing a gender responsive budgeting
Local Government Budget cycle	• Roles of local government • Planning & budgeting cycle • Roles of actors at each stage • Common abuse of the planning & budget cycle
Participatory Gender Monitoring & Evaluation	• Defining Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation • Purpose of Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation • Actors involved in Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation • Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation Timing • Indicators for Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation • Tools for conducting Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation • Utilization of Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation information *cont.>>*

Table 6.2	Summary of the various trainings covered, *ctd.*
Advocacy	• Defining advocacy
	• Purpose of advocacy
	• Timing advocacy
	• Steps in undertaking advocacy: Issue identification, research and analysis, and planning advocacy
	• Methods of doing advocacy
	• Evaluating advocacy
	• Pitfalls to avoid in advocacy and lobbying

responsive planning and budgeting; 723 women leaders and LLG officials in participatory gender monitoring and evaluation; and 622 women leaders and LLG officials in advocacy skills. These trainings were preceded by multi-channel mobilization - radio announcements on the local FM radio station (Radio Paidha), circulation of letters of invitation, and direct contacts by the Project Officer to the local leaderships. As a result, attendances were always more than 100% as many people especially women turned up to attend to the training even if they would not receive the participants' per diem.

Finally, two office-based and 47 field-based training evaluations were conducted to assess the relevance with the trainers and trainees. These assessments provided invaluable input for AFARD staff to identify core areas of technical backstopping women leaders continue to need in order to effectively use their political space.

Mobilization of women to participate in LLG planning/budgeting cycle
Grassroots women and women leaders needed to take up their space in the policy arena. To do so, women leaders mobilized grassroots women. Local information, education and communication materials were produced and disseminated to both women and LLG policy makers. This included 3,500 posters, 3,500 brochures, 3,000 leaflets, 53 radio talk shows and radio spots, and 19 drama shows. Besides, 385 LLG women leaders were provided with cash facilitation to participate in LLG closed door budget meetings held in sectoral committees.[4]

Periodic follow-ups and feedback meetings
While participating in the planning and budgeting meetings is one thing, adherence to commitments made in budget management is something else. Figure 3.2 revealed that LLG officials always changed budget priorities when they have funds on their accounts. Women leaders therefore needed to be alert to follow

---

4   The provision of the money was only to pay for their lunch allowances given that in those meetings non LLG officials are not catered for in any way while those from LLGs receive long day allowances.

up and share their findings on how LLG officials are responsive and accounting for the approved plans. As such, the project supported 95 LLG follow-up meetings between women leaders and LLG officials, 38 information sharing meetings only for women leaders in order to account to their constituency and strategize on the way forward, and 76 half year LLG review meetings.

Critical in the follow-up meetings was the use of the gender responsiveness audit noted above. The audits aimed at finding out as to whether or not LLGs were gender responsive.

Advocating local government officials
Often follow-ups found delayed responses to commitments made in plans and budgets. Also found were manipulations by some LLG officials as usual to defraud the women of what had been planned for. As such, 58 advocacy and lobbying meetings were held with LLG leaders using facts and figures to win non-forthcoming promises.

Technical backstopping
To reinforce the presence and voices of the women leaders in the various LLG meetings, the Project Officer attended 40 various meetings. In such meetings, LLG technocrats were put to task to explain what they often hide under technical jargons (a common tactics used to dub women leaders as well as LLGs committee members). They were also asked to provide evidences to back up their (in)actions.

Documenting best practices
The project also documented some of the best practices. Five hundred copies of local government gender responsiveness audit reports were produced and circulated and a video documentary (locally known as "*Poku Peke*" meaning dividing the cake) produced.

Summing up

In all, the two projects responded to the existing gaps among grassroots women and women leaders. They focused on political capabilities building targeting only critical aspects that would invigorate civic engagement between women and LLG officials. It also instituted a participatory and cost-effective method of assessing local government responsiveness and accountability. Further, the activities of the projects were harmonized with local government planning and budgeting cycle (see Table 6.3). Chapter 7 assessed the returns to these initiatives.

Table 6.3   LLG harmonized budget cycle and women leaders' engagement

Plan & budget stages	LG activities	Women leaders' key activities	Women leaders' (must-have) results	LLG timing
Mobilization	• Dissemination of policy and planning guidelines • Consultative meeting on implications of policy guidelines, planning and budgeting processes, participation of development partners and IPFs • Dissemination of consultative meeting-planning and budgeting programme	• Meet women to solicit critical issues for budget concern • Mobilize women to participate	Issues of women concern for the year are articulately identified Mass mobilization of grassroots women conducted	September - October
Village planning	• Community level consultations	• Participate with grassroots women in meetings	Women's preferred projects accepted	October
Parish planning	• Parish level meetings • Consolidation and submission of community proposals and plans to LLG	• Advocate Parish Councils • Participate in meetings	Women's preferred projects accepted	November
Sub-county budget conference	• Planning and budgeting conference to review performance and agree on priorities	• Build alliance with WC • Advocate LLG officials • Participate in meetings with grassroots women	Women's preferred projects accepted	November
Sub-county sectoral committee meetings	• Consolidation and costing of LG priorities • Discussion of LG draft plans and estimates • Consolidation and incorporation of sectoral committee recommendations into LG three year draft plan and annual estimate	• Build alliance with WC • Advocate LLG officials • Participate in meetings	Women's preferred projects accepted	November - May
Plan approval	• Presentation of LG three year plan and budget estimates to council for approval	• Advocate LLG officials • Participate in meetings	Women's preferred projects included in the plan & budget	June
Plan feedback	• Dissemination of information in plan and budget to HLG and LLGs	• Demand for information • Provide information to constituency	Constituency know services to be delivered in the year	June/July
Plan/budget execution	• Plan and budget implementation • Plan implementation reviews	• Demand for information from LLG • Build alliance with WC • Monitor projects, lobby LLG officials and provide information to constituency	Projects committed to are implemented and feedback given to constituency	June-May

7

Returns from civic engagement

In chapter one I presented the counter arguments of development practitioners involved in gender advocacy work for political capability building as a valuable means for enabling those unable to effectively utilize their political space (such as women leaders) to do so. Political capability building, they argue, is a route to claiming citizenship, which in turn allows for engendering governance. Chapter 6 detailed what AFARD did in this regard. The focus of this chapter is, therefore, to assess whether or not the investments made in political capability building produced meaningful results on the citizen-state equation of citizenship building and transformation of local governance.

Assessing the effects of political capability building

While impact evaluation is theoretically contentious (Lakwo 2006: 68-75), given the scope of these projects, it is imperative that some 'outcomes' are traced. Still with nuance issues like budget advocacy, Laney (2003) cautions that the focus on '*influencing change*' typical with the subject warrants exploring results of interventions from a '*dimension of change*' approach.

Basing on this approach, the three core objectives of the projects were considered as the dimensions along which changes can be assessed. These are summarized in Table 7.1. Evident from it is that first, under empowerment changes are envisaged at both women leaders and ordinary women levels. Women leaders are expected to know and perform their roles as well as have civic

Table 7.1 Dimensions of change envisaged from the projects

Dimensions of change	Empowerment of women	LLG responsiveness	LLG accountability practices
Indicators	- Women leaders awareness and performance of roles - Women leaders knowledge & application of core skills - Women's participation in policy processes	- Plans are based on gender situation analysis - Plans & budget have gender responsive statements - Budget allocations and disbursements favor services sectors - Evidence of tangible projects	- Approved plans and budgets are communicated to all tiers of LLG - Cash inflows and outflows are communicated to the population - Monitoring are participatory - Reports are gender sensitive

engagement skills that they should be using in executing their roles. Such gains are expected as they argued in Chapter 5 to translate into having more grass-roots women participating in policy-making arena.

By so doing, the traditional institutional setup of LLGs will be under undue pressure from the focal voices that women will echo during planning and budgeting meetings. As a result, LLGs are expected to circum by formulating, approving and implementing services sector bias plans and budgets that are cognizant of the various development needs of men and women in their areas. And that at least some affirmative action budgets for women as well as tangible projects must result from such engagement.

Finally, as participatory processes take firm root in the co-governance of the LLGs, transparency practices like communicating approved plans and budgets and flow of funds will be adopted. Likewise, LLGs should undertake to disaggregate data in their activity reports so that it can be evidently clear who they are working with. These issues therefore became the centre of the review.

Review objective and questions

Guided by the argument above, the assessment objective was therefore to explore the extent to which the political capability building projects empowered women and improved local governance. The primary question asked was, 'to what extent did the project empower women and made LLG responsive and accountable?' This question was further broken down into five sub-questions below:

1. To what extent and in what ways did the project change women leaders' knowledge and skills for effective civic engagement?
2. To what extent and in what ways did the project change women's participation in the planning and budgeting processes?
3. To what extent and in what ways did the project change LLG budget responsiveness?
4. What tangible benefits have resulted for women from effective participation and LLG responsiveness and accountability?
5. To what extent and in what ways did the project change LLG transparency and accountability practices?

Data collection methods

In order to answer all the above questions, a number of data collection methods were used. Foremost, a staff meeting was held to discuss the need to review the project performance (successes and failures). This meeting, also attended by the District WCEs, agreed on the review objectives, scope and focus and who should do what, when, and with what results. This was followed by literature review of the project proposals and implementation reports were conducted. Attention in this review was drawn on what was planned to be achieved from the logframe and what were actually achieved.

The inputs from the literature review provided the framework for data collection instrument design. Questionnaires for collecting quantitative information from the various respondents were designed and discussed. Finally, a team composed of the project staffs, local government officials and the District WCE moved to the field to collect data.

It is important to point out that data was collected through two individual surveys as were done in chapter 4 & 5. Data collectors went back to the same areas where data was collected during the baseline survey. They also interviewed the same women leaders. In this way, the survey method was able to generate information required to answer questions 1 concerned with women leaders' knowledge and application of their roles and core skills in political engagement, and question 2 focusing on grassroots women were also interviewed on their participation in LLG planning and budgeting processes.

Further secondary data reviews were conducted on approved and actual LLG plans and budgets as well as their certified Final Accounts and progress reports. This method turned out to be the most cumbersome of all given the level of poor information management in most LLGs. Some LLGs like Kucwiny and Wadelai had actually approved plans and budgets that were not printed out.

Finally, a district-wide review workshop was conducted in all the 19 LLGs. These workshops were attended by WCEs and LLG officials drawn from key

decision makers – the political heads of the LLGs (Chairmen LCIII) accompanied by Women Councillors and councillors who head Committees. The technical staffs were led by the administrative heads of the LLGs (Sub-county Chiefs/Town Clerks), accompanied by department heads.

The various data that were collected where simultaneously analyzed. Different teams handled different aspects of the data – quantitative and qualitative. However, the teams met routinely to discuss their findings and to agree on the reporting framework given that they were also tasked to produce reports for their various data sources. Their draft reports were also shared amongst themselves and discussed with other WCEs and LLG officials. Below are the findings that the political capability building initiatives yielded.

Awareness and performance of roles

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 together with Annex 4 reveal that a significant change has occurred in the awareness and performance of roles among women leaders. Much of those changes (>50%) did occur specifically in the roles regarding monitoring of services delivery, advocating for women's rights, and linking women to policy makers. These were areas that women leaders had initially reported they did much less work in.

*Figure 7.1*   Women leaders' awareness of their mandated roles (%)

Figure 7.2   Women leaders' performing their mandated roles (%)

Knowledge and practice of civic engagement skills

Figures 7.3 & 7.4 above provide evidences of increased skills for civic engagement and the application of such skills among women leaders. As it can be seen, during the baseline, women leaders grossly lacked competency with which to engage with seasoned LLG officials in order to further women's interest. Approximately four years down the road, women leaders have attained a significant (see Annex 5) improvement of over 60% point changes on all facets of the desired skills.

In the review workshops that were attended by both the women leaders and local government officials, the following were noted as marked changes in the ways the women leaders are displaying their engagement skills within the existing political arena to the advantage of women's interests.

- The women leaders who hitherto did not meet at all were now actively meeting as leaders with vested interests in what takes place in their local governments to discuss about their statutory roles, laying strategies for alliance building, lobbying LLG and NGO leaders, and even taking keen steps to meet with grassroots women. To this Zainabu Ayubu from Nebbi LLG had this to say:

    I had never known exactly what my roles were. The government just organized our elections and left us without support. How could you have expected me to perform my roles satisfactorily? After the training, I started to measure myself as to whether I am making any progress in executing my roles or not. I ensure that we meet regularly to know what is going on, lay out strategies on how best to deal with the issues, and if not possible make contacts with our sister leaders in other sub counties or even with NGOs.

Mrs Florencea Anywar, Chairperson WCEs Wadelai LLG pointed out that,

Figure 7.3   Women leaders' having civic engagement skills (%)

Figure 7.4   Women leaders' practicing civic engagement skills (%)

> We gather core women issues through informal meetings, especially in places where women like to gather, like at water sources and during funerals. This is because women will not respond to meetings called without you facilitating them.

- The women leaders have succeeded in ensuring core women's concerns are generated and integrated into LLG plans/budgets (main budgets and affirmative action budgets) through their assertiveness during the planning and budgeting processes. They pointed out that from the training they devised

four strategies for pushing women's concern on the policy agenda, namely: (i) lobbying elected Women Councillors who are members of sectoral committees; (ii) lobbying members of the committees individually; (iii) seeking formal meetings with the committees; and (iv) seeking permission to attend committee meetings. Ms Odero Celly a member of Panyango LLG remarked:

> … they (referring to LLG technocrats) used to consider as very illiterate when it comes to the issues of especially the budget. They only used to read for us figures that I could not truly understand. Now I know what a budget should look like and contain such an approach does not work. I want to see for myself what the income and expenditure figures are so that I can know where our money going and to whose benefit.

- The WCEs have adopted a relentless pursuit for approved plan and budget follow-ups to ensure that commitments made and passed during budget approval are honoured during implementation. The rewards of such persistence can be seen from the remark of the Accountant of Nyaravur LLG that,

> The women leaders after the training have become too vigilant. When I was in Pakwach LLG I thought that the Chairperson was just over-active when she made very frequent follow-ups in my office. When I received my transfer letter, I felt relived from her pressure. However, when I reached here, it is the same story. Mrs Nezia is even more persistent. Imagine that she walks a very long distance without any pay to follow on the commitments made in the plans and budget, you simply can not hide any information! Should you try, they will walk to the office of the LLG Chairperson and that causes chaos. The only way around it is to give them the information but also importantly to work with them in implementing the approved plan.

Some sub-counties have also responded by incorporating WCEs on their Poverty Action Fund (PAF) monitoring committees. According to Mr. Oloya Michael, Sub-county Chief Pakwach LLG they already work with, *"the five (5) Sub county WCEs, whom we financially cater for"* to ensure that a wider team beyond the LLG officials are involved in the periodic monitoring of LLG projects.

- The women leaders have become agents for promoting transparency in government budget executions. They provide horizontal and vertical faster feedbacks to their fellow WCEs at the lower levels (from Sub county/Town Council to especially parish/ward levels). Mrs Margaret Akello of Paidha LLG noted that

> We are always at the sub county office to follow disbursements and evaluate work done to ensure value for money. For example, we were on the monitoring team during the construction of this new office block, right from the start to the

end'. In this way, no one was able to tell us any lie about the project. We also take this information back to our electorates – the women. This had in the past defeated LLG officials but it is easy for us to do so. Should anything go wrong, the information can be disseminated quickly downwards.

- Besides, many women leaders especially the WCEs have adopted a self-driven initiative of meeting with local government sectoral committees. Meeting this committee is considered important for them because it is the committees that allocate and approve funds that are simply window dressed by the public budget approval meetings. In these meetings women leaders are ably raising the issues that women have prioritized to be integrated into their LLG plans and budgets. This improved negotiation (lobbying) ability is confirmed by Hon. Anewa, Chairman of Nebbi LLG when he said,

> You simply can no longer rubbish off women's demands. The women leaders know all sector heads. They talk to them both individually and collectively. In that way, they are able to win support for the issues that they want to be funded. Should be in disagreement with their idea, they strategically wait for the bigger council meeting and echo their needs justifying why. You just find yourself defeated!

These findings present evidences of the value of political consciousness as a vital ingredient in citizenship building. Aware of what they are expected to do and armed with the relevant skills, women leaders have taken to dancing in the centre other than at the periphery of the hitherto denied political space. They have gained, in the words of Rowland (1997), *power with* other women through *alliance building* for a collective voice on what matters to women's practical and strategic needs. By identifying critical issues as evidence for lobbying for support, women leaders have confidence and *power to* present justified cases for consideration by the various sectoral committees. Important is that they are re-creating informal political spaces as enclaves where they interact with grass-roots women without encumbrance of the formal local government systems. And finally, women leaders are able to shape transparency and accountability practices which directly link to their attaining *power over* their roles. They no longer wait for accountability to be invested in the Chairpersons of the LLGs and hence are transforming the traditional practice of accountability which was the preserve of formal local government officials.

Women's participation in policy processes

The individual survey conducted among grassroots women elicit whether or not they were participating in LLG planning and budgeting processes that starts from their village and ends at the LLG levels. Figure 7.5 presents the findings.

Figure 7.5   Women's participation in LLG planning and budgeting cycle (%)

What is evident from this figure (and is also corroborated by Annex 7) as well as the discussions in the review workshops is that there has been a major shift in the way grassroots women hunger for engagement in local policy processes. The key stages where women are actively participating (>50% gains) starts with the mobilization of fellow women to attend planning meetings up to when the LLG plans and budgets are approved.

To a smaller extent women are also engaging in monitoring projects that are implemented in their vicinity something they used not to. They are venturing in monitoring especially village projects (37%) as well as the work of the often dictated project committees (18%) as different donors have different project implementation strategies. And interesting to note is that women are starting to engage in project implementation in their villages (27%).

However, limited changes were recorded in parish to LLG feedback processes as well as in the implementation stages. This was because the LLG officials, as usual, noted that they simply do not have the funds with which to hold feedback meetings. Second, they also noted that most project implementation

are either technical or contracted out to the private sector. True as such reasons may be, worth noting is that using such implementation approach reduces people's ownership of projects meant to benefit them given that often even where local materials that they can contribute are all tendered out.

The key changes pointed out during the review workshops were that:

- Women are now self-mobilizing fellow women to come for planning meetings thereby short circuiting the former exclusionary mobilization strategy practiced by male local councils (LCs) and Parish development Committees (PDCs). Yanijo Gabby of Erussi LLG had this to say,

  > Before AFARD trained us in gender responsive planning and budgeting, a majority of us saw no value in attending such meetings. But today, we attend planning and budgeting meetings without fail. We even mobilize grassroots women to participate in such meetings and they attend in larger numbers than before.

- 'Now funds that used not to be there for community planning is starting to surface' remarked one woman leader. Funds for facilitating planning processes at the village levels are being provided by some LLGs. To this effect, Hon. Hassan Ringtho, Chairman of Paidha LLG and Mr. Olama the Accountant for Akworo LLG echoed,

  > So far we have released some money (UGX 500,000 in Paidha and UGX 800,000 in Akworo) to facilitate lower local government administrative units to organize planning meetings at village and parish levels. We are mobilizing more funds to facilitate participation during budget conference for all councillors and sub-county WCEs.

- LLG officials have started to appreciate stakeholders' consensus as an effective means for representative democracy. Hon. Anewa Chairman of Nebbi LLG pointed out, '*We ensure that community views are sought from grassroots level up to the budget conference by properly mobilizing them through the local councillors'.* Mr. Michael Oloya the Sub-county Chief of Pakwach LLG reaffirmed this when he noted that '*we ensure that the very issues raised by grassroot communities are what make up our plans/budget and we* do *implement the activities when resources are available'.*

From the above observations, it can be said that while initially the exclusion of women shelved them off the local policy arena and justifiably build distrust in them about their government, through awareness creation and revamping the effectiveness of their leadership, gradually women as a constituency are making a come-back into the policy arena. They consider their recognition as active players vital to co-partake in their own development both in terms of being part of the implementation team or overseeing what is going on. This confirms their

sentiments expressed during the feedback meeting held after the baseline assessment that they felt their government was distant from them and have lost trust in it.

LLGs plan and budget responsiveness

While the increased empowerment of women through awareness, skills and alliance building are ends in themselves given their returns to the women's political projectivity, they in the view of political capability building advocates are also means to another end – engendering local governance. One aspect of this engenderment lies in how LLGs transform their institutional practices away from the conclave of hitherto hegemonic male-leadership selfish ways of doing things into opening up, as is required by deliberative politics, to dialogue with others and build consensus on the ways forward.

In this regard, another focus on how LLG respond in how they manage their plans and budget as was shown in Chapter 3 was explored. The approved plans and budgets as well as the final accounts and annual reports were reviewed. What came out from this exercise and were also confirmed by the review workshops were that:

- *All LLGs have their plans based on gender sensitive analysis*
Before the advent of the project, plans of all LLGs were almost invariably gender blind or gender neutral. Even reports were presented in terms of "number of people reached" without disaggregating outreach data by gender. This is changing as Mr. Anyolitho, a Councillor heading Production Committee in Parombo LLG said,

> "…gendering of data is taking roots. While our plans and activity reports are required to show who (by gender) we are reaching out to, in the extreme even in council and sectoral committee meetings, we are expected to state how many men and women are in attendance. Doing so helps us to know who (which gender) is dominating the show and why?"

- *Plans of all LLGs have gender responsive statements and considerations for affirmative action*
Before the project, hardly any LLG had a gender responsive statement, or even the word "gender". Affirmative action for women, though emphasized by government, rarely meant more than money for Women's Day Celebrations. It was verified during the review that all LLG plans had gender responsive statements translated into gender disaggregated targets. All LLGs had affirmative action budgets, however little (0.5-1%), specifically to address women's issues that could not fit within the traditional sectoral budgeting approach. A Woman Councillor in Paidha Town explained,

We refused to pass the budget of this financial year because we could not see some-
thing specifically for affirmative action. We only relented when we were assured
and shown that our concerns were captured under the various sectors – health, edu-
cation, and production – where specific budget lines were made for women's special
needs.

- *LLGs adopted discipline in plan and budget management*

What was celebrated by all the stakeholders was the shift away from the
manipulation of cash budget management into budget management discipline.
Figures 7.6, 7.7, & 7.8 below show that from the start of the project (see also
chapter 3), LLG officials made empty promises to the people that they were
committed to services delivery. Once they had the funds, spending priorities are
switched away from services delivery into administrative cost from which the
officials had their dividends.

This practice changed from FY2005/06 onwards. Budget planning and
execution (Figure 7.6) witnessed a turnaround in LLG commitments to services
delivery. What is evident from the figure is that generally from 2005/06 up to
2007/08 Services sectors continued to receive a steadily increasing proportion
of LLG budgets as compared to Administrative sectors. This positive shift is
contrary to what was happening prior to the project intervention when Admini-
strative sectors received both more allocations and actual disbursement. How-
ever, (male) LLG officials with vested interests in budget management still con-
tinue to practice budget indiscipline during cash budget management. Services
sectors receive less disbursement than was approved when compared to admi-
nistrative cost.

Figure 7.6   Budget management in LLGs in Nebbi district (%)

However, this aggregate improvement is not in all LLGs. Some LLGs such as Jangokoro, Paidha, Pakwach TC, Akworo and Wadelai still experienced a decline in Services sector budget allocation. Likewise, a similar decline in budget disbursement occurred in Pakwach TC, Jangokoro, Wadelai, Panyimur, Zeu and Parombo. This downturn makes the LLGs of Jangokoro, Pakwach TC, and Wadelai worst performing LLGs in budget management.

Such changes were attributed to one critical factor; the vigilance of women leaders (women councilors and WCEs). The LLG confessed that it was becoming increasingly difficult to single-handedly manage the affairs of their councils without the involvement of other stakeholders. The Chairman of Nyaravur had this to say,

> We used not to care much how our budget was allocated and spent since we have the technocrats who are trained to do so. The technocrats took it for granted that since most of us are not schooled enough they can manipulate the budget to suit their interest. No more! After the training given by AFARD it became apparent that a budget must be scrutinized to show/know who will benefit from it. In this way, even the technocrats got scared that their old tricks can no longer work. The arithmetic clearly compares administrative and services costs from the budget total. This keenness has made things better. More of our funds are now spent on delivering services for which we are elected.

Tangible projects

The effective participation of women in the planning and budgeting process and the reciprocal responsiveness exhibited by LLGs were expected to result into tangible benefits to women. Top on the benefit list was having what could be flagged as the fruits of women leaders' efforts. The ultimate question therefore was, after all the awareness, skills building, mobilization to participate in the planning processes, advocacies, follow-ups, and so on, what could women and LLGs point to as visible results?

To elicit answers to the above question, the review team probed the workshop participants so that whatever projects that they mentioned could be undoubtedly *attributed* to the consequences of the women leaders' work. As a result, a dialogue and consensus between Women leaders and LLG officials present in the workshop revealed what Women leaders generally pushed for and what LLGs finally responded to because of such dialogues.

The various review meetings revealed that through women's efforts LLGs were able to provide sponsorship of best performing girls in Primary Leaving Examinations (in Nebbi Town and Nebbi), distribute sanitary pads to teenage girls in schools (in Wadelai) and play balls and drama kits (in Panyimur), provide bicycle ambulance (in Pakwach town), and to construct 4 market stalls with shades and public VIP latrine (in Akworo). The most important projects

were the 4 maternity units constructed and/or equipped with 3 placenta pits, 14 beds, 10 mattresses, 7 pieces of curtains, and 2 bath shelters (in Nyaravur, Nebbi, Pakwach, Panyango, and Paidha). Mrs Zainab Ayub of Nebbi LLG emphasized that,

> We met the sectoral committee and lobbied for a better equipped maternity unit in our health centres. I am proud that the sub-county equipped maternity units at Kalwang and Koch health centers with beds and mattresses in response to our demand.

Figures 7.7 & 7.8 show a maternity unit and a placenta pit respectively. The importance attached to the placenta pit was thrilling, as the Chairperson WCE of Nyaravur narrated,

> In the past many women and their children were dying from unsafe deliveries. Many women preferred to deliver at home with traditional birth attendants for a very simple and less costly reason. They did not want the placentas of their babies to be thrown anywhere in the bush after delivery for dogs and fox to eat. Traditionally this is assumed to bring bad omen to their children. Yet, no one cared! All the things those leaders who controlled our money knew were different from such simple needs of ordinary women.
>
> When we came to the table where resources are shared, we demanded for such a simple project to be implemented in our health centre as part of an affirmative action. Because it was not costly, many LLG officials supported the idea. There it was put.
>
> When we informed the women in the villages that the health unit now had facilities for the disposal of placenta, go and visit and witness for yourselves. The number of supervised deliveries has suddenly increased. Women are flocking to come and deliver at the health facilities because they know it is safe.
>
> Meanwhile the groining from deaths has instead reduced. All of us, men and women alike, are benefiting. No more wasted labour for digging graves and fewer headaches from wailing for the deceased. All we want are such services that make life better for us all!

Figure 7.7   Equipped maternity unit in Kalowang health centre

Figure 7.8   A placenta pit in Nyaravur health centre

In response to this remark made above, the Chairperson Nyaravur LLG confessed that,

> If we were serious as leaders, I have come to realize, we can change the lives of many people with so little money. But ignorantly, we think people's needs require a lot of money which we do not have. This is our cynicism as political leaders!

LLG transparency and accountability practices

While it was recognizable that improvements in core co-governance issues have started taking root, the cardinal principles of openness and being responsible for (in)actions by LLG officials is equally vital. In this regard, the review workshops also asked 'in what ways, if any, did LLG transparency and accountability practices change?' In answering this question, two critical aspects were explored starting with LLG adherence to mandatory regulations that requires them to be transparent and accountable to their constituencies. Second, how such regulatory practices were engendered and institutionalized. For instance, while LLG are supposed to provide feedback on approved plans and budget, do they as a norm do it to both men and women? The findings from both the review workshops and documentary reviews revealed that:

- None of the LLGs had popular versions of their approved plans and budgets written in a language that an ordinary, moderately literate person, can read and understand. Only 3 of the 19 LLGs (Paidha, Pakwach and Pakwach TC) shared the full bulky copies of their plans with Women leaders. Unfortunately, many of the Women leaders could not comprehend the plan documents. Mrs Akello Margaret of Paidha LLG commented that, '*LLG officials need to forget that they are doing us a favor when they give us a copy of the approved plan and budget. It is their mandated duty to do so*'. Meanwhile Mr. Oloya Michael, Sub-county Chief Pakwach noted that '*due to resource constraints, we are unable to provide all stakeholders with copies of approved plans. However, we make sure that women leaders get a copy at least.*'

- Besides, no feedbacks on approved plans and budgets were provided to lower administrative units by most LLGs except by only 3 of the 19 LLGs (Nyapea, Pakwach and Pakwach TC). In all the remaining LLGs, instead it was the WCEs who informed their electorates of approved plans and budgets and the expected projects in the financial year. But no LLG specifically convened a feedback meeting for WCEs.

- Beyond the documents, no LLG shared with their constituency in general and Women leaders in particular any report of periodic revenues and expenditures. Details of cash inflows and outflows were jealously and secretly guarded as they are considered too sensitive for the ordinary people to know. *'The Sub-county Chiefs and Accountants only give copies of financial reports to the Chairmen of the LLGs and Secretaries for Finance Committee'* reported the workshop. Although some LLGs attempt to pin on their notice boards summaries of income and expenditures, first, they are too brief to show where the money actually went and second, one needed to move long distances to the LLG notice boards at the Sub-County offices to access the information. Again the usual culprit was lack of funds with which to make many copies of the expense reports.

  A worst case scenario was in Wadelai LLG where even the Chairman LC III, the political head of that LLG, complained that technocrats were shielding vital information from elected politicians just because the law bars politicians from delving into books of accounts. He said, "since I assumed my office, there has been little transparency on the part of the Sub-County Chief and the Accountant, yet I feel business is not fine. That is why I took the initiative to invite the Inspectorate General of Government to investigate the council." But the fundamental question that should be asked is, 'if the head of a LLG has difficulty accessing information, what chance do simple village women have accessing information?

- But on a good note almost all LLGs (except Jangokoro) are producing periodic progress reports with data that are disaggregated by gender. Achievements are starting to be tracked both against plan and intended outreach to women and men.

Wrapping up

In this chapter the effects of political capability building on women's empowerment and engendering local governance practices was assessed. The findings show more gains occurred in the facets of women leaders' awareness of their roles as well as their acquisition of civic engagement skills. Using both gains, they have taken head on performing their roles. They are moving away from a state of docility into active change agents within the political space available to them. As a result, they have ensured increasing grassroots women's participation in decentralized planning and budgeting processes. They have also through alliance building ensured that women's voices are taken up the ladder beyond the reach of ordinary village women. They are lobbying strategically for budget

support to women's strategic needs and ensuring that any promises made does not slip away.

Such an unexpected vigilance has met with positive LLG budget management practices. More funds are being committed to service delivery and such funds are no longer being diverted to meet administrative costs as was before. Yet, LLG traditional power-holders who have been for long beneficiaries of illegitimate management system still continue to hold information (that is power) away from women leaders. They do not provide feedback to the communities they serve. Neither are they willing to circulate cash inflow or outflow information. Such kaleidoscopic reactions warranted conducting a gender responsiveness audit to identify which LLGs were compliant or not. This is the focus of the next chapter.

8

Gender responsiveness barometer

In the preceding chapter, intervention outcomes were presented in the forms of dimensions of change in the practices of women leaders, ordinary women, and LLG officials. From that analysis, it was not possible to compare and contrast different LLG performance. Such a comparison is important in charting the roadmap for focal outreach and promoting internal learning. By using a system-agency analysis approach built on locally sensitive indicators, this chapter explores how each LLG was performing at the time of the closure of the project by asking 'to what extent are LLGs Gender Responsive?'. The concern herein is more on the institutionalization of engendered local governance. Answers to this question came from a Gender Responsiveness Audit (GRA) that was conducted in 2008. This chapter, therefore, describes the audit justification, focus, processes, and findings.

What is Gender Responsiveness Audit?

An effective, responsive, transparent and accountable LLG is required to be pro-people (women and men alike) not only in its policy statements *per se* but also in undertaking initiatives that benefit it constituency. The LLG is obliged to open public space for its constituency for shared rights and responsibilities in demanding for and contributing to the collective implementation, monitoring and finally accountability for development programmes (Ackerman 2004). Doing so however has to take note of gender concerns beyond the exclusive people/community-driven approach. As such, Gender Responsiveness Audit

(GRA) also known as 'Participatory Gender Plan/Budget Tracking' is, therefore, a participatory process of tracking whether or not decentralized development in LLGs is conducted through a gender-sensitive citizen-state engagement (Lakwo 2006).

Seen in this way, GRA transcends the myopic financial audit[1] and the easily manipulated Ministry of Local Government's annual performance assessment exercise. It is a stakeholder-driven user-friendly approach that tracks LLG commitments to gender equality in its participatory and gender-sensitive planning and budgeting processes and outcomes.

Why GRA?

The commitment of central government to local development is confirmed beyond policy statements by its continued provision of funding to local governments. Nebbi district itself is 99% (see Figure 3.2) dependent on such funding. Whether or not such funds reach to the intended beneficiaries is another debate altogether. But central government attempts to ascertain this by subjecting its funds utilization to: (i) financial audit; and (ii) performance assessment. Both these methods as accountability measures as I will show below have fallen short of ensuring gender responsiveness, hence the need for the Gender Responsiveness Audit. A brief look at the weaknesses of each method is stated hereunder.

Local government financial audit
To ensure effective and efficient utilization of decentralized funds, financial audits (internally and externally) are routinely conducted. SNV (2000: 4) notes that financial audit as a management tool is a control measure that investigates whether or not an organization complies with external and internal demands. Therefore, the preoccupation of financial audit is embedded in certifying and approving the legitimacy of financial management in line with the rules and regulations of financial management.

Arising from the above, financial audits are devoid of verifying value-for-money in terms of returns to the lives of the people it was meant to benefit. Rather it is preoccupied with financial procedures (often falsified by paper accountability). As such, financial audits do not provide a clear link between financial and accounting regulations, financial expenses and the change in the lives of women and men who out to benefit from such expenditures. For instance, while the Constitution demands for gender equality; financial audits do

---

[1] Krug & van Staveren in *Gender Audit: Whim or Voice* (citing Frey, 1994 and Cooter & Ginsburg 1997) echo that auditing institutions operate where information asymmetry makes them to rely on budgetary reviews of good bookkeeping and rule keeping.

not in any way analyze the gender dimensions of budgets. Such changes in people's lives are always construed to have inherently occurred.

It can therefore be said that relying on financial audit that gives priority to budget management over the relevance of the budget to beneficiary livelihoods and of all gender equality is too inadequate to guarantee improvement in services delivery and engendered governance.

Box 8.1   Objectives of the assessment

The objectives of the assessment of minimum conditions and performance measures are:

a)   To verify local government compliance to the provisions of the law governing their operations, thereby ensuring improved service delivery and resource management.

b)   To determine the local government that have the capacity to manage discretionary development funds and are eligible to access LDG under LGDP in the following financial year.

c)   To provide incentives to local government performance by rewarding good performance and sanctioning poor performance as a strategy for systems, structural and institutional strengthening and promotion of efficient and competitive service deliveries in local government

d)   To assist local government to identify functional capacity gaps and needs which if timely addressed through an enhanced Capacity Building Programme should lead to increased outputs, improved service delivery and significant poverty reduction.

e)   To promote good practice in the administration and service delivery (good governance) at the LLGs by linking all central government transfer to LLGs performance.

f)   To encourage local government to adhere to national sector specific targets and standards by incorporating local government performance on these targets in the reward/penalty scheme of the LGDP II.

g)   To enhance downwards accountability, closer coordination and integration of development activities at the Local government.

h)   To prepare ground and a comparative benchmark for external and final performance Assessment of local government by the National Assessment that must mandatorily be pre-informed by the Internal Assessment findings and results.

Source: District Planning Unit, Nebbi: 2005, 2006

Local government performance assessment

Since 2000, Ministry of Local Government has been implementing an institutionalised annual assessment of minimum conditions and performance for all local governments in Uganda, with the objectives as are detailed in Box 8.1. Initiated as a project modality for Local Government Development Programme (LGDP), this assessment later broadened to target all government transfers accessed in the form of Local Development Grant (LDG) and Capacity Building

Grant (CBG). The minimum conditions and performance assessed (and rewarded or penalised) are derived from government laws and guidelines such as the Local Governments Act (Amended 1997), Local Government Finance and Accounting Regulations (1998), Local Government Tendering and Procurement Regulations 2000, Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act (2004), National Gender Policy, National Environment Policy, HIV/AIDS Policy, as well as Guidelines for implementing sector specific conditional grants.[2]

This exercise is internally conducted by the District Internal Assessment Team composed largely of government staffs. In Nebbi district it was only in 2006 that civil society participation was enlisted. The National Assessment Team finally does the verification, validation, and benchmarking.

Of importance for this study is the gender mainstreaming aspect. The key gender mainstreaming questions asked are summarised in Box 8.2. While the results of this assessment have been promising over the years caution is needed for its use. Why? Because first, the assessment is a post-mortem exercise which does not tell us how the plans and budgets were made. Its focus is on the final results. Second, who identified and prioritised the gender issues is also not addressed as long as gender issues appear in the final plan even as mere word. Yet, chapter 4 demonstrated that how and who manages the process matters in the final result. Finally and disheartening is that the exercise is internally done exclusively by government personnel. Evidences that it is often compromised because many assessors worry about awarding penalty scores given that financial fines are the end reward. For instance, Boaz Tumusiime in 'Ministry Accuses Kasese of Forgery' during a National Assessment exercise revealed that Kasese District Local Government forged plans, budgets, minutes, and other documents.[3] Another shortfall of this assessment is evident from the minority report that AFARD as a Civil Society organization representative produced after it participated in the exercise in September 2006. The report revealed that there was:

- *Gender compartmentalization rather than mainstreaming*: At both the district and LLGs, gender issues were considered an independent affair of Community Based Services Office as opposed to government policy that requires gender issues to be mainstreamed in all sectors/departments.

---

[2] The assessment covers: Development planning; Staff functionality capacity; Monitoring and mentoring performance; Communication and accountability; Budget allocation; Procurement capacity and performance; Local revenue performance; Gender mainstreaming; Council, Executive and Finance Committee performance; Council sector committees' performance; Operation, maintenance and sustainability of investment; and Environmental mainstreaming.

[3] See Boaz Tumusiime in 'Ministry Accuses Kasese of Forgery' in *Daily Monitor Newspaper*, November 14, 2006: 7.

- *Planning processes were mostly pegged to Indicative Planning Figures (IPFs)*: Committee arrangements were found to dominate the planning and budgeting processes. By implication, the link between the top-bottom (mentoring) and bottom-up (needs identification and prioritization) approaches was lost. Officials on receipt of IPFs first allocated funds to the various sectors and activities then did situation analysis and bottom-up planning processes to window dress their results.

- *Progress reporting*: In almost all local governments (the district level inclusive) there were no progress reports. Technical Planning Committee and Sectoral Committee meetings were more inclined on budget discussions than accountability that should focus on plan, budget, output, challenges, and lessons learnt. All local governments neither measured their performance nor provided performance accountability to their constituencies for the past years through a comprehensive Sub County/Town Council Progress Report.

Box 8.2   Performance assessment questions for gender mainstreaming

1. Investment Plan reflects sound gender analysis including disaggregated data, gender impact analysis, etc.
2. Investment Plan reflects strategies to address the gender issues identified in the analysis.
3. Annual budget reflects budgetary allocations to address gender strategies that were raised in the plans.
4. Evidence that the local government has financed the gender issues identified by the plan during planning, monitoring and mentoring activities.
5. Evidence that gender specific needs were identified and analyzed during the capacity building needs assessment.
6. Specific capacity enhancement strategies and activities for Gender Focal Point Person in the current financial year linked to addressing inequalities between men and women.
7. Skills enhancement training for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities councillors undertaken during previous financial year aimed at reducing the inequalities between men and women.
8. Gender awareness training (addressing inequalities between men and women) planned for and undertaken during the previous financial year.
9. Evidence that Gender Focal Point person identified gender issues, designed strategies and mentored other staff on how to deal with inequalities between men and women.
10. Evidence that the gender Focal Person has disseminated gender information (either received from the centre or developed within the local government) to technical as well as political leaders in the local government.
Source: Ministry of Local Government, 2006

Therefore, GRA attempts to fill the gaps of and give meanings to financial audits and performance assessment. First, it is conducted in a participatory manner by core stakeholders of the respective LLG without any preserved rights to technocrats. Second, it focuses on critical contextualized gender concerns in decentralized development management of the LLGs. Third, GRA tracks beyond the traditional gender budgeting[4] focus on distributive and allocative efficiency of government budgets but also the entire planning and budgeting cycle. Finally, it also explores aspects of transparency and accountability to ensure true adherence to commitments to approved plans and budgets. This makes GRA a citizen-state managed process of assessing the engenderment of local governments using mutually agreed upon yardsticks.

Objective and focus of GRA

As an approach, this GRA was conducted to assess the extent to which engendered governance was institutionalized in LLGs in Nebbi district as is required by the Constitution, National Gender Policy, and the planning and budgeting guidelines. The assessment aimed at providing a basis for entrenching women's political entitlements and local government compliance to existing laws and regulations that promote gender equality in services delivery.

The audit looked at the entire approved local government planning and budgeting framework and ideally categorized them into two interrelated phases and 4 themes as is described below and summarized in Table 8.1.

---

4   With respect to engendering local governance, the tools used in gender budgeting have the following pitfalls:
1. Some tools like incidence analysis require 'expert/technocrat skills that is lacking among a majority of the elected leaders and especially women leaders.
2. Where plans are not target specific and do not have gender disaggregated data the analysis of budget benefit to women and men is grossly hampered.
3. The tools pay more attention to budget outcomes than budget formulation processes. Yet, often such outcomes are derived from structural exclusion of women like their denied participation in the various budget processes.
4. In many local governments, plan and budget documents are less synchronized. Therefore, by looking at the budget alone one missed the issues raised in the plan document.
5. Finally, the practice of 'cash budget' management is characterized by manipulations and 'closed door transactions' much to the disadvantage of women leaders.

Table 8.1 Gender Responsiveness Audit focus

Focus	Indicators # in assessment tool
1. Women's participation • Proportion of women to men participating in village planning meetings • Proportion of women to men participating in parish planning meetings • Proportion of women to men participating in sub county budget conference • Proportion of women to men participating in sub county budget approval meeting	2-4, 6
2. Women leaders effectiveness • Women leaders identified core women's issues at all levels before planning meetings • Women leaders held meetings with sub county Sectoral committees • Women leaders involved in expenditure allocation • Women leaders met Sectoral committees to follow disbursements	1, 5, 18, 22
3. LLG responsiveness • Sectoral plans have gender disaggregated targets • Plans and budgets have affirmative action consideration • Budgets have explicit gender responsiveness statements • Aggregate budget allocated for services Vs administrative sectors • Intra-sector allocation for services Vs administrative costs • Share of budget allocated for affirmative action • Aggregate budget disbursed for services Vs administrative sectors • Intra-sector disbursement for services Vs administrative costs • Share of budget disbursed for affirmative action	7-12, 19-21
4. LLG transparency & accountability practices • LLG have popular version of their plans • LLG provided WCE with a copy of the approved plan/budget • LLG communicated about approved plan/budget to lower units • LLGs communicated about approved plan/budget to WCE • LLG provide WCE with details of cash inflows/outflows • Progress reports include gender disaggregated data	13-17, 23

a) *Plan and budget formulation processes.* The focus herein is on *needs assessment and programming*. Ideally, the processes are required to be participatory, use gender analytical tools, and should be poverty responsive. The eventual outcome should be a gender responsive plan and budget. Pertinent also is women's participation as well as women's needs. This is because it was noted that women start losing out on resource allocation from: (i) their inability to identify what their priorities are; (ii) in order to ably rally support for such priorities; and (iii) hence, they fail to mobilize other women to take

active part in the various meetings where decisions are made. Attention is also given to the fact that when needs reprioritization become 'Sectoral Committee' affairs, Women leaders as the champion of women's voices need to actively pursue women's needs with the various Sectoral committees.

b) *Plan and budget implementation and accounting*. At this stage, funds received from all sources are disbursed for translating plans into procuring the agreed upon goods and services that the people needed. It is expected that resources should be spent as per the targets agreed upon and any revision is done collectively. Equally, the monitoring, review, and reporting of progress resulting from the funds utilization are assessed for adherence to the promises made.

Methodological approach

The GRA exercise was conducted in three stages, namely:

Stage 1: The preparatory phase
- The audit indicators (as is detailed in Annex 3) were identified in a brainstorming session attended by the District Planner and the Senior Community Development Officer and the Good Governance team of AFARD.
- The identified indicators were refined during the training of local government officials and Women Council Executives in Participatory Gender Monitoring and Evaluation of local government investments.
- After the indicators were finally developed, a working team comprising of local government and AFARD staffs as well as the District WCEs was set up. This team developed a work plan and communicated it to the various local governments with clear information on what is expected of them as well as the time for assessment.

Stage 2   The field work phase
- Every local government was assigned one day for the assessment. On the scheduled days, the assessment team visited the LLGs and together with the local government staffs collected data from the various sources.
- At the end of each day, a review and summary scoring was done.

Stage 3   Reporting and feedback
- A draft report was written from the summarized findings in the daily reviews.

- The draft report was discussed in a feedback meeting which analyzed the overall findings. This meeting was also attended by officials from local government, District WCE office, and peer civil society organizations.
- A final report was then written. This was shared with the district and local government political and technical leaders.

Data collection methods

As is detailed in the audit instruments, the following main data collection methods were used by the team of assessors:

- *Documentary reviews*: The available documents related to lower local government commitments to gender equality and adherence to regulations especially in line with the indicators for planning and budgeting (as well as accounting) were reviewed. These were mainly the approved and revised plans and budgets, activity reports for some central government programmes, and minutes of women council meetings.
- *Observations*: To ensure that what were reported in the reviewed documents were true, verification observations of some documents like copies of vouchers, virement letters requesting for budget re-allocation, and cash flow statements were done and the figures used to cross-check what were stated in approved plans and budgets.
- *Interviews*: These were held with the Sub county Chiefs, Accountants, and Sub-county Women leaders. The focus of the interviews was on the participation of women in the planning and budgeting processes and the effectiveness of Women Council structures.

Results scoring

That the GRA is expected to capture both process and outcome performance indicators of a given local government in regards to gender planning and budgeting, the identified indicators were scored in order to allow for comparison of local government performance. This was done by:

Step 1:   Having each indicator scored on a 0 - 1 scores because either the local government did not meet the requirement (0 score) or it did (1 score).

Step 2:   Summarizing the actual (observed) score for every local government and dividing it with the expected 23 scores that all local governments should have scored. The sum was then multiplied by 100% to get a local government Gender Responsiveness Score.

Step 3:   Categorizing the Gender Responsiveness Score into Gender Responsiveness Status using Table 8.2 below.

Table 8.2   Categorization of gender responsiveness status

Scale	Status
71-100%	*Gender responsive status:* Represents good performing LLG with engendered governance system and to a large degree adheres to gender sensitive decentralized development management.
36-70%	*Fairly gender responsive status:* Represents fairly performing LLG that needs added effort to improve on their responsiveness status. It is a LLG that is on track in engendering its governance system.
0-35%	*Non-gender responsive status:* Represents bad performing LLG that needs concerted effort in order to change their responsiveness status. This also means that the LLG practices a gendered governance system.

Assessment findings

Table 8.3 shows the gender responsiveness thematic scores and status of all LLGs in Nebbi district in 2008. While overall the LLGs attained a 55% average score representing a fairly gender responsive status, no single LLG had a gender responsive status. However, 16 of the 19 LLGs scored in the fairly gender responsive status and 3 LLGs were non-gender responsive.

Meanwhile, as is shown in Figure 8.1, there is marked performance in the facets of women leaders' effectiveness, grassroots women participation, and LLG plan and budget responsiveness to gender concerns. Concerns remains in LLG transparency and accountability practices.

Table 8.3   LLG performance by score theme

Theme	Gender responsiveness status		
	Gender responsive	Fairly gender responsive	Non-gender responsive
Women leaders effectiveness	All 19 LLGs	None	None
Women's participation	None	Akworo, Panyango, Panyimur	Nebbi, Kucwiny, Atyak
LLG (plan/budget) responsiveness	All 11 other LLGs	Parombo, Nyapea, Nebbi TC, Nebbi	Jangokoro, Kucwiny, Atyak, Wadelai
LLG transparency & accountability practices	None	Pakwach TC, Pakwach	All 17 other LLGs
Overall performance	None	All 16 other LLGs	Jangokoro, Atyak, Kucwiny

Figure 8.1   Gender Responsiveness Audit performance

WCE Effectiveness
78%
68%
LLG Responsiveness
63%
6%
Women's participation
LLG transparency &
accountability practices

Summing up

From the GRA findings, it can be observed that an improvement in decen-
tralized governance in Nebbi district is largely coming from the citizen side of
the equation given that the state side of the equation exhibited by LLGs res-
ponses are largely sluggish. The finding reveals that to a greater extent the
process of engendering local governance in the LLGs will be slow. This poses
an enormous challenge for majority of women leaders who are for the first time
securing central political space which they were never allowed before. That
their growing zeal to work is meted by a lukewarm reception by the traditional
LLG power-holders, the effectiveness of the political space to yield to co-
governance can be doubted given that whether or not women leaders and LLG
officials will be 'dancing to the same tune in the same dancehall' (Helmsing
2005). Thus, the process of engendering decentralized governance remains an
uphill task ahead.

9

Learning from actions

This last chapter focuses on exploring the way forward for building sustainable and engendered decentralized governance. It ties a link between the two opposing arguments pointed out in Chapter 1 regarding the relevance of the insertion of women in decentralized governance with the practitioners' call for political capability building. While the former provides recognized actors status to women leaders the latter catalyzes their effective roles' execution. As a result, integrating the two arguments present a valuable ingredient for enhancing effective women's political participation, in the available policy arena, as citizens with rights to demand for both services and accountability.

In so doing, the chapter explores – as is summarized in Table 9.1 below – what lessons can be learned from the success of the AFARD projects in triggering women's political participation. It also delves into factors that are impeding LLG commitments to gender equality before finally proposing the way forward in deepening engendered decentralized governance. To do so, however, the chapter asks a central question, 'how can decentralized governance be sustainably engendered?' This question is answered by further asking the following sub-questions:

- What lessons can be learned from AFARD projects?
- What challenges continue to hinder engendering decentralized co-governance?
- What more needs to be done to sustain the current gains achieved?

Lessons to learn

AFARD projects were initiated to countervail the technocratic and patronizing practices of local government development management that had blocked public space for duly elected women leaders because some male power-holders wanted to conclave the dividends of their political capture. The projects' logic was simple: put the women leaders as the rightful rights holder in front and catalyze them to stand firm for their rights and that of their constituency. To a greater extent this logic was successful. Why? This part answers this question basing on the discussions with the project staffs, women leaders, and some LLG officials as well as the information generated during the end-of-project review workshops. The following were seen as critical lessons to consider:

- *Local politics does not mean local equality*
Bringing power closer to the people and designating special seats for marginalized social groups as is done under decentralization in Uganda is no clear license for promoting equality. Such an approach is simply an equity approach which does not address the deep-seated root causes of discrimination. For women, it can be said that adopting such an approach only helps to bridge the gender gaps in the numbers of politicians rather than the gender discrimination that relegates women to the backseat of social development. It is simply not automatic that women's presence means having voice; voice that is heard to impact on their lives.

- *The public and the private is blurred in governance*
While it is easy to delineate the public and private divide in the lives of state power-holders, from a gender perspective this line is blurred in practice. Men who have been socialized and are always cheered up by hegemony translates such social dividends as normal into the public arena. Unfortunately, within the public arena it translates into denial of rights to voice and access to public services; something that helps perpetuates inequalities between women and men on the one hand and between government officials and the masses on the other.

- *Citizenship is enmeshed with culture; it can only be claimed*
While the legal frameworks in Uganda supports gender equality of women and men in all walks of live, to the contrary within local governments the culture of 'male superiority' still lingers in the minds and practices of both male power-holders as well as women whose voice and rights are denied. Women are often reduced to only saying opening and closing prayers without critical deliberation in council meetings because of fear of being perceived as behaving abnormally by talking in public; a preserve for men. Such a trend makes culture to subdue ability to claiming citizenship.

- *Political capability building is inevitable for claiming citizenship*

Claiming women's citizenship is not merely a matter of having a good legal basis for doing so. Rather, it requires conscientization to ignite political bargaining. This comes when women have the civic competency capacity commensurate with their roles and responsibilities. Short of which a majority of women and men who neither know their rights nor have the skills with which to claim those rights may find it either hard, or take too long on their own, to stand up in defence of their abused rights.

- *The license to claiming citizenship is not only a function of literacy*

The tendency that policy arena requires technical skills was found to be redundant because such an arena is not where plan and budget documents are written. Rather they are spaces where women and men air out their views as a woman leader remarked, 'do I have to go to school in order to say I need medicine in the hospital?' Thus, the exclusion of women in the policy arena because they are not highly schooled to master technical jargons is simply a scapegoat to enable elites capture local governance. Equally among the women such a reason was because they had lost trust in their LLGs. Given public support many women leaders who are not schooled ably championed women's causes within their LLG policy arena.

- *Civil society has a role to play in claiming citizenship*

The big bang therefore does not simply occur with claiming citizenship. It has to be initiated by someone or an institution. That majority of women do not know that their rights are tramped on and that LLG power-holders are simply unwilling to let go of their benefits, civil society organizations (CSOs) can catalyze the process and let those affected take the show. CSOs can mobilize the participation of the excluded, facilitate their civic awareness, and also provide technical backstopping.

- *Rights-based approach enhances engendering decentralized governance and development*

This approach is vital because first, it enlists women leaders to know that they have rights and duties. This awareness ignited their latent power to demand for recognized inclusion in the arena as well as to demand for services and accountability from government power-holders. Meanwhile for LLG officials the approach was reported to have 'clipped their manoeuvres of patronizing development'. It challenged their hitherto unquestioned powers and reduced them to duty-bearers entitled to listen to people's needs and account for their actions.

- *The affected constituency are better forerunners in claiming their citizenship*

A LLG official remarked that 'you cannot mourn more than the bereaved' meaning that women leaders know the plight of women better and are the right category whose rights are abused. Their standing up to claim what was theirs was more justified and indeed compelled LLG power-holders not to dispute their demand for representation and support to women's needs.

- *Winning political support has more payoffs*

While political and elite captures were found to operate concurrently, in areas where political capture was detached the elites became vulnerable to the pressure of women leaders. Thus political support to co-governance and pro-poor budget is vital in ensuring that plans and budget are responsive to services sectors and affirmative action support.

- *Alliance building strengthens voice and information flow*

For women leaders to effectively play in the policy arena they need the support of other actors. The alliance built with women councillors and community development officers enhanced women's access to 'confidential information' as well as developing rightful strategies for advocating for their needs.

- *Citizenship building takes time*

For women to gain the acceptance to claim their rights and for initial power-holders to recognize women's vitality in the policy arena, time is need. This project demonstrated that even if the first project started in the FY 2004/05 it is not until 2005/06 that budget responsiveness started to take root (see Figure 7.6).

- *Information is important*

Effective civic engagement also requires timely and relevant information to support a given human right that is being demanded. By showing the local government leadership the extent to which women were excluded from the policy arena contrary to the legal requirements and by linking such acts with the inability to deliver services given that no one was there to ask enabled women leaders to win most political power-holders to support their course.

- *Accountability question is double-edged for women leaders*

While in community participation the link between rights-holders and duty-bearers is straight for accountability flow, for women leaders this is double-edged in the sense that their constituency requires them to account to them just like they require LLG officials to account for the commitments made in the plans and budget. As such, engendering decentralized governance widens the

accountability frontiers and increases the flow of information as well as the participation of citizens.

- *Effective mobilization requires multi-communication channel*

Effective participation of women is dependent on how they are mobilized. One approach like the interpersonal communication alone was found to be inadequate in reaching out to many women. A woman in Zeu pointed out that, 'to get women together for a meeting you have to use as many ways of reaching out to them as possible, for instance, through contact leaders, announcements in churches, during public gathering, over the radio, and so forth'. This also goes for general awareness creation.

- *Having a woman chaired committee hastens rights claiming*

Many committees headed by men were found to be slow in accepting women leaders as co-actors in those committees as compared to where the committees were headed by women. It was easier for women to integrate in these latter committees and speak out their minds easily that was in the former.

Challenges impeding engendering decentralized governance

The following were also revealed as slowing down the pace of engendering decentralized governance:

- *Rigidity on resource-based planning*

While collaborative policy-making is evidence-based and needs-driven, LLGs were found to be exclusively rigidly attached to ministry resource envelops and focused on input-output oriented plans and budgets. In this way, attention is drawn to how many people are reached with little concern for inequalities embedded in causes and outcomes of such interventions.

- *Ignorance of gender policies*

It was also echoed that while the need for gender mainstreaming was really not new, many leaders were ignorant of policies governing gender issues. For instance, the National Gender Policy and Action Plan was noted to have remained as a buzz-framework only known by national level actors. Many LLG and Women Council leaders were too ignorant about it and how to get it operationalized. In areas where the leaders knew of the policy requirements, women's participation and needs were accorded due attention as the Assistant Town Clerk, Nebbi Town Council said,

> Despite our resource limitations, we try very much to consider issues raised by women in our budget for implementation. We also do so because it is a policy issue

by government to cater for gender concerns in plans/budgets as well as in the quality of life of the people we serve.

- *Weak institutionalization of Women Council*

Although the government established a parallel structure of women council to reinforce the women councilors, this structure is largely not recognized by LLGs. They are seen as a central government business and at times as competitors and not as complementary support agency of LLG operations. Jeska Okori, Woman Councilor Pakwach Town Council summed this challenge when she stated that,

> The women council leaders do not have working space and their activities are not funded by LLGs. They are expected to work principally on voluntarism basis and no LLGs seem to recognize their presence and importance in bringing women's issues to the fore. So, how effective would you expect them to be beyond what they are doing now; more so apparently they are beggars?

- *Limited local government resource envelop*

It was noted that many LLGs do not have enough funds with which to fund all the needs of collaborative policy-making. LLG officials echoed that they lack funds to undertake village-based planning, produce copies of plans/budget, produce accountability reports, and finally to effectively respond to the various project needs of their constituencies. The consequences are that many women are excluded from this policy arena together with the very needs they should have brought forth. Equally, many women simply see no reason to continue participating in a non-responsive policy arena as Mr. Onyongocok Peter a councillor from Pakwach put it,

> Women's lack of interest in participation in planning and budgeting processes is simply because their prioritized needs are not implemented by government. They ask themselves, why they must demand for the same things over and over without any of them implemented.

Public reliance on representative politics underscores the hidden interest such representatives have (Goetz & Jenkin 2005: 28). Besides, as Robinson (1998) notes such mediated voice through indirect participation distorts part of the political strength the near-dominant actors should have attained.

- *Inability to tap into community potentials*

It was also noted that in the few LLGs that have opened up for their communities to participate in the various processes of decentralized development, attention is only focused on central and donor funds. Discussions all rotate on what is to be done with funds from other sources. Little attention is drawn on catalyzing people to not only claim their rights but also become responsible by contributing towards their needs.

- *Livelihood insecurity*

While collective action is important for the common good of society, a woman asked, 'how do I reach that public space when I am hungry? Would I not need to have the food and energy first? This is a fundamental question to claiming citizenship. Often women leaders find it difficult to mobilize women to engage with their council collectively as a women's constituency because many women give preference to their livelihood activities. Mrs Ngamita Molly of Panyimur voiced this sentiment when she said:

> I am a mother of four children who cannot afford to sacrifice getting bread for my children to go for public meetings in which no allowances are even paid. How would you feel when you come back home after the meeting and your children are sleeping under the veranda hungry? Would you be a successful mother or just a laughing stock? I prefer my fish business to Women Council's affairs.

- *Competitive politics between women council and women councillors*

Having a parallel women structure has also in some cases fuelled competition for recognition. Women councillors especially find that the coming in of WCEs to co-partake with them in furthering women's interest is an encroachment on their initial powers and dominance of women presence in the policy arena (even if they were not effective). Mrs. Bithum Nester of Nyaravur contended that,

> Some Women Councillors actively frustrate our lobbying efforts. Instead of working with us as a team they turn around to de-campaign our efforts. Some even insist that only elected politicians must sit in sector committee meetings thereby excluding us and the spaces we have already won with male politicians.

As a result, Mrs. Zainabu Ayub of Nebbi and Mrs. Ociba Serefina of Pakwach pointed out that often male politicians and technical staff take advantage of such squabbles to under look women's efforts. Some, in fear of the assertiveness of WCE, side with Women Councillors to block the effective participation of WCEs. They deny them information about whatever is taking place in the LLG and when asked only say that they have already passed the information through women councillors.

- *Limited awareness of human rights*

It was also noted that majority of women and men alike are not aware of their rights. In this limbo of lack of knowledge duty-bearers take advantage to make it appear normal that others are not mandated to know what is happening in their council and also to be part of the processes.

- *One-sides and one-off capacity building approach*

Participants in the review workshops also pointed out that often times many CSOs wrongly construe that LLG officials already have skills for doing what-

ever tasks they are expected to do. For instance, the skills to undertake gender responsive planning and budgeting, monitoring, and even writing reports in a gender neutral language is lacking among many LLG officials. Therefore, 'expecting LLG officials to achieve the needs of engendering their plans without the skills would indeed be demanding for too much', the Community Development Officer concluded.

Meanwhile the women leaders also argued that one-off trainings are not very effective. Without refresher courses many people forget their acquired skills given that they do not use those skills on a daily basis.

- *Lack of effective communication strategy*

Lack of free flow of information among active stakeholders continues to inhibit coordination for collective actions. Often, such a weakness has been used to deliberately make decisions without the correct information (Robinson 2006: 12) and also to deny access to budget information (Goetz & Jenkins 2005: 89) thereby hampering people's demand for accountability..

- *Contraction in the 1997 Local Governments Act*

Some LLG leaders were noted to be uncooperative because they see women leaders entry into their dominated policy arena as 'stepping on their toes' remarked the Accountant of Akworo. To defend their interest (Robinson, 2006: 12), they ensure that almost all planning and budgeting activities are completed at the sectoral committee levels using the LLG Act that only permits elected councillors to sit on sectoral committee as their shield remarked the Sub county Chief Kango.

Ways forward

In order to sustain the current gains made, it is imperative that:

- LLG resource envelops are widened. This can be done by increasing remittance from central government on the one hand and by ensuring that citizens are enlightened to claim their rights as well as exhibit the accompanying responsibilities on the other hand.
- Increased political capability building is undertaken to strengthen grassroots women's civic competence through human rights awareness creation as well as skills training for women leaders and LLG officials.
- The alliances and networking between women councillors and WCE basing on their common purpose of championing women's needs in their constituencies is strengthened. However, the wider women constituency would also need to be enlightened to hold the women leaders jointly accountable.

Table 9.1   Learning from action analysis

To improve:	Success factors	Inherent challenges	Lessons learned
WCE effectiveness	• Skills training • Support with allowances • Technical backstopping support by AFARD • Having women on key LLG committees • Political will	• One-off capacity building approach • Illiteracy of many members • Lack of facilitation • Weak national Women Council structure • Rivalry with Women Councillors	• Civic competence and skills building are inevitable for effective advocacy • Alliance between different women leaders' institutions promotes the effectiveness of demanding for women's rights
Women's participation	• Multimedia communication for mobilization • Vigilance of WCE • Alliance with Women Councillors	• Cultural inhibition of women's public demands • Livelihood insecurity • Low awareness of rights • LGA 1997 restrictions on committee participation • LLG selective mobilization strategy • LLG avoidance of village planning meetings	• Effective mobilization by women leaders energizes women's participation • Unfulfilled promises discourage continued participation • Illiteracy is wrongly used as a roadblock to women's participation
LLG responsive-ness	• Alliance with WC • Evidence-based advocacy by women themselves • Promoting development as a human right • Political will	• Illiteracy of many women leaders • Inadequate skills for GRPB • Inadequate revenue of LLGs • Sectoral committee approach to budgeting • Arrogance of sub accountants	• CSO technical backstopping reduces elitist machination of budget cycles • Better budget lobbying is done in the sectoral committee meetings • Affirmative action budget support hasten balancing the gender inequality scale
LLG transparency & accountability practices	• WCE vigilance • Conducting joint GRA • Political will	• Poor (gender sensitive) data management • Lack of effective communication strategy • Inadequate understanding of accountability (e.g., it is taken for witch-hunt, mere information dissemination, or all about money) • Weak demand by women for accountability • Lack of linkage with Anti-corruption institutions	• Credible advocacy requires the affected people to take the frontline seat and use valid information • Accountability is a double edge principle that requires the people to demand for it and the duty bearer to find value in accounting. Besides it is beyond mere information dissemination but also involves direct participation in decision making processes • Data dis-aggregation by sex improves lobbying for budget equity and ability to account for engendered benefits

- Information sharing channels are improved. This will allow all women leaders and LLG officials to have correct information on, and confidence in, each other thereby building trust and cordial working relations.
- CSOs in the district should take-up building private-public partnership to ensure effective coordination of planning, outreach and accounting. By so doing, the culture of input-output and outcome-impact driven planning will be shared and institutionalized; and resource envelop for tackling livelihood insecurity will increase.

A concluding reflection

In all, this study explored the processes of engendering local governance. It questioned the relevance of the insertion of women in democratic decentralization on the one hand and the fad with political capability building on the other. Its central argument was how these two divergent appeals translate into better life for women who have and continue to suffer from hegemonic gender relations more so that local governance is gendered in its management.

Answers from the various empirical chapters drawn from Nebbi district revealed that inserting women into decentralized political offices is no panacea to gender equality. Such a strategy was found to only open the symbolic door to political space for both grassroots women and women leaders without any guarantee of their effective political participation in such arena. Decentralized governance was found to be gendered. Majority male political leaders and technocrats socialized and cheered by hegemony were perpetuating their gendered interests into public policy arena.

Without recognition and voice of the women constituency, it also became visible why women are denied public services from LLGs due to 'sins of commission' (Mehta 2005). To challenge the status quo of exclusionary local governance called for citizenship building. Yet, citizenship is not given but claimed because no power-holder who has been gaining dividends from exclusion can willingly handover such power position.

Importantly, the study showed that citizenship is better claimed by those affected by political exclusion. It also showed that to balance state-citizen equation through claiming citizenship political capability building is inevitable. By facilitating the politicization and reactivation of citizens, political capability building was found to enhance the engagement between citizens in demanding for services and accountability from their state leaders. By '(re)positioning citizens' as actors, capability building allows for the 'creation, opening and reshaping' of policy arena (Cornwall 2002a) whereby women who were simply beneficiaries of LLG services offered to them as and how LLG experts deemed wise became shapers and markers of the key services they need.

However, the meek receptivity of LLG power-holders in this re-defined political arena as well as the gaps in women's participation and political capabilities means that an uphill task of half the battle won stands ahead to be fought with determination for gender equality to be institutionalized in local governance. Civil society organizations have competitive edge in leading this process.

Annexes

Annex 1: About AFARD: The implementing agency

AFARD's Functional Mandates

Values/Principles			
Respecting human dignity, equality, justice and freedom. The enshrinement of the empowerment approach to development Adopting an interactive and flexible approach; Local ownership by groups of whatever initiatives they are involved in; Use of participatory methodologies in all activities; Reliance on local resources including ITK, human and physical resources; Localizing research aimed at generating local area sensitive interventions; Genuine partnership based on mutual trust, respect and honesty; • • • • • • • •	**Vision**	"A Prosperous, Healthy, and Informed People of West Nile".	**Impact**
	Mission	"To contribute to the molding of a region in which the local people, including those who are marginalized, are able to participate effectively and sustainably and take a lead in the development of the region".	
	Objectives	1. To harness the knowledge, skills and experiences of development practitioners within the region and channel it for the accelerated, equitable and sustainable development of the region. 2. To act as a midwife, an interim link between the grass roots and sources of new information, innovations, expertise and funds required for the type of development that places people firmly in the center of all development efforts. 3. To avail of our expertise by way of consultancy to other development stakeholders interested in the region.	**Outcome**
	Thematic Areas	❖ Food and income security ❖ Community health ❖ Community empowerment Cross cutting issues - Institutional development - Gender - Environment	Key strategies ❖ Skills development ❖ Participatory action research ❖ Resource mobilization ❖ Information dissemination ❖ Advocacy and lobbying ❖ Networking and linkages
	Main benefici-aries	❖ Community based groups. ❖ Disadvantaged community especially women.	**Operations**
	System	❖ Operational guidelines. ❖ Action plans.	
	Structure	❖ The Board of Directors. ❖ The Management team. ❖ Independent partner groups.	
	Alliances	❖ Local governments. ❖ Donor community. ❖ Private sector institutions. ❖ Members of Civil Society Organizations.	

AFARD, a local professional, not-for-profit, and non-denominational NGO currently operating in West Nile region, Uganda, was formed in July 2000. AFARD's formation was motivated by numerous reasons. *First*, the West Nile

region is the poorest in Uganda with over 6 in 10 people living below US$ 1 a day. *Second*, many development interventions have been 'external to local context' and imposed leaving behind a people hardly changed. *Third*, given the hitch of democratic machination by government, the people are reduced to subjects and not citizen of the state. They only matter during election. *Finally*, that many sons and daughters of the region prefer to work elsewhere limited enthusiasms to work for self development.

AFARD's focus

AFARD is engaged in a number of activities. These are implemented using a participatory approach right from the needs identification through execution to monitoring progress. Below are the interventions.

AFARD thematic focuses

Theme 1 Food and Income Security	
Sustainable agriculture enhancement To fight food insecurity due to the poor farmer-extension-researcher linkage, AFARD focuses on increasing household food production and purchasing power. Improved agro-technologies like high-value crops and livestock have been introduced for group-based multiplication. Field-based extension services are routinely provided. These are complemented by agri-business skills and nutrition education.	***Community microenterprise development*** To increase household income and groups' self-funding capacity, AFARD integrates entrepreneurship and group savings and credit schemes promotion. Income generation and savings mobilization and credit management skills are provided to all partner group members. Loan committees are established and trained. Boaster funds are preferred as top-ups onto what the groups have.
Theme 2 Community Health	
HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation Herein multi-channel communication is used for behaviour change promotion. And for mitigation a family centered approach is adopted. Direct supports are provided for Orphans and Vulnerable Children in schools. Support families' abilities to generate income for their basic needs are also enhanced. For Persons living with AIDS a post test club approach to community care and support is emphasized. Herein issues related to economic independence, counselling, life skills, and community dialogue are mainstreamed.	***Safe water and sanitation promotion*** With a focus on fishing communities where access to and utilization of safe water and sanitation practices are poor, AFARD provides access to safe facilities, community education and hygiene competitions as baits for entrenching community policing to be enforced by the community. This is pivoted on the locally agreed upon standards (also approved by the sub county local government council).
Theme 3 Community empowerment	
Institutional development To build sustainability of partner community based organizations (CBOs), AFARD facilitate both their programme enhancement and organizational growths hinging on participatory capacity self-assessment, agreed upon capacity building plan, and periodic review where CBOs ably chart their growth paths and identify their areas of persistent weaknesses for continued support.	***Good governance*** To promote gender equality, AFARD focuses on widening political space for, and entitlements of women by increasing women's participation and voice in decision-making in local government planning and budgeting processes through skills training, participatory M+E, information sharing, alliance building, technical and financial backstopping and advocacy and lobbying.

Source: Annual Reports and Strategic Plan

Annex 2:   Nebbi district local government budget performance, 1995-2008

	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/2000	2000/01
Income						
Local revenue	416,745,982	215,015,666	244,096,969	696,065,464	312,413,848	195,647,245
Central government transfers	2,686,681,933	2,371,532,891	4,093,941,359	5,455,160,655	5,927,906,850	9,077,994,195
Donor funds	143,641,600	398,265,458	315,690,857	321,391,198	640,424,312	1,951,815,572
Total	**3,247,069,515**	**2,984,814,015**	**4,653,729,185**	**6,472,617,317**	**6,880,745,010**	**11,225,457,012**
Expenditures						
Council, Boards, & Commission	53,709,968	24,320,541	48,659,023	122,071,265	190,503,058	151,892,204
Finance & Planning	217,300,019	282,903,939	165,250,605	139,613,643	203,618,327	171,510,881
Management support services	741,330,242	435,412,476	655,472,914	895,086,579	583,943,083	4,585,218,256
Education & sports	1,225,903,030	1,631,499,551	2,379,174,097	3,451,449,572	4,303,232,774	3,664,608,193
Production & Marketing	136,472,516	94,375,067	118,664,572	135,683,779	227,197,804	179,560,265
Health & Environment	494,715,144	334,727,582	776,994,857	934,885,541	1,052,470,694	1,325,878,889
Community Based Services	27,735,300	9,887,584	28,054,865	32,629,290	40,042,165	39,879,157
Technical Services & Works	275,076,976	231,154,737	320,831,354	609,877,157	535,546,024	882,265,953
Natural Resources	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**3,172,243,195**	**3,044,281,477**	**4,493,102,287**	**6,321,296,826**	**7,136,553,929**	**11,000,813,798**

Annex 2: Nebbi district local government budget performance, 1995-2008 (continued)

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Income							
Local revenue	19,795,570	360,547,246	362,414,033	279,220,749	95,258,945	99,936,150	181,353,031
Central government transfers	12,147,043,288	10,679,800,622	13,113,825,680	13,799,170,375	14,586,716,224	15,291,526,633	15,961,128,120
Donor funds	1,957,820,373	2,705,546,514	983,165,030	1,482,633,812	1,061,202,453	1,627,428,137	2,408,842,440
Total	**14,124,659,231**	**13,745,894,382**	**14,459,404,743**	**15,561,024,936**	**15,743,177,622**	**17,018,890,920**	**18,551,323,591**
Expenditures							
Council, Boards, & Commission	173,501,714	223,190,102	282,729,334	141,444,713	128,375,194	102,123,771	225,510,108
Finance & Planning	327,156,572	110,756,698	133,435,150	220,176,329	219,409,651	215,009,717	425,338,479
Management support services	3,527,835,653	8,349,587,149	8,136,972,485	9,215,236,737	10,869,607,743	11,932,754,001	4,562,200,493
Education & sports	5,240,346,541	1,896,493,669	2,017,090,623	2,266,669,164	1,613,515,361	625,350,233	7,381,904,968
Production & Marketing	601,234,640	333,062,673	353,039,322	388,642,195	356,399,871	938,845,690	1,138,237,487
Health & Environment	2,458,180,917	1,600,634,586	1,872,279,475	1,968,039,672	1,450,476,498	1,765,096,529	2,916,030,133
Community Based Services	87,438,825	64,190,342	81,321,760	88,255,714	69,676,977	85,399,335	171,388,094
Technical Services & Works	1,456,654,654	1,216,990,235	1,395,683,204	1,754,573,081	1,013,935,575	920,005,853	1,454,953,843
Natural Resources	-	-	-	-	20,146,022	31,560,437	84,859,803
Total	**13,872,349,516**	**13,794,905,454**	**14,272,551,353**	**16,043,037,605**	**15,741,542,892**	**16,616,145,566**	**18,360,423,408**

Annex 3: Gender responsiveness audit focus

Cy-cle	Critical indicators	Source of information	Method of data collection	How to conduct the assessment	Use
Budget Planning	1. WCE identified core women's issues at all levels before LG planning meetings	Minutes of WCE	Documentary review	∗ From the chairperson WCE, ask for a copy of their pre-planning minute. ∗ Verify whether or not they identified core women's issue. Also verify whether or not they communicated to lower WCEs ∗ *If an issue is identified score 1 otherwise 0.*	Evid-ence of women council effect-iveness Pursue specific gender needs in the budget
	2. Proportion of women to men participating in village planning meeting	Attendance list with PDCs i/c planning	Documentary review	∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	Mobi-lize women to
	3. Proportion of women to men participating in parish planning meeting	Attendance list with PDCs i/c planning	Documentary review	∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	partici-pate in the plannin

Cy-cle	Critical indicators	Source of information	Method of data collection	How to conduct the assessment	Use
	4. Proportion of women to men participating in sub county budget conference	Attendance list with sub accountant	Documentary review	∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	
	5. WCE held meeting with sub county Sectoral committees	Attendance list with sub accountant	Documentary review	∗ From the i/c planning in the LLG get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *If they did score 1 otherwise 0*	Push for fairness of budget allo-cation
	6. Proportion of women to men participating in sub county budget approval meeting	Minutes of WCE	Documentary review	∗ From the i/c planning in the LLG get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *For proportion equal to 50% score 1 otherwise 0*	Push for women's needs
	7. Sectoral plans have gender disaggregated targets	Approved plan	Observation	∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved plan ∗ Look at sector analysis in problem statement, target setting and monitoring plan ∗ Ascertain whether or not they contain gender blind, neutral or sensitive analysis ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	Policy commit-ment to engen-dered develop ment
	8. Plans and budgets have affirmative action consideration	Approved plan & budget	Observation	∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved plan and budget ∗ Look at affirmative actions in the approved priority project list ∗ Ascertain whether or not the approved budget have allocations for those priorities ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	

Cycle	Critical indicators	Source of information	Method of data collection	How to conduct the assessment	Use
	9. Budgets have explicit gender responsiveness statements	Approved budget	Observation	* From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved budget * Look at the budget statement if it contains explicit gender responsiveness statements * *If so, score 1 otherwise 0*	
	10. Aggregate budget allocated for services Vs administrative sectors	Approved budget	Documentary review	* From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved budget * Compute the budget allocation for services sectors (education, health, agriculture, community development, environment and technical services) * Compute the budget allocation for administrative sector (management support and finance, councils and planning) * Compute the percent for services and administrative sectors * *For allocation equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	Policy translation into budget commitment
	11. Intra-sector allocation for services Vs administrative costs	Approved budget	Documentary review	* From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved budget * Compute the Sectoral budget allocation for services sectors (education, health, agriculture, community development, environment and technical services) in terms of recurrent and development cost * Compute the sector budget allocation for administrative sector (management support and finance, councils and planning) in terms of recurrent and development cost * Compute the percent for recurrent and development budget allocation for services and administrative sectors * *For allocation equal to 90% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	

Cycle	Critical indicators	Source of information	Method of data collection	How to conduct the assessment	Use
	12. Share of budget allocated for affirmative action	Approved budget	Documentary review	∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved budget ∗ Compute the budget allocation for affirmative action ∗ Compute the percent of affirmative action from the total budget ∗ *For allocation equal to 5% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	
	13. LLG have popular version of their plans	Sub county chief	Observation	∗ Ask (and see it)the sub county chief whether or not they have a popular version of their approved plan and budget ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	Measure of feed-back process
	14. LLG provided WCE with a copy of the approved plan/budget	Copy of plan/budget	Observation	∗ Ask (and see it) the Chairperson of sub county WCE whether or not they have a popular version of their approved plan and budget ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	
	15. LLG communicated about approved plan/budget to lower units	Feedback report	Observation	∗ Ask (and see it) the sub county chief whether or not they communicated to lower units about the approved plan and budget ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	Engage-ment in resource manage-ment
	16. LLGs communicated about approved plan/budget to WCE	Feedback report	Observation	∗ Ask (and see it) the sub county chief whether or not they communicated to WCE about the approved plan and budget ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	
	17. LLG provide WCE with details of cash inflows/outflows	Disbursement reports	Observation	∗ Ask (and see it) the sub county chief whether or not they have copies of budget inflows and outflows ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	Trace commit-ment to appro-ved plans and budget
	18. WCE involved in expenditure allocation	Committee reports	Interview	∗ Ask WCE whether or not they are involved in expenditure allocation ∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	
	19. Aggregate budget disbursed for services Vs administrative sectors	Expenditure ledgers	Documentary review	∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved budget ∗ Compute the actual budget disbursed for services sectors (education, health, agriculture, community development, environment and	

Cy-cle	Critical indicators	Source of information	Method of data collection	How to conduct the assessment	Use
				technical services)	
				∗ Compute the actual budget disbursed for administrative sector (management support and finance, councils and planning)	
				∗ Compute the percent of disbursement for services and administrative sectors	
				∗ *For allocation equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	
	20. Intra-sector disbursement for services Vs administrative costs	Expenditure ledgers	Documentary review	∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved budget	
				∗ Compute the Sectoral actual budget disbursed for services sectors (education, health, agriculture, community development, environment and technical services) in terms of recurrent and development cost	
				∗ Compute the sector actual budget disbursed for administrative sector (management support and finance, councils and planning) in terms of recurrent and development cost	
				∗ Compute the percent disbursement for recurrent and development budget for services and administrative sectors	
				∗ *For allocation equal to 90% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	
	21. Share of budget disbursed for affirmative action	Expenditure ledgers	Documentary review	∗ From the sub county chief of the LLG get a copy of the approved budget	
				∗ Compute the actual budget disbursed for affirmative action	
				∗ Compute the percent disbursement of affirmative action from the total budget disbursed	
				∗ *For allocation equal to 5% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	
	22. WCE met Sectoral committees to follow disbursements	Minutes of WCE	Documentary review	∗ Ask the chairperson WCE for a minute of their meeting with Sectoral committee on budget disbursement	Hold leaders account-able
				∗ *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	

Cy-cle	Critical indicators	Source of information	Method of data collection	How to conduct the assessment	Use
	23. Progress reports include gender disaggregated data	Plan review reports	Documentary review	* From the sub county chief, obtain a copy of quarterly progress report * Look through the various sectors for gender disaggregated data in the reports for outputs and outcomes * Ascertain whether or not they contain gender blind, neutral or sensitive analysis * *If so score 1 otherwise 0*	Measure progress made

Annex 3, continued

Cycle	Critical indicators	Source of information	Method of data collection	How to conduct the assessment	Use
	24. WCE identified core women's issues at all levels before LG planning meetings	Minutes of WCE	Documentary review	∗ From the chairperson WCE, ask for a copy of their pre-planning minute. ∗ Verify whether or not they identified core women's issues. Also verify whether or not they communicated to lower WCEs ∗ *If an issue is identified score 1 otherwise 0.*	Evidence of women council effectiveness Pursue specific gender needs in the budget
	25. Proportion of women to men participating in village planning meeting	Attendance list with PDCs i/c planning	Documentary review	∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	Mobilize women to participate in the planning processes so that they can echo their needs
Budget Planning	26. Proportion of women to men participating in parish planning meeting	Attendance list with PDCs i/c planning	Documentary review	∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	
	27. Proportion of women to men participating in sub county budget conference	Attendance list with sub accountant	Documentary review	∗ From the PDC i/c planning get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *For proportion equal to 50% or more score 1 otherwise 0*	
	28. WCE held meeting with sub county Sectoral committees	Attendance list with sub accountant	Documentary review	∗ From the i/c planning in the LLG get a summary of planning attendants ∗ Calculate the percent of women who participated ∗ *If they did score 1 otherwise 0*	Push for fairness of budget allocation

Source: Lakwo (2006

Annex 4: Change in knowledge and performance of roles

Indicators	Baseline (2005.06)	End of project (2007/8)	Variance	Value	Signifi-cance level
1. Knowledge of mandatory roles					
Indentifying women's concern	60.4	97.0	36.6	0.472	0.000*
Policiy sensitization	50.6	89.8	39.2	0.438	0.000*
Linkage of women to policy makers	40.9	96.2	55.3	0.618	0.000*
Monotoring government projects	11.7	91.1	79.4	0.791	0.000*
Advocacy and lobbying	4.5	98.7	94.2	0.946	0.000*
2. Performing mandatory roles					
Identifying women's concern	57.8	93.6	35.8	0.433	0.000*
Policy sensitization	61.0	84.7	23.7	0.268	0.000*
Linkage of women to policy makers	62.3	89.4	27.1	0.323	0.000*
Monitoring government projects	24.0	78.3	54.3	0.536	0.000*
Advocacy and lobbying	20.1	89.8	69.7	0.703	0.000*

Percentage change columns: Baseline, End of project, Variance. *Cramer's V measure*: Value, Significance level.

* denotes statistically significance at 5%
Source: Individual evaluation survey data, 2008

Annex 5: Change in skills for and performance of civic engagement

Indicators	Baseline (2005.06)	End of project (2007/8)	Variance	Value	Signifi-cance level
1. Skilled in civic engagement					
Participatory gender planning & budgeting	11.7	81.3	69.6	0.683	0.000*
Participatory gender monitoring & evaluation	8.4	73.2	64.8	0.634	0.000*
Advocacy and lobbying	6.5	71.1	64.6	0.634	0.000*
2. Practicing civic engagement skills					
Participatory gender planning & budgeting	20.1	81.3	61.2	0.604	0.000*
Participatory gender monitoring & evaluation	11.7	74.5	62.8	0.614	0.000*
Advocacy and lobbying	7.1	67.7	60.6	0.597	0.000*

* denotes statistically significance at 5%
*Source*: Individual evaluation survey data, 2008

Annex 6: Change in grassroots women's participation in policy processes

Indictors of participation (yes response to did you participated participated in?)	Baseline (2005.06)	Percentage change		Cramer's V measure	
		End of project (2007/8)	Variance	Value	Signifi-cance level
Mobilization	5.5	79.5	74.0	0.755	0.000*
Village meetings	8.1	74.9	66.8	0.684	0.000*
Parish meetings	2.6	65.8	63.2	0.680	0.000*
LLG budget conference	3.1	58.4	55.3	0.610	0.000*
LLG plan approval	1.5	58.9	57.4	0.642	0.000*
Village feedback meetings	3.7	33.8	30.1	0.397	0.000*
Parish feedback meetings	1.5	22.8	21.3	0.339	0.000*
Village project implementation	14.8	42.0	2.2	0.305	0.000*
Parish project implementation	3.3	20.1	16.8	0.268	0.000*
LLG project implementation	2.6	14.2	11.6	0.215	0.000*
Vilage project monitoring	7.7	44.3	36.6	0.425	0.000*
Parish project monitoring	2.2	29.2	27.0	0.384	0.000*
LLG projct monitoring	3.3	16.0	12.7	0.220	0.000*
LLG budget monitoring	-	12.3	12.3	0.269	0.000*
PIC monitoring	-	17.8	17.8	0.327	0.000*

denotes statistically significance at 5%
Source: Individual evaluation survey data, 2008

Annex 7: LLG gender responsiveness audit performance

References

ABER, R. (1998), 'From clientilism to co-operation: Local government, participatory policy and civic organizing in Porto Alegro, Brazil'. *Politics and Society* 26(4): 511-523.

ACKERMAN, J. (2004), 'Co-governance for accountability: Beyond "Exit" and "Voice"'. *World Development* 32(3): 447–463.

ALESINA, A. (1994), 'Political models of macroeconomic policy and fiscal reforms.' In: Stephan Haggard & Steven B. Webb, eds., *Voting for reform: Democracy, political liberalization and economic adjustment.* New York: Oxford University Press.

AMANOR, K. & J. ANNAN (1999), 'Linkages between decentralisation and decentralised cooperation in Ghana'. *ECDPM Discussion paper No. 9.*

ANDERSON, C.H. (1976), *The sociology of survival: Social problems of growth.* Illinois: The Dorsey Press.

ANDERSON, J.E. (1984), *Public Policy-Making,* 3rd ed., New York: CBS College Publishing.

ANDREWS, C. & A. KOUZMIN (1999), Re-legitimating 'Voice' and 'Loyalty' within economic theories of democracy and accountability: Brazil Examplars. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 65: 395-406.

APPADUARAI, A. (2002), 'Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics'. *Public Culture* 14(1): 21-47.

AVRITZER, L. (2000), 'Civil society, public space and local power: A study of the participatory budget in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre.' *IDS-Ford Web Site* www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/index.html

AVRITZER, L. (2002), *Democracy and the public space in Latin America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

AVRITZER, L. (2006), 'New public sphere in Brazil: Local democracy and deliberative politics'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30(3): 623-637.

BABBIE, E. (1995), *The practice of social research.* Leiden: Stefert Kroesse.

BABCOCK, C., E. BRANNAN, P. GUPTA & S. SHAH (2008), 'The right to participate: Participatory budgeting and revenue generation in Uganda' (draft), paper presented at the Africa Regional Seminar on Participatory Budgeting, March 10-14, 2008, Durban.

BACCHI, C.L. (1999), *Women, policy and politics,* London, Thousand Oaks and Delhi: Sage Publications.

BACHRACH, P. & M.S. BARATZ (1970), *Power and poverty: Theory and practice.* New York: Oxford University Press.

BEALL, J. (1996), *Urban governance: Why gender matters.* New York: United Nations Development Programme, UNDP Gender in Development Monograph Series, No. 1.

BEALL, J. (2005), 'Decentralizing government and de-centering gender: Lessons from local government reform in South Africa.' *Politics and Society* 33(2): 253-276.

BEALL, J., D. LEWIS & C. SUTHERLAND (2003), 'Supporting human rights and governance: A background paper on conceptual and operational approaches for

Manusher Jonno'. In: J. Beall (2005) *Funding Local Governance, Small Grants for Democracy and Development,* London: IT Publications.

BECK, T. (1999), *Using gender-sensitive indicators. A reference manual for governments and other stakeholders*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.

BERG, L.B. (1995), *Qualitative research methods for the social sciences*, 2nd ed. Boston/London/Toronto/Sydney/Tokyo/Singapore: Allyn and Bacon.

BLACKBURN, J. & J. HOLLAND (1998) *Who changes: Institutionalising participation in development*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

BOOTH, D. (2005), *Missing links in the politics of development: Learning from the PRSP Experiment*. ODI Working Paper No. 26.

BOSSUYT, J. & J. GOULD (1999), 'Synthesis: Elaborating the linkage'. In: Karin de Jong, Christiane loquai & Iina Soiri, eds, *Decentralisation and poverty reduction: Exploring the linkages*, pp. 1-17. IDS, University of Helsinki and ECDPM, Policy Paper 1/1999.

BOSWORTH, J. (2005), *Citizens, accountability and public expenditure: A rapid review of DFID Support*. DFID Working Paper 17.

BOX, L. & A. KRUITER (1998), *Sustainable finance for development activities: A matter of creativity and skills*. Maastricht: ECDPM Policy Management Brief No. 10 April.

BRATTON, M. (1989), 'The politics of government-NGO relations in Africa'. *World Development* 17(5): 569-589.

BRATTON, M. (1990), Non-governmental organizations in Africa: Can they influence public policy? *Development and Change* 21: 87-118.

BRÄUTIGAM, D. (2004), 'The people's budget? Politics, participation and pro-poor policy'. *Development Policy Review* 22(6): 653-668.

BRINKERHOFF, D.W. (1996), 'Technical cooperation for building strategic policy management capacity in developing countries'. *International Journal of Technical Cooperation* 2(1): 1-18.

BRINKERHOFF, D.W. (2000), 'Democratic governance and sectoral policy reform: Tracing linkages and exploring synergies.' *World Development* 28(4): 601-615.

BROCK, K., A. CORNWALL, & J. GAVENTA (2001), *Power, knowledge and political spaces in the framing of poverty policy*. Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 143.

BROOK, J.E. (1990), 'The opinion-policy nexus in Germany'. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54: 508-529.

BUDLENDER, D. (2001), *A global assessment of gender responsive budget initiatives*. Report for the Commonwealth Secretariat, London: Commonwealth Secretariat.

BURKE, F.G. (1964), *Local governance and politics in Uganda*. New York: Library of Congress.

CAIAZA, A. (2006), 'Call to speak: Six strategies that encourage women's political activism.' *Research-in-Brief*, Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR# 1917).

CARROLL, T.F. (1992),. *Intermediary NGOs: The supporting link in grassroots development*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

CERNEA, M. (1991), *Putting people first: Sociological variables in rural development.* 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank

CHAMBERS, R. (1983), *Rural development: Putting the last first*. UK: Intermediate Technology Publications.

CHAMBERS, R. (1988), *Poverty in India: Concepts, research and reality*. Brighton: IDS, Discussion Paper 241.

CHAMBERS, R. (1993), *Challenging the professions: Frontiers for rural development*. Intermediate Technology Publications.

CHAMBERS, R. (1994), 'Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Analysis of experience'. *World Development* 22(9): 1253-1268.

CLAIBOURN, M. P. & P.S. MARTIN (2007), 'The third face of social capital: How membership in voluntary associations improve policy accountability'. *Political Research Quarterly* 60: 192-201.

CLARK, J. (1991), *Democratizing development: The role of voluntary organizations*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

CLAY, E. & B. SCHAFFER, eds. (1984), *Room for manoeuvre*. London: Heinemann.

COCKERY, J., A. LAND & D. OSBORNE (1997), *Governance and Policy Formulation*. Maastricht: ECDPM.

COCKERY, J., A. LANDS & J. BOSSUYT (1995), *The policy formulation: Institutional path or Institutional maze? A study based on the introduction of cost-sharing for education in three African countries*. Maastricht: ECPDM and AAPAM, Policy Management Report No. 3.

COLLE, S.D. & C. GONELLA (2002), 'The social and ethical alchemy: An integrative approach to social and ethical accountability'. *Business Ethics: A European Review* 11: 86-96.

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT (2001), *Gender budgets make cents: Understanding gender responsive budgets*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.

CONYERS, D. (1983), 'Decentralization: The latest fashion in development administration?' *Public Administration and Development* 3(2): 97–109.

CONYERS, D. (1986), 'Future directions in development studies: The case for decentralisation'. *World Development* 14(5): 593-603.

CONYERS, D. & P. HILL (1984), *An introduction to development planning in the Third World*. John Wiley and Sons.

COOKE, B. (2004), 'Rules of thumb for participatory change agents'. In: S. Hickey & G. Mohan, eds., *Participation: From tyranny to transformation? Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*, pp. 42-56. New York: Zed Books.

COOKE, B. & U. KOTHARI (2001), *Participation: The new tyranny?* London: Zed Books.

CORNWALL, A. & P.V.S. COELHO (2006), 'Spaces for change? The politics of participation in New Democratic Arenas'. In: A. Cornwall & P.V.S. Coelho, eds, *Spaces for change? The politics of participation in new democratic arenas*, pp. 1-26, London: Zed Books.

CORNWALL, A. & J. GAVENTA (2001), *From users and choosers to makers and shapers: Repositioning participation in social policy*. Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 127.

CORNWALL, A. (1999), *Making a difference? Gender and participatory development*. Brighton: IDS, Discussion Paper 378.

CORNWALL, A. (2000), *Beneficiaries, consumers, citizen: Perspectives on participation for poverty reduction.* Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency, SIDA Study No. 2.

CORNWALL, A. (2002a), *Making spaces, changing places: Situating participation in development*. Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 170.

CORNWALL, A. (2002b), 'Locating citizen participation'. *IDS Bulletin* 33(2): 49-58.

CORNWALL, A. (2004), 'Spaces for transformation? Reflections on issues of power and difference in participation in development'. In: S. Hickey & G. Mohan, eds.,

Participation, from tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development, pp. 75-91. New York: Zed Books.

COX, K., ed. (1997), *Spaces of globalization: Reasserting the power of the local.* New York: Guilford.

CROOK, R. & J. MANOR (2000), *Democratic decentralization, operations evaluation department*. Washington D.C: World Bank, Working Paper.

CROSBY, B.L., & D.M. ORSINI (1996), *Developing lobbying capacity for policy reform*. Washington D.C., USAID, Implementing Policy Change Project, Technical Note No. 7.

CUTHILL, M. & J. FIEN (2005), 'Capacity building: Facilitating citizen participation in local governance.' *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 64(4): 63-80.

DE RENZIO, P. & W. KRAFCHIK (n.d.), *Lessons from the field. The impact of civil society budget analysis and advocacy in six countries. Practitioners Guide*. International Budget Project. www.internationalbudget.org

DE RENZIO, P., V. AZEEM & V. RAMKUMAR (2006), *Budget monitoring as an advocacy tool. Case study prepared for the research project. Lessons from civil society budget analysis and advocacy initiative*. Kampala: Uganda Debt Network.

DE WIT, W.J. (1997), *Decentralization, empowerment and poverty alleviation in Urban India: Roles and responses of Government, NGOs and Slum communities*. The Hague: ISS, Working Paper No. 267.

DECENTRALISATION SECRETARIAT (1994), *Handbook for facilitators of decentralisation system seminar*. Kampala.

DECENTRALISATION SECRETARIAT (1995), *Decentralisation in Uganda: Policy and Implication, Volume 2*. Kampala.

DECENTRALISATION SECRETARIAT (1996a), *The local government budgeting cycle*. Kampala.

DECENTRALISATION SECRETARIAT (1996b), *Data and analysis needed for decentralized planning and coordination in Uganda* (draft)*. Kampala.

DECENTRALISATION SECRETARIAT (1996c), *Decentralisation implementation review Workshop Report, February 12-14, 1996*, ICC-Kampala.

DEHN, J., R. REINIKKA. & J. SVENSSON (2001), *Basic service delivery: A quantitative survey approach*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

DENIVA (2002), '*Towards effective political participation and decision-making for women councillors in decentralised local governments and the role of NGOs in Uganda'*. Report of a Study Commissioned by DENIVA, with Financial Support of Action Aid Uganda. Printing and Distribution Cost by Ford Foundation, Nairobi.

DENNING, S. (2000), *The springboard: How storytelling ignites action in knowledge-era organisations*. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

DENZIN, N.K. (1978), *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

DRC (2006), *Building effective states: Taking citizens' perspective. DRC: Citizenship, Participation and Accountability* www.drc-citizenship.org

DRESANG, D.L. & J.J. GOSLING (1989), *Politics, policy and management in the American States.* New York: Longman.

EADE, D. (1996), *Capacity building: An approach to people-centred development*. Oxford: Oxfam.

EADE, D. & S. WILLIAMS (1995), *The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief (Vol. 1&2).* Oxford: Oxfam.

EDWARDS, G.C. III. (1980), *Implementing public policy.* Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

ELSON, D. (1996), 'Gender-neutral, gender-blind, or gender-sensitive budgets? Changing the conceptual framework to include women's empowerment and the economy of care', paper prepared for the Fifth Annual Conference of Ministers responsible for Women's Affairs, Commonwealth Secretariat, Trinidad and Tobago.

ELSON, D. (1997), *Integration gender issues into public expenditures: Six tools*, mimeo. GENECON Unit, Graduate School of Sciences, University of Manchester.

ELSON, D. (2002), 'Gender justice, human rights and neo-liberal economic policies'. In: M. Molyneux & S. Razavi, eds., *Gender justice, development and rights,* pp. 78-114. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ELSON, D. (2003), *Budget for women's rights: Monitoring government budgets for compliance with CEDAW.* UNIFEM.

ELSON, D., ed. (1991), *Male bias in the development process*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

EVERTZEN, A. (2001), *Gender and local governance*. Amsterdam: SNV.

FLURY, M. & U. GEISER, eds. (1999), *Participation and knowledge management in natural resource management.* Findings of the workshop between Research and Development Cooperation: Solothurn. (December).

FOWLER, A. (1998), 'Authentic NGDO partnerships in the new policy agenda for international aid: Dead end or light ahead?' *Development and Change* 29(1): 137-159.

FOWODE (2007), "Making NAADS work for women." *Issue Brief.* Kampala: Fowode.

FOX, J. (1994), 'The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: Lessons from Mexico.' *World Politics* 46(2):151-184.

FOX, J. (1996), *Decentralization and rural development in Mexico: Community participation in Oaxaca's municipal funds program*. La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

FRASER, N. (1989), *Unruly practices: Power, discourse and gender in contemporary social theory.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press and Cambridge: Polity Press.

FRISCHTAK, L. (1993), *Comparative research on governance and adjustment: Project description.* Washington, DC: World Bank, Private Sector Development Department.

FRISCHTAK, L. (1994), *Governance capacity and economic reform in developing countries.* Washington, DC: World Bank, Technical Paper No. 254.

FUNG, A. & E. WRIGHT (2001), 'Deepening democracy: Innovations in empowering participatory governance'. *Politics and Society* 9(1): 5-41.

FUNG, A. & E.O. WRIGHT (2003), *Deepening democracy: Institutional innovations in empowered participatory governance*. London: Verso.

GAVENTA, J (2002), 'Exploring citizenship, participation and accountability'. In: Making rights real: Exploring citizenship, participation and accountability, *IDS Bulletin* 33(2): 1-11.

GAVENTA, J. (1980), *Power and powerlessness.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

GAVENTA, J. (1998), 'The scaling up and institutionalisation of PRA: Lessons and challenges'. In: J. Blackburn & J. Holland, eds., *Who changes: Institutionalising participation in development*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

GAVENTA, J. (2004a), 'Towards participatory local governance: Assessing the transformative possibilities'. In: S. Hickey & G. Mohan, eds., *Participation, from tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development,* pp. 25-41. New York: Zed Books.

GAVENTA, J. (2004b), 'Strengthening participatory and deliberative approaches to Local governance: Learning the lessons from abroad'. *National Civic Review*, Winter 2004: 16–27.

GAVENTA, J. (2005), 'Claiming citizenship'. In: N. Kabeer, ed., *Inclusive citizenship: Meanings and expressions*, pp. xii-iv. London: Zed Books.

GAVENTA, J. (2006), *Triumph, deficit or contestation? Deepening the 'Deepening Democracy' Debate*. Citizenship DRC/Logolink/IDS, IDS Working Paper 264.

GILPIN, R. (1987), *The political economy of international relations.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

GOETZ, A.M. & J. GAVENTA (2001), *From consultation to influence: Bringing citizen voice and client focus into service delivery.* Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 138.

GOETZ, A.M. & R. JENKINS (2001), 'Hybrid forms of accountability: Citizen engagement in institutions of public-sector oversight in India.' *Public Management Review* 3(3): 363-383.

GOETZ, A.M. & R. JENKINS, R (2005*), Reinventing accountability – making democracy work for human development.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

GOETZ, A.M. & S. HASSIM (2000), *In and against the party: Women's representation and constituency building in Uganda and South Africa.* Geneva: UNRISD.

GOETZ, A.M. (1995), *The politics of integrating gender to state development processes: Trends, opportunities and constraints in Bangladesh, Chile, Jamaica, Mali, Morocco and Uganda.* Geneva: UNRISD, Occasional Paper 2.

GOETZ, A.M. (1997), *Getting institutions right for women in development.* London: Zed Books.

GOETZ, A.M. (2003), 'The problem with patronage: Constraints on women's political effectiveness in Uganda'. In: A.M. Goetz & S. Hassim, eds., *No shortcuts to power: African women in politics and policy-making,* pp. 110-139. London: Zed Books.

GOETZ, A.M. (2004), *Gender and good governance at national level: Do growing numbers of women in public office produce better public sector accountability to women?* Geneva: UNRISD, Background Paper for Gender Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World.

GOETZ, A.M. (2007), 'Political cleaners: Women as the new anti-corruption force?' *Development and Change,* 38(1): 87-105.

GRIFFIN, K. (1990), *Alternative strategies for economic development,* 2 ed. London: Antony Rowe.

GRINDLE, M. (1990), 'The new political economy: Positive economics and negative politics'. In: G.M. Meier, ed., *Politics and policy making in developing countries: Perspectives on the new political economy*, pp. 4l-42. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.

GRINDLE, M. & J. THOMAS (1990), 'After the decision: Implementing policy reforms in developing countries'. *World Development* 18(8):1163-1181.

GRINDLE, M. & J.W. THOMAS (1991), *Public choices and policy change: The political economy of reform in developing countries.* Baltimore, Md., & London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

GUIJT, I. (2005), *Assessing civil society participation as supported in-country by Cordaid, HIVOS, NOVIB and Plan Netherlands 1999-2004*. Synthesis report of Dutch CFA Programme Evaluation.

GUIJT, I. & M.K. SHAH, (1998), 'General introduction: Waking up to power, process and conflict'. In: I. Guijt & M.K. Shah, eds., *The myth of community: Gender issues in participatory development,* pp. 1-23. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

GULHATI, R. (1990), *The making of economic policy in Africa.* Washington: World Bank, EDI Seminar series.

HABERMAN, J. (1992), 'Individuation through socialization'. In: W.M. Hohengarten, Trans., *Postmetaphysical thinking,* pp. 149-204. Cambridge: MIT Press.

HARRISS, J. (2002), *Depoliticizing development: The World Bank and Social Capital.* London: Anthem Press.

HASSIM, S. & S. RAZAVI (2006), 'Gender and social policy in a global context: Uncovering the gendered structure of 'The Social''. In: S. Razavi & S. Hassim, eds., *Gender and social policy in a global context, uncovering the gendered structure of 'The Social',* pp. 1-39. Geneva: UNRISD.

HASSIM, S. (2004), 'Voices, hierarchies and spaces: Reconfiguring the women's movement in democratic South Africa', paper prepared for the Social Movements Project, Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. http://www.ukn.ac.za/ccs/files/Hassim%20Womens%20Movement%20RR.pdf

HEIDENHEIRMER, A.J., H. HEDO & C.T. ADAMS (1990), *Comparative public policy: The politics of social choice in America, Europe and Japan,* 3rd ed., New York: St. Martin's Press.

HELLER, P. (2000), 'Moving the state: The politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa and Porto Alegre'. *Politics and Society* 29(1): 131-163.

HELLER, P., K. HARILAL & S. CHAUDHURI (2007), 'Building local democracy: Evaluating the impact of decentralization in Kerala, India'. *World development* 35(4): 626-648.

HELMSING, A.H.J. (2005), *Governance of local economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Who are the dancers and do they act 'in Concert'?* The Hague: ISS, Working Paper Series No. 408.

HICKEY, S & G. MOHAN (2004), 'Towards Participation and Transformation: Critical Themes and Challenges'. In: S. Hickey & G. Mohan, eds., *Participation: From tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development*, pp. 3-24. New York, Zed Books.

HICKEY, S. & G. MOHAN (2005), 'Relocating participation within a radical politics of development'. *Development and Change* 36(2): 237-262.

HIGGINS, B. (1996), *Economic Development: Principles, Problems and Policies,* 4/e, New Delhi.

HILLIGES, G. & J. RADEMAKER (2000), 'A new understanding of accountability in towns and development'. In: *Advancing the policy and practice of capacity building in international development cooperation capacity*. Maastricht: ECDPM, Org Issue 5.

HIRSCHMAN, A.O. (1975), 'Policymaking and policy analysis in Latin America: A return journey'. *Policy Science* 6: 385-401.

HIRSCHMANN, D. (1993), 'Institutional development in the era of economic policy reform: Concerns, contradictions, and illustrations from Malawi'. *Public Administration and Development* 13(2): 11-28.

136

HOGWOOD, B.W. & L.A. GUNN (1984), *Policy analysis for the real world.* New York: Oxford University Press.

HOLZNER, B.M & J.W. DE WIT (2003), Supporting decentralized urban governance: Training women municipal councillors in Mumbai, India. The Hague: ISS, Working Paper Series No. 386.

HORN, C.E. VAN, D.C. BAUMAN & W.T. GORMLEY JR. (1989), *Politics and public policy.* Washington D.C.: Congresional Quarterly Press.

HYDÉN, G. (1994), 'Changing ideological and theoretical perspectives on development'. In: U. Himmelstrand, K. Kinyanjui & E. Mburugu, eds., *African Perspectives on Development.* Nairobi: EAEP.

JACKSON, C. (1999), 'Social exclusion and gender: Does one size fit all?' *European Journal of Development Research* 11(1): 125-146.

JUMA, C. & N. CLARK (1995), 'Policy research in sub-saharan Africa'. *Public Administration and Development* 15: 121-137.

KABEER, N., ed. (2005), *Inclusive citizenship: Meanings and expressions*. London: Zed Books.

KAPWEPWE, J. (2007), 'To have and to have not: The debacle of decentralization in Uganda', *Policy Review Newsletter* 7(10): 1, 7-8.

KEELY, J. & I. SCOONES (2000), *Environmental policy-making in Zimbabwe: Discourses, science and politics.* Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 117.

KHARONO, E. (2003), *Review of affirmative action in Uganda*. Kampala: UWONET.

KIRLIN, J. & M.K. KIRLIN (2002), 'Strengthening effective government-citizen connections through greater civic engagement', *Public Administration Review* 62: 80-85.

KLASEN, S. (1999), *Gender inequality reduce growth and development? Evidence from cross-country regressions*. Washington, DC: World Bank, The World Bank Development Research Group/Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working Paper Series, No. 7.

KOMBA, A.A. (2000), *The teaching and researching in public policy in contemporary African Universities and implications for democratic governance*. Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam, Institute of Development Studies.

KOTHARI, U. (2001), 'Power, knowledge and social control in participatory development'. In: B. Cooke & U. Kothari, *Participation: The new tyranny?,* pp. 139-152. London: Zed Books.

KRUG, B. & I. VAN STAVEREN (nd), *Gender audit: Whim or voice*. At www.eurosur.org/wide/GM/Gender%20audit.htm

KULLENBERG, L. & D. PORTER (1998), 'Accountability in decentralized planning and financing for rural services in Uganda', *Entwickling und Landlicher raum* 32(3): 11-15.

KURIAN, G. (1999), *Empowering conditions in the decentralization processes: An analysis of dynamics, factors and actors in Panchayati Raj institutions from West Bengal and Karnataka, India*. The Hague: ISS, Working Paper No. 288.

LAKWO, A. (2003), 'Decentralization, democratic centralism, and citizen exclusion'. In: G. Mudacumura *et al., Handbook of developmental policy studies,* pp. 607-628. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc.

LANAO, G.S. (2007), *Leading to transformation? The case of participatory budgeting al local levels in Ayacucho, Peru*. The Hague: ISS, Working Paper No. 438.

LANEY, M.L. (2003), *Advocacy impact assessment guidelines*. Wallingford: Communications and information management resource centre.

LAVALLE, G.A., P.P. HOUTZAGER & G. CASTELLO (2005), *In whose name? Political representation and civil organizations in Brazil*. Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 249.

LEVINE, C.A., B. GUY PETERS & F.J. THOMPSON (1990), *Public administration: Challenges, choices, consequences.* Illinois: Scott Foreman.

LITVACK, J., & J. SEDDON (n.d), 'Decentralisation briefing notes'. World Bank Institute, WBI Working Paper in collaboration with PREM Network.

LITVACK, J., J. AHMAD.& R. BIRD (2001), *Rethinking decentralization at the World Bank,* Washington, DC: World Bank.

MALENA, C., R. FORSTER & J. SINGH (2004), *Social accountability: An introduction to the concept and emerging practice*. Washington, DC: World Bank, Paper No. 76.

MAMDANI, M. (1996), *Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism.* Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

MANOR, J. (1995), 'Democratic decentralization in Africa and Asia', *IDS Bulletin* 26(2)*:* 81-88.

MANOR J. (1999), *The political economy of democratic decentralization,* Washington, DC: The World Bank.

MARCUSSEN, H.S. (1996), 'NGOs, the state and civil society', *Review of African Political Economy* 69: 405-423.

MARKUS, S. (2000), *Monitoring and evaluation support to decentralisation: Challenges and dilemmas.* Maastricht:ECDPM, Discussion Paper No. 19.

MATOVU, G. & T. MUMVUMA (2008), *Participatory budgeting in Africa: A training companion. Part 1.* Harare: MDP-ESA & UN-Habitat.

MCGEE, R, K. BROCK & J. GAVENTA (2004), *Unpacking policy: Knowledge, actors and spaces in poverty reduction in Uganda and Nigeria*. Kampala: Fountain Press.

MEDARD, J.F. (1991), 'The historical trajectories of the Ivorian and Kenyan States'. In: J. Manor, ed., *Rethinking Third World Politics,* pp. 185-212. UK: Longman.

MEDARD, J.M. (1996), 'Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism, and the study of the postcolonial state in Subsaharian Africa'. In: H.S. Marcussen, ed., *Improved natural resource management - The role of formal organisations and informal networks and institutions,* pp.76-97. Roskilde: Roskilde University, International Development Studies.

MEHROTRA, S. (2006), 'Governance and basic services: Ensuring accountability in service delivery through deep democratic decentralization', *Journal of International Development* 18: 263-283.

MEHTA, L. (2005), *Unpacking rights and wrongs: Do human rights make a difference? The case of water rights in India and South Africa*. Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 260.

MIKKELSEN, B. (2005), *Methods for development work and research: A new guide for practitioners,* 2nd ed. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

MOHAN, G. & K. STOKKE (2000), 'Participatory development and empowerment: The dangers of localism', *Third World Quarterly* 21(2): 247-268.

MOHAN, G. (2001), 'Beyond participation: Strategies for deeper empowerment'. In: B. Cooke & U. Kothari, eds., *Participation: The new tyranny?,* pp. 153-167. London: Zed Books.

MOHAN, G. & K. STOKKE (2000), 'Participatory development and empowerment', *Third World Quarterly* 21(2): 266-280.

138

MOLYNEUX M. & S. RAZAVI (2002), 'Introduction' In: M. Molyneux & S. Razavi eds.,
    Gender justice, development and rights, pp. 1-42. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MORAN, M. F. (2004), The practice of participatory planning at Mapoon Aboriginal
    settlement: Towards community control, ownership and autonomy. *Australian
    Geographical Studies* 42(3): 339-355.
MOSER, C.O. & A. NORTON (2001), *To claim our rights: Livelihood security, human
    rights and sustainable development.* London: ODI.
MUKHOPADHYAY, M. (1998), *Legally disposed: Gender, identity and the process of
    law.* Calcutta: Stree.
MUNYONYO, R. (1999), 'Decentralization in Uganda: Theory and practice.' *Mtafiti
    Mwafrika (African Researcher)* 5: 10-11. Nkozi, UMU: African Research and
    Documentation Centre.
MUTABWIRE, K.P. (2007), *Fact sheet on decentralization in Uganda*. Harare: MDP.
NAKAMURA, R.T. & F. SMALLWOOD (1980), *The politics of policy implementation.* New
    York: St. Martin's Press.
NDUHUKIRE-OWA-MATAZE. (2000), *Critical reflections on development theory and
    Uganda's past growth, corruption and politics.* Nkozi: UMU Press.
NELLIS, J.R. (1983), *Decentralisation in North Africa*, In: G.S. Chema & D.A.
    Rondenelli, eds., *Decentralisation and development*, pp. 91-102. Beverly Hills, CA.:
    Sage.
NELSON, J. (1994), 'Linkages between politics and economics', *Journal of Democracy*
    5(4): 49-62.
NELSON, N. & S. WRIGHT, S. (1995), *Power and participatory development: Theory and
    practice.* London: ITP.
NERFIN, M. (1987), 'Neither prince nor merchant - citizen: An introduction to the third
    system', *Development Dialogue* 1: 170-195.
NSIBAMBI, A., ed. (1998), *Decentralisation and civil society in Uganda: The quest for
    good governance*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
NYAMU-MUSEMBI, C. (2002), *Towards an actor-oriented perspective on human rights*.
    Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 169.
O'NEILL, W. (2003), '*An introduction to the concept of rights-based approach to
    development: A paper for interaction*'. At:
    http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/2495_RBA_1.5.04.pdf.
ODI (2007), *Budget monitoring and policy influence: Lessons from civil society budget
    analysis and advocacy initiatives*. ODI, Briefing Paper No. 16.
OFEI-ABOAGYE, E. (2000), *Promoting the participation of women in local governance
    and development: The case of Ghana*, Maastricht: ECDPM, Discussion paper No.
    18.
OFFICE OF AUDITOR GENERAL (2007), Annual Report of the Auditor General for the
    year ended 30th June, 2007. Volume 3. Local Governments. At:
    http://www.oag.go.ug/uploaded_files/1213967714Annual%20report%20to%20Parli
    ement%20(2007)%20Vol%203-%20Local%20Governments%202007.pdf
    (Accessed October 7, 2008).
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL (2006), Value for money audit report on the
    management of health programmes in the health sector: Ministry of Health.
    Kampala. At:
    http://www.oag.go.ug/uploaded_files/1190992338HealthServiceDelivery.pdf
    (Accessed October 7, 2008).

OLOWU, B. (2001), *African decentralization policies and practices from 1980s and beyond*. The Hague: ISS, Working Paper 334.

ONIS, Z. (1991), 'The logic of development state', *Comparative Politics* 24(1): 109-121.

ORUKA, O.H. (1997), 'Practical philosophy'. In: *Search of an ethical minimum.* Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.

OSLON, K. (2008), 'Constructing citizens'. *The Journal of Politics* 70(1): 40-53.

PAUL, S. (1992), 'Accountability in public services: Exit, voice and control', *World Development*. 20(7): 1047-1060.

PHILLIPS, A. (1991), *Engendering democracy.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

PHILLIPS, A. (1999), *Which equalities matter?* Cambridge: Polity Press.

PICCIOTTO, R. (1995), *Putting institutional economics to work: From participation to governance*. Washington, DC: World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 304.

PIETERSE, J.N. (1998), 'My paradigm of yours? Alternative development, post-development, reflexive development', *Development and Change* 29: 343-373.

PRETTY, J.N. (1994), 'Alternative systems of enquiry of sustainable agriculture', *IDS Bulletin* 25(2): 37-48.

PRUD'HOMME, R. (1995), 'The dangers of decentralisation'. *The World Bank Research Observer* 10(2): 201-220.

PUTNAM, R., R. LEONARDI & R. NANETTI (1993), *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

RAES, F. (nd), *What can we expect from gender sensitive budgets? Strategies in Brazil and in Chile in a comparative perspective*. www.eurosur.org/wide/GM/GB_Raes.htm

RAI, S. (1996), 'Women and the state in the Third World: Some issues for debate'. In: S. Rai & G. Lievesley, eds, *Women and the state, international perspectives,* pp. 5-22. London: Taylor and Francis.

RANDALL, V. (1998), 'Gender and power: Women engage the state'. In: V. Randall & G. Waylen, eds, *Gender, politics and the state,* pp. 185-205. London: Routledge.

REINIKKA, R. & J. SVENSSON (2002), *Explaining leakage of public funds*. United Kingdom: Centre for Economic Policy, CEPR Discussion Paper 3227.

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (2006), *Public finance management performance report and update of CIFA Action Plan 2005*. Entebbe.

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, *The constitution, 1995*. Entebbe.

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, *The local governments act, 1997*. Entebbe.

ROBINSON, M. (2006), *Budget analysis and policy advocacy: The role of non-governmental public action*. Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 279.

RONDINELLI, D. A. (1981), 'Government decentralization in comparative theory and practice in developing countries'. *International Review of Administrative Science* 47(2): 133-147.

RONDINELLI, D., J. MCCULLOUGH & R. W. JOHNSON (1989), 'Analysing decentralization policies in developing countries: A political-economy framework', *Development and Change* 20(1): 57-87.

RONDINELLI, D., S. CHEEMA & J.R. NELLIS (1983), Decentralization in developing countries: A review of recent experience. Washington, DC: World Bank, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 581.

RONDINELLI, D.A. (1983), 'Implementing decentralisation policies: An introduction'. In: G.S. Chema & D.A. Rondenelli, eds., *Decentralisation and development*, pp. 9-34. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

RONDINELLI, D.A. & J.R. NELLIS (1986), 'Assessing decentralisation policies in developing countries: The case for cautious optimism'. *Development Policy Review* 4(1): 3-25.

ROSE, N. (1999), *Power of freedom: Reframing political thoughts.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

ROTHCHILD, D. (1994), 'Structuring state-society relations in Africa: Toward an enabling political environment'. In: J.A. Widner, ed., *Economic change and political liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 201-229. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

ROWLANDS, J. (1997), *Questioning empowerment: Working with women in Honduras.* Oxford: Oxfam.

SAI, E. (1993), 'Priorities for action', *DPMN Bulletin* 1(2): 11-12.

SAITO, F. (2002), 'Decentralization measures and gender equalities: Experiences in Uganda', *Ryukoku Journal of Economic Studies* 41(5).

SAMOFF, J. (1979), 'The bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralisation and the class structure in Tanzania.' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21: 30-62.

SAMOFF, J. (1990), 'Decentralization: The politics of interventionism', *Development and Change* 21(3): 513–530.

SCHNEIDER, A. & B. GOLDFRANK (2002), *Budgets and ballots in Brazil: Participatory budgeting from the city to the state*. Brighton: IDS, Working Paper 149.

SCHUURMAN, F.J. (1997), 'The decentralization discourse: Post-Fordist paradigm or neo-liberal cul-de-sac?' *European Journal of Development Research* 9(1): 150–164.

SCOTT, J. (1998), *Seeing like a state: Why certain schemes to improve the human conditions have failed.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

SERAGELDIN, I. (1996), 'Sustainability as opportunity and the problem of social capital', *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 3(2): 187-203.

SHARPE, B. (1998), 'First the forest': Conservation, 'community' and 'participation' in South-West Cameroon', *Africa* 68(1): 25-45.

SHOTTER, J. (1985), 'Social accountability and selfhood', *Contemporary Sociology* 14: 520-523.

SLATER, D. (1992), 'Theories of development and politics of the modern, exploring a border zone', *Development and Change* 23(3): 283-319.

SLATER, R., & J. WATSON (1989), 'Democratic decentralisation or political consolidation: The case for local government reform in Karnataka'. *Public Administration and Development* 9(2): 147-157.

SMITH, B.G. (1985), *Decentralisation: The territorial dimension of the state.* London: George Allen and Unwin.

SNV (1999), *Decentralisation and empowerment: From rehabilitation to growth in West Nile region, Uganda, Report of the External Review Commission.* Kampala: SNV.

SNV (2000), *Participatory gender audit.* Gender and Development Training Centre. http://www.siyanda.org/static/snv_participataudit.htm

STANDISH, B. (1983), 'Power to the people? Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea', *Public Administration and Development* 3(3): 223-238.

STAUDT, K. (1998), *Policy, politics and gender, women gaining ground.* West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press.

STIGLER, G. (1971), 'The theory of economic regulation', *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2: 3-21.

STOCKER, G. (1988), *Politics of local governments*. London: Macmillan.

STOKER, G. & D. WILSON, eds. (2004), *British local government into the 21st century.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

SUTTON, R. (1999), *The policy process: An overview*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

TAMALE, S. (1998), 'The limitation of affirmative action in Uganda'. *Women's World.* 32: 15-19.

TAMALE, S. (1999), *When hens begin to crow: Gender and parliamentary politics in Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

TENDLER, J. (1997), *Good government in the tropics.* Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press.

THOMAS, J.W. & M.S. GRINDLE (1990), 'After the decision: Implementing policy reforms in developing countries', *World Development* 18(8): 1163-1181.

THOMPSON, J. (1995), 'Approaches in government bureaucracies: Facilitating the process of institutional change', *World Development* 23(9): 1521-1554.

TIBAMWENDA IKIRIZA, A. (nd), *Gender inclusion in decentralised governance: The case for district development project – Uganda*. At: www.uncdf.org/english/countries/uganda/local_governance/other_project_related_reports/akiriza_gender.php

TIDEMAND, P. (1994), *The resistance council in Uganda: A study of rural politics and popular democracy in Afrika*. PhD Thesis, Roskilde University.

TIMMER C.P. (1998), *Adding value through policy-oriented research: Reflections of a scholar-practitioner*. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, Director-General's Office.

TRIPP, A.M. (2000), *Women and politics in Uganda,* Oxford: James Currey and Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

TUMUSIIME, B. (2006),'Ministry accuses Kasese of Forgery'. In: *Daily Monitor*, November 14.

UBOS (2007), *Assessment of beneficiary participation and accountability under second Local Government Development Programme (LGDP II) and baseline of Local Government Management Services Delivery Programme (LGMSDP).* Kampala: MoLG.

UDN (2008), *Increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public goods and services in Uganda. Civil society contribution to the National Development Plan (NDP).* Kampala: UDN.

UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ASSOCIATION (2006), *Gender policy*. Kampala. (April).

UNDP (2006), *Measuring democratic governance. A framework for selecting pr o -poor and gender sensitive indicators*. New York: Bureau for Development Policy. Democratic Governance Group.

UNITED NATIONS (2003), *The human rights based approach to development: Towards a common understanding among the UN Agencies.* New York: United Nations.

VERÓN, R., G. WILLIAMS, S. CORBRIDGE. & M. SRIVASTAVA (2006), 'Decentralized corruption or corrupt decentralization? Community monitoring of poverty alleviation schemes in Eastern India'. *World Development* 34(11): 1922-1944.

WALIGGO, J.M. (2002), *Struggle for equity. Women and empowerment in Uganda*. Ggaba, Kampala: AMECIA.

142

WALKER, P. (2002), 'Understanding accountability: Theoretical models and their Implications for social service organizations'. *Social Policy and Administration* 36(1): 62-75.

WALLE, D. VAN DE & K. NEEDS, eds. (1995), P*ublic spending and the poor: Theory and Evidences.* Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press.

WEIGLE, M.M. (1996), 'Political liberalism in post communist Russia', *The Review of Politics* 58(3): 477-484.

WHITE, S. (1996), 'Depoliticising development: the uses and abuses of participation', *Development in Practice* 6(1): 6-15.

WHITEHEAD, L. & G. GRAY-MOLINA (2001), 'Political capabilities over the long run'. In: P. Houtzager. & M. Moore, eds., *Changing paths: International development and the new politics of inclusion,* pp. 32-57. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

WHITELY, P.F. (1995), 'Rational choice and political participation: Evaluating the debate', *Political Research Quarterly* 48(1): 211-233.

WILLIAMS, G. (2004a), 'Towards a repolitization of participatory development political capabilities and spaces for empowerment'. In: S. Hickey & G. Mohan, eds, *Participation, from tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development,* pp. 92-107. London: Zed Books.

WILLIAMS, G. (2004b), 'Evaluating participatory development: tyranny, power and (re)politicization', *Third World Quarterly* 25(3): 577-578.

WLEZEIN, C. (1995), 'The public as a thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spending', *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 981-1000.

WORLD BANK (1997), *World Development Report: The State in a Changing World.* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

WORLD BANK (2000), *Reforming public institutions and strengthening governance: A World Bank Strategy.* Washington, DC: The World Bank.

WORLD BANK (2001), *Engendering development through gender equality in rights, resources and voice.* Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

WORLD BANK (2004), 'State-society synergy for accountability: Lessons for the World Bank'. Washington, DC: World Bank, World Bank Working Paper No. 30.

WORLD BANK (n.d.), *Accountability to the poor: Experiences in civic engagement in public expenditure management.* Draft paper prepared by the Participation Group-Social Development Department.

YOUNG, I.O. (2000), *Inclusion and democracy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Project & District based reports

AFARD (2005), *9th EDF Civil Society Capacity Building Programme. Full Proposal Form – Empowering Communities, Improving Lives C8/A12/2005.*

AFARD (2006*), Advocating for Gender-responsive Planning and Budgeting in Nebbi District Local Government.* A Workshop Report financed by HURINET (U).

AFARD (2006), *Engendering Services Delivery and Accountability in Decentralized Local Governments in Nebbi District. Phase 1 Interim Narrative Report.*

AFARD (2006), *Strengthening Women Councils in Nebbi district to participate in planning and budgeting at Sub county and District levels, 2005-2006: End of project report*. Nebbi.

AFARD (2006), *Training Report on Advocacy for Women Council Executives and Women Councillors in Nebbi District Lower Local Governments.*

AFARD (2007), *Civil Society Capacity Building Programme: Quarterly Progress Report 4.* (October).

AFARD (2007), *Civil Society Capacity Building Programme: Quarterly Progress Report 3.* (June).

AFARD (2007), *Engendering Services Delivery and Accountability in Decentralized Local Governments in Nebbi District. Phase 2 Interim Narrative Report.* (December).

AFARD (2008), *Civil Society Capacity Building Programme: Grant Closure Report.* Nebbi.

AFARD (2008), *Civil Society Capacity Building Programme: Quarterly Progress Report 5.* (April).

DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND TRAINING (2007), *Strengthening Women Councils in Nebbi district to participate in panning and budgeting at sub county and district levels.* AFARD Report submitted to HURINET (U), Kampala.

DPU (1995-2008), *Nebbi District 3-Year Development Plan, 2004/05-06/07.* Nebbi.

DPU (1998), *Nebbi District Local Government Development Plan, 1999-2002.* Department of Planning, Nebbi District Local Government, Nebbi.

DPU (2005), *Assessment of Minimum Conditions of Local Government Performance Report 2005.* Nebbi District.

DPU (2006), *Assessment of Minimum Conditions of Local Government Performance Report 2006.* Nebbi District.

KIBUUKA, A. S. AISU (2007), *Civil society capacity building programme: Best grantee assessment 2007. Evaluation Report.* A report submitted to Programme Management Unit, Kampala.

KIZITO, J. (2008), *Civil society capacity building programme: Retrospective reporting April 2006 – June 2008.* (March).

LAKWO, A. & W. CWINYAAI (2006), *Advocacy in lower local governments: A starter kit for training Women Council Executives and Women Councillors in Nebbi district.* AFARD & EDF-CSO CBP. Vol. 12 (October).

LAKWO, A. & W. CWINYAAI (2006), *Training manual for participatory gender monitoring and evaluation of lower local government plans and budget.* AFARD & EDF-CSO CBP, Vol. 11 (August).

LAKWO, A. (2007), *Final Report on Gender Responsiveness Audit of Nebbi District Lower Local Governments.* AFARD. (April).

LAKWO, A. (2008), *Engendering services delivery and accountability in decentralized local governments in Nebbi district, April 2006 – June 2008. End-of-project review report.* Nebbi.

LAKWO, A., A.J. OCAYA., H.J. ODONGO & W. CWINYAAI (2006), *Facilitators' handbook for training women councils on gender responsive planning and budgeting in the lower local governments in Nebbi district.* AFARD & EDF-CSO CBP, Vol. 1 (May).

LAKWO, A., A.J. OCAYA, H.J. ODONGO & W. CWINYAAI (2006), *Assessing the participation of grassroots women in decentralized development planning*

144

processes in Nebbi district local government. AFARD and Action Aid International Uganda – Nebbi Development Initiative. (May).

MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2006), *Assessment manual of minimum conditions and performance measures for local governments*. Kampala. (August).

MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2006), *District and urban councils Development planning guidelines – 2006*. Kampala: Ministry of Local Government. (July).

OCAYA, A.J., H.J. ODONGO & W. CWINYAAI (2006), *Report on training needs assessment of women council in Nebbi District Local Government.* AFARD and EDF-CSO CBP. (May).

OITAMONG, D. (1996), *Decentralisation in Nebbi District: A story of a frontline team*. Nebbi District Administration.

SNV (UGANDA) & DISTRICT PLANNING UNIT-NEBBI (1997), *Nebbi capacity building programme: Project Proposal*, December 1996 and *1998-2001 Programme Proposal*.

ASC BOOK PUBLICATIONS

Copies of all the publications listed below in the African Studies Collection and the earlier Research Reports Series may be ordered from:

African Studies Centre
Email: asc@ascleiden.nl
Tel: +31 (0)71 527 3490
Fax: +31 (0)71 527 3344

For prices, check the ASC website [www.ascleiden.nl] under Publications.

African Studies Collection

16 *Making decentralization work for women in Uganda*
Alfred Lakwo   (2009)

15 *Food security and coping mechanisms in marginal areas: The case of West Pokot, Kenya, 1920-1995*
Anne Kisaka Nangulu   (2009)

14 *'Beyond their age'. Coping of children and young people in child-headed households in South Africa*
Diana van Dijk   (2008)

13 *Poverty and inequality in urban Sudan. Policies, institutions and governance*
Muna A. Abdalla   (2008)

12 *Dilemmas of Development: Conflicts of interest and their resolutions in modernizing Africa*
Jon Abbink & André van Dokkum (eds)   (2008)

11 *Teaching peace, transforming conflict? Exploring participants' perceptions of the impact of informal peace education training in Uganda*
Anika May   (2008)

10 *Plantations, power and people. Two case studies of restructuring South Africa's forestry sector*
Alice Achieng Ojwang   (2008)

9 *Coming back from the bush. Gender, youth and reintegration in Northern Sierra Leone*
Janneke van Gog   (2008)

8   *How to win a football match in Cameroon. An anthropological study of Africa's most popular sport*
    Arnold Pannenborg   (2008)

7   *'Prendre le bic'.* Le Combat Spirituel *congolais et les transformations sociales*
    Julie Ndaya Tshiteku   (2008)

6   *Transnationalism, local development and social security. The functioning of support networks in rural Ghana*
    Mirjam Kabki   (2007)

5   *Tied to migrants: Transnational influences on the economy of Accra, Ghana*
    Lothar Smith   (2007)

4   *"Our way": Responding to the Dutch aid in the District Rural Development Programme of Bukoba, Tanzania*
    Adalbertus Kamanzi   (2007)

3   *Transition towards Jatropha biofuels in Tanzania? An analysis with Strategic Niche Management*
    Janske van Eijck   (2007)

2   *"Ask and you shall be given": Pentecostalism and the economic crisis in Cameroon*
    Robert Mbe Akoko   (2007)

1   *World and experiences of AIDS orphans in north central Namibia*
    Mienke van der Brug   (2007)

Research Reports

85   *Microfinance, rural livelihoods, and women's empowerment in Uganda*
     Alfred Lakwo   (2006)

84   *Trade liberalization and financial compensation. The BLNS states in the wake of the EU-South African trade and development agreement*
     Sam van der Staak   (2006)

83   *The rock art of Mwana wa Chentcherere II rock shelter, Malaŵi. A site-specific study of girls' initiation rock art*
     Leslie F. Zubieta   (2006)

82   *Bibliography on Islam in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa*
     Paul Schrijver   (2006)

81   *Bridging the urban-rural divide: Multi-spatial livelihoods in Nakuru town, Kenya*
     Samuel Ouma Owuor   (2006)

66 *Démocratisation en Afrique au sud du Sahara: Transitions et virage. Un bilan de la littérature (1995-1996)*
Klaas van Walraven & Céline Thiriot   (2002)

65 *Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa: Transitions and turning points. An overview of the literature (1995-1996)*
Klaas van Walraven & Céline Thiriot   (2002)

64 *Sharing a valley. The changing relations between agriculturalists and pastoralists in the Niger Valley of Benin*
Antje van Driel   (2001)

63 *Pathways to negotiate climate variability. Land use and institutional change in the Kaya region, Burkina Faso*
Mark Breusers   (2001)

62 *"We think of them." How Ghanaian migrants in Amsterdam assist relatives at home*
Daniel K. Arhinful   (2001)

61 *Pastoralists and markets. Livestock commercialization and food security in north-eastern Kenya*
Abdirizak A. Nunow   (2000)

60 *Rural development and agricultural policy in central western Zambia. The case of Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme*
K. Hailu   (2000)

59 *Secrecy and ambiguity. Home care for people living with HIV/AIDS in Ghana*
Maud Radstake   (2000)

58 *Urban agriculture in Africa: A bibliographical survey*
R.A. Obudho & Dick Foeken   (1999)

57 *Changing security. Livelihood in the Mandara Mountains in North Cameroon*
Annette van Andel   (1998)

56 *Catholic mission, colonial government and indigenous response in Kom (Cameroon*
Jacqueline de Vries   (1998)

55 *Eritreo-Ethiopian studies in society and history: 1960-1995. A supplementary bibliography*
Jan Abbink   (1996)

54 *Commodity auctions in Tropical Africa. A survey of the African tea, tobacco and coffee auctions*
John Houtkamp & Laurens van der Laan   (1993)

53 *Land and labour in Myjikenda agriculture, Kenya, 1850-1985*
Henk Waaijenberg   (1993)